Contents

Rule 1.1 Competence
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall not intentionally, recklessly, with gross negligence, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.

(b) For purposes of this rule, "competence" in any legal service shall mean to apply the (i) learning and skill, and (ii) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably* necessary for the performance of such service.

(c) If a lawyer does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal services are undertaken, the lawyer nonetheless may provide competent representation by (i) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer whom the lawyer reasonably believes* to be competent, (ii) acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required, or (iii) referring the matter to another lawyer whom the lawyer reasonably believes* to be competent.

(d) In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required if referral to, or association or consultation with, another lawyer would be impractical. Assistance in an emergency must be limited to that reasonably* necessary in the circumstances.

Comment

[1] This rule addresses only a lawyer's responsibility for his or her own professional competence. See rules 5.1 and 5.3 with respect to a lawyer's disciplinary responsibility for supervising subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers.

[2] See rule 1.3 with respect to a lawyer's duty to act with reasonable* diligence.

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.1
(Former Rule 3-110)
Competence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") evaluated current rule 3-110 (Failing to Act Competently) in accordance with the Commission Charter, including consideration of the national standard of the ABA counterpart, Model Rule 1.1 (Competence). The result of the Commission's evaluation is proposed rule 1.1 (Competence).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

The main issue considered when drafting proposed rule 1.1 was whether the rule should be revised to delete the longstanding California standard prohibiting intentional, reckless or repeated acts of incompetence in order to substitute a standard like Model Rule 1.1 which states affirmatively that a lawyer must provide competent representation to a client. The Commission is recommending that the current California standard be retained as this is consistent with applicable Supreme Court precedent that has been repeatedly applied in State Bar Court disciplinary proceedings.

In *Lewis v. State Bar* (1981) 28 Cal.3d 683, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a lawyer's single act of ordinary negligence does not suggest that the lawyer is unfit to practice law, and that the discipline system should not be burdened with conduct that is best addressed as a civil issue: "This court has long recognized the problems inherent in using disciplinary proceedings to punish attorneys for negligence." In *In Matter of Torres* (Rev. Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 138, 149, the State Bar Review Department emphasized: "We have repeatedly held that negligent legal representation, even that amounting to legal malpractice, does not establish a [competence] rule 3-110(A) violation." It is important to note that under California's approach a lawyer's single act of gross negligence is not given a free pass. The Commission is recommending that paragraph (a) of the proposed rule be amended to include an explicit reference to gross negligence. In addition, gross negligence might also be regarded as an act constituting moral turpitude (See Business and Professions Code § 6106 and proposed rule 8.4).

Although the essential prohibition of the current rule is retained, proposed rule 1.1 includes three substantive changes. First, the concept of "diligence" as a component in the definition of competence has been deleted. The Commission is recommending a separate rule on a lawyer's duty of diligence consistent with the approach used in most jurisdictions (see the executive summary of proposed rule 1.3 (Diligence)). A new comment in proposed rule 1.1, Comment [2], would cross reference rule 1.3 to alert lawyers to this change. A corresponding comment in proposed rule 1.3 cross references rule 1.1.

Second, in paragraph (c), in situations where a lawyer lacks sufficient learning and skill to handle a client's case or matter, the Commission is recommending the addition of an option for the lawyer to refer a matter to another attorney whom the lawyer reasonably believes is competent.

Third, the Commission is recommending deletion of the existing Discussion paragraph that provides case citations addressing a lawyer's supervision obligations. Rather than relying on case citations, the Commission is recommending three new separate rules on supervision (see

the executive summaries of proposed rules 5.1 (Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers), 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer) and 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants). This is consistent with the approach to the duty of supervision in most jurisdictions.

Post-Public Comment Revisions

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 1.1 at its November 17, 2017 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as submitted by the State Bar to be effective November 1, 2018.

Rule 1.1 ~~3-110 Failing to Act Competently~~Competence
(Redline Comparison to the California Rule Operative Until October 31, 2018)

(~~A~~a) A ~~member~~lawyer shall not intentionally, recklessly, with gross negligence, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.

(~~B~~b) For purposes of this rule, "competence" in any legal service shall mean to apply the ~~1) diligence, 2~~(i) learning and skill, and ~~3~~(ii) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably* necessary for the performance of such service.

(~~C~~c) If a ~~member~~lawyer does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal ~~service is~~services are undertaken, the ~~member may~~lawyer nonetheless ~~perform such services competently~~may provide competent representation by ~~1~~(i) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer whom the lawyer reasonably ~~believed~~believes* to be competent, ~~or 2~~(ii) ~~by~~ acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required, or (iii) referring the matter to another lawyer whom the lawyer reasonably believes* to be competent.

(d) In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required ~~where~~if referral to, or association or consultation with, another lawyer would be impractical. ~~Even~~ Assistance in an emergency~~, however, assistance should~~ must be limited to that reasonably* necessary in the circumstances.

~~Discussion~~Comment

~~The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents. (See, e.g., *Waysman v. State Bar* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 452; *Trousil v. State Bar* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 342 [211 Cal.Rptr. 525]; *Palomo v. State Bar* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785 [205 Cal.Rptr. 834]; *Crane v. State Bar* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 122; *Black v. State Bar* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 692 [103 Cal.Rptr. 288; 499 P.2d 968]; *Vaughn v. State Bar* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 847, 857-858 [100 Cal.Rptr. 713; 494 P.2d 1257]; *Moore v. State Bar* (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 81 [41 Cal.Rptr. 161; 396 P.2d 577].)~~

[1] This rule addresses only a lawyer's responsibility for his or her own professional competence. See rules 5.1 and 5.3 with respect to a lawyer's disciplinary responsibility for supervising subordinate lawyers and nonlawyers.

[2] See rule 1.3 with respect to a lawyer's duty to act with reasonable* diligence.

Rule 1.4 Communication with Clients
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which disclosure or the client's informed consent* is required by these rules or the State Bar Act;

(2) reasonably* consult with the client about the means by which to accomplish the client's objectives in the representation;

(3) keep the client reasonably* informed about significant developments relating to the representation, including promptly complying with reasonable* requests for information and copies of significant documents when necessary to keep the client so informed; and

(4) advise the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows* that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably* necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

(c) A lawyer may delay transmission of information to a client if the lawyer reasonably believes* that the client would be likely to react in a way that may cause imminent harm to the client or others.

(d) A lawyer's obligation under this rule to provide information and documents is subject to any applicable protective order, non-disclosure agreement, or limitation under statutory or decisional law.

Comment

[1] A lawyer will not be subject to discipline under paragraph (a)(3) of this rule for failing to communicate insignificant or irrelevant information. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (m).) Whether a particular development is significant will generally depend on the surrounding facts and circumstances.

[2] A lawyer may comply with paragraph (a)(3) by providing to the client copies of significant documents by electronic or other means. This rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking recovery of the lawyer's expense in any subsequent legal proceeding.

[3] Paragraph (c) applies during a representation and does not alter the obligations applicable at termination of a representation. (See rule 1.16(e)(1).)

[4] This rule is not intended to create, augment, diminish, or eliminate any application of the work product rule. The obligation of the lawyer to provide work product to the client shall be governed by relevant statutory and decisional law.

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.4
(Former Rule 3-500)
Communication with Clients

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") evaluated current rule 3-500 (Communication) in accordance with the Commission Charter, including consideration of the national standard of the ABA counterpart, Model Rule 1.4 (Communications). The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rules. The result of this evaluation is proposed rule 1.4 (Communication with Clients).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

Proposed rule 1.4 is generally consistent with current rule 3-500 but has added clarifying language from ABA Model Rule 1.4 which has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions. This language is intended to enhance public protection by more clearly stating a lawyer's obligations to clients with regard to communication.

Paragraph (a)(1) provides a duty to inform clients when written disclosure or informed consent is required.

Paragraph (a)(2) provides a duty to discuss the means by which to accomplish a client's representation objectives.

Paragraph (a)(3) most closely resembles current rule 3-500 and provides a duty to keep the client reasonably informed about significant developments relating to the representation, including providing access to significant documents.

Paragraph (a)(4) requires a lawyer to advise the client about any ethical limitations the lawyer faces when a client expects assistance barred by the rules or the law.

Paragraph (b) provides a duty to sufficiently explain a matter to a client so that the client can make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Paragraph (c) permits a lawyer to delay transmission of information to the client if doing so would prevent a client from harming himself or others.

Paragraph (d) provides that a lawyer's obligation to provide information or documents is subject to any applicable order, agreement, or law.

Comment [1] provides that a lawyer will not be disciplined for failing to disclose insignificant or irrelevant information to a client.

Comment [2] provides that a lawyer may provide documents or information electronically and that the rule does not prevent the attorney from recouping expenses for such in a subsequent legal proceeding.

Comment [3] provides that paragraph (c) applies only during the representation and does not alter a lawyer's duties at the termination of the representation.

Comment [4] provides that the rule does not affect a lawyer's obligation to provide work product to a client.

Post-Public Comment Revisions

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission made a clarifying change in paragraph (d) to include a reference to "decisional law" in order to carry forward the concept found in the discussion section of the current rule 3-500, that a lawyer need not provide information to the client where there is an exception permitted by decisional or statutory law. A non-substantive stylistic change was also made.

With these changes, the Commission voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 1.4 at its November 17, 2016 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as modified by the Court to be effective November 1, 2018. In subparagraph (a)(1), an unnecessary comma was deleted.

Rule ~~3-500~~1.4 Communication with Clients
(Redline Comparison to the California Rule Operative Until October 31, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which disclosure or the client's informed consent* is required by these rules or the State Bar Act;

(2) reasonably* consult with the client about the means by which to accomplish the client's objectives in the representation;

(3) ~~A member shall~~ keep ~~a~~the client reasonably* informed about significant developments relating to the ~~employment or~~ representation, including promptly complying with reasonable* requests for information and copies of significant documents when necessary to keep the client so informed~~.~~; and

(4) advise the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows* that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably* necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

(c) A lawyer may delay transmission of information to a client if the lawyer reasonably believes* that the client would be likely to react in a way that may cause imminent harm to the client or others.

(d) A lawyer's obligation under this rule to provide information and documents is subject to any applicable protective order, non-disclosure agreement, or limitation under statutory or decisional law.

Comment~~Discussion~~

~~Rule 3-500 is not intended to change a member's duties to his or her clients. It is intended to make clear that, while a client must be informed of significant developments in the matter, a member will not be disciplined~~[1] A lawyer will not be subject to discipline under paragraph (a)(3) of this rule for failing to communicate insignificant or irrelevant information. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (m).) Whether a particular development is significant will generally depend on the surrounding facts and circumstances.

[2] A lawyer may comply with paragraph (a)(3) by providing to the client copies of significant documents by electronic or other means. This rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking recovery of the lawyer's expense in any subsequent legal proceeding.

~~A member may contract with the client in their employment agreement that the client assumes responsibility for the cost of copying significant documents. This rule is not intended to prohibit a claim for the recovery of the member's expense in any subsequent legal proceeding.~~

[3] Paragraph (c) applies during a representation and does not alter the obligations applicable at termination of a representation. (See rule 1.16(e)(1).)

~~Rule 3-500~~[4] This rule is not intended to create, augment, diminish, or eliminate any application of the work product rule. The obligation of the ~~member~~lawyer to provide work product to the client shall be governed by relevant statutory and decisional law. ~~Additionally, this rule is not intended to apply to any document or correspondence that is subject to a protective order or non-disclosure agreement, or to override applicable statutory or decisional law requiring that certain information not be provided to criminal defendants who are clients of the member.~~

Rule 1.6 Confidential Information of a Client
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information protected from disclosure by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) unless the client gives informed consent,* or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b) of this rule.

(b) A lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes* the disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes* is likely to result in death of, or substantial* bodily harm to, an individual, as provided in paragraph (c).

(c) Before revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) to prevent a criminal act as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall, if reasonable* under the circumstances:

(1) make a good faith effort to persuade the client: (i) not to commit or to continue the criminal act; or (ii) to pursue a course of conduct that will prevent the threatened death or substantial* bodily harm; or do both (i) and (ii); and

(2) inform the client, at an appropriate time, of the lawyer's ability or decision to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as provided in paragraph (b).

(d) In revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as provided in paragraph (b), the lawyer's disclosure must be no more than is necessary to prevent the criminal act, given the information known* to the lawyer at the time of the disclosure.

(e) A lawyer who does not reveal information permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this rule.

Comment

Duty of confidentiality

[1] Paragraph (a) relates to a lawyer's obligations under Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), which provides it is a duty of a lawyer: "To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." A lawyer's duty to preserve the confidentiality of client information involves public policies of paramount importance. (*In Re Jordan* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575, 580 [116 Cal.Rptr. 371].) Preserving the confidentiality of client information contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the lawyer-client relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or detrimental subjects. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to

refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know* that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. Paragraph (a) thus recognizes a fundamental principle in the lawyer-client relationship, that, in the absence of the client's informed consent,* a lawyer must not reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). (See, e.g., *Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 934, 945 [155 Cal.Rptr.393].)

Lawyer-client confidentiality encompasses the lawyer-client privilege, the work-product doctrine and ethical standards of confidentiality

[2] The principle of lawyer-client confidentiality applies to information a lawyer acquires by virtue of the representation, whatever its source, and encompasses matters communicated in confidence by the client, and therefore protected by the lawyer-client privilege, matters protected by the work product doctrine, and matters protected under ethical standards of confidentiality, all as established in law, rule and policy. (See *In the Matter of Johnson* (Rev. Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179; *Goldstein v. Lees* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621 [120 Cal.Rptr. 253].) The lawyer-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or be otherwise compelled to produce evidence concerning a client. A lawyer's ethical duty of confidentiality is not so limited in its scope of protection for the lawyer-client relationship of trust and prevents a lawyer from revealing the client's information even when not subjected to such compulsion. Thus, a lawyer may not reveal such information except with the informed consent* of the client or as authorized or required by the State Bar Act, these rules, or other law.

Narrow exception to duty of confidentiality under this rule

[3] Notwithstanding the important public policies promoted by lawyers adhering to the core duty of confidentiality, the overriding value of life permits disclosures otherwise prohibited by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). Paragraph (b) is based on Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(2), which narrowly permits a lawyer to disclose information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) even without client consent. Evidence Code section 956.5, which relates to the evidentiary lawyer-client privilege, sets forth a similar express exception. Although a lawyer is not permitted to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) concerning a client's past, completed criminal acts, the policy favoring the preservation of human life that underlies this exception to the duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary privilege permits disclosure to prevent a future or ongoing criminal act.

Lawyer not subject to discipline for revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted under this rule

[4] Paragraph (b) reflects a balancing between the interests of preserving client confidentiality and of preventing a criminal act that a lawyer reasonably believes* is

likely to result in death or substantial* bodily harm to an individual. A lawyer who reveals information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted under this rule is not subject to discipline.

No duty to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1)

[5] Neither Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(2) nor paragraph (b) imposes an affirmative obligation on a lawyer to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) in order to prevent harm. A lawyer may decide not to reveal such information. Whether a lawyer chooses to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted under this rule is a matter for the individual lawyer to decide, based on all the facts and circumstances, such as those discussed in Comment [6] of this rule.

Whether to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted under paragraph (b)

[6] Disclosure permitted under paragraph (b) is ordinarily a last resort, when no other available action is reasonably* likely to prevent the criminal act. Prior to revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted by paragraph (b), the lawyer must, if reasonable* under the circumstances, make a good faith effort to persuade the client to take steps to avoid the criminal act or threatened harm. Among the factors to be considered in determining whether to disclose information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) are the following:

(1) the amount of time that the lawyer has to make a decision about disclosure;

(2) whether the client or a third-party has made similar threats before and whether they have ever acted or attempted to act upon them;

(3) whether the lawyer believes* the lawyer's efforts to persuade the client or a third person* not to engage in the criminal conduct have or have not been successful;

(4) the extent of adverse effect to the client's rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and analogous rights and privacy rights under Article I of the Constitution of the State of California that may result from disclosure contemplated by the lawyer;

(5) the extent of other adverse effects to the client that may result from disclosure contemplated by the lawyer; and

(6) the nature and extent of information that must be disclosed to prevent the criminal act or threatened harm.

A lawyer may also consider whether the prospective harm to the victim or victims is imminent in deciding whether to disclose the information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). However, the imminence of the harm is not a prerequisite to disclosure and a lawyer may disclose the information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) without waiting until immediately before the harm is likely to occur.

Whether to counsel client or third person not to commit a criminal act reasonably* likely to result in death or substantial* bodily harm*

[7] Paragraph (c)(1) provides that before a lawyer may reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), the lawyer must, if reasonable* under the circumstances, make a good faith effort to persuade the client not to commit or to continue the criminal act, or to persuade the client to otherwise pursue a course of conduct that will prevent the threatened death or substantial* bodily harm, including persuading the client to take action to prevent a third person* from committing or continuing a criminal act. If necessary, the client may be persuaded to do both. The interests protected by such counseling are the client's interests in limiting disclosure of information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e) and in taking responsible action to deal with situations attributable to the client. If a client, whether in response to the lawyer's counseling or otherwise, takes corrective action — such as by ceasing the client's own criminal act or by dissuading a third person* from committing or continuing a criminal act before harm is caused — the option for permissive disclosure by the lawyer would cease because the threat posed by the criminal act would no longer be present. When the actor is a nonclient or when the act is deliberate or malicious, the lawyer who contemplates making adverse disclosure of protected information may reasonably* conclude that the compelling interests of the lawyer or others in their own personal safety preclude personal contact with the actor. Before counseling an actor who is a nonclient, the lawyer should, if reasonable* under the circumstances, first advise the client of the lawyer's intended course of action. If a client or another person* has already acted but the intended harm has not yet occurred, the lawyer should consider, if reasonable* under the circumstances, efforts to persuade the client or third person* to warn the victim or consider other appropriate action to prevent the harm. Even when the lawyer has concluded that paragraph (b) does not permit the lawyer to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), the lawyer nevertheless is permitted to counsel the client as to why it may be in the client's best interest to consent to the attorney's disclosure of that information.

Disclosure of information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) must be no more than is reasonably necessary to prevent the criminal act*

[8] Paragraph (d) requires that disclosure of information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted by paragraph (b), when made, must be no more extensive than is necessary to prevent the criminal act. Disclosure should allow access to the information to only those persons* who the lawyer reasonably believes* can act to prevent the harm. Under some circumstances, a lawyer may determine that the best course to pursue is to make an anonymous disclosure to

the potential victim or relevant law-enforcement authorities. What particular measures are reasonable* depends on the circumstances known* to the lawyer. Relevant circumstances include the time available, whether the victim might be unaware of the threat, the lawyer's prior course of dealings with the client, and the extent of the adverse effect on the client that may result from the disclosure contemplated by the lawyer.

Informing client pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of lawyer's ability or decision to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1)

[9] A lawyer is required to keep a client reasonably* informed about significant developments regarding the representation. (See rule 1.4; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (m).) Paragraph (c)(2), however, recognizes that under certain circumstances, informing a client of the lawyer's ability or decision to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted in paragraph (b) would likely increase the risk of death or substantial* bodily harm, not only to the originally-intended victims of the criminal act, but also to the client or members of the client's family, or to the lawyer or the lawyer's family or associates. Therefore, paragraph (c)(2) requires a lawyer to inform the client of the lawyer's ability or decision to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted in paragraph (b) only if it is reasonable* to do so under the circumstances. Paragraph (c)(2) further recognizes that the appropriate time for the lawyer to inform the client may vary depending upon the circumstances. (See Comment [10] of this rule.) Among the factors to be considered in determining an appropriate time, if any, to inform a client are:

(1) whether the client is an experienced user of legal services;

(2) the frequency of the lawyer's contact with the client;

(3) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(4) whether the lawyer and client have discussed the lawyer's duty of confidentiality or any exceptions to that duty;

(5) the likelihood that the client's matter will involve information within paragraph (b);

(6) the lawyer's belief,* if applicable, that so informing the client is likely to increase the likelihood that a criminal act likely to result in the death of, or substantial* bodily harm to, an individual; and

(7) the lawyer's belief,* if applicable, that good faith efforts to persuade a client not to act on a threat have failed.

Avoiding a chilling effect on the lawyer-client relationship

[10] The foregoing flexible approach to the lawyer's informing a client of his or her ability or decision to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code

section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) recognizes the concern that informing a client about limits on confidentiality may have a chilling effect on client communication. (See Comment [1].) To avoid that chilling effect, one lawyer may choose to inform the client of the lawyer's ability to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as early as the outset of the representation, while another lawyer may choose to inform a client only at a point when that client has imparted information that comes within paragraph (b), or even choose not to inform a client until such time as the lawyer attempts to counsel the client as contemplated in Comment [7]. In each situation, the lawyer will have satisfied the lawyer's obligation under paragraph (c)(2), and will not be subject to discipline.

Informing client that disclosure has been made; termination of the lawyer-client relationship

[11] When a lawyer has revealed information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted in paragraph (b), in all but extraordinary cases the relationship between lawyer and client that is based on trust and confidence will have deteriorated so as to make the lawyer's representation of the client impossible. Therefore, when the relationship has deteriorated because of the lawyer's disclosure, the lawyer is required to seek to withdraw from the representation, unless the client has given informed consent* to the lawyer's continued representation. The lawyer normally must inform the client of the fact of the lawyer's disclosure. If the lawyer has a compelling interest in not informing the client, such as to protect the lawyer, the lawyer's family or a third person* from the risk of death or substantial* bodily harm, the lawyer must withdraw from the representation. (See rule 1.16.)

Other consequences of the lawyer's disclosure

[12] Depending upon the circumstances of a lawyer's disclosure of information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted by this rule, there may be other important issues that a lawyer must address. For example, a lawyer who is likely to testify as a witness in a matter involving a client must comply with rule 3.7. Similarly, the lawyer must also consider his or her duties of loyalty and competence. (See rules 1.7 and 1.1.)

Other exceptions to confidentiality under California law

[13] This rule is not intended to augment, diminish, or preclude any other exceptions to the duty to preserve information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) recognized under California law.

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6
(Former Rule 3-100)
Confidential Information of a Client

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") evaluated current rule 3-100 (Confidential Information of a Client) in accordance with the Commission Charter. In addition, the Commission considered the national standard of ABA Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information). The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, case law, and ethics opinions relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rule. The result of this evaluation is proposed rule 1.6 (Confidential Information of a Client).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

Proposed rule 1.6 is nearly identical to current rule 3-100 but has been renumbered to correspond to the ABA Model Rules. California's treatment of lawyer-client confidentiality is unique. Unlike every other jurisdiction in the country, whose statement of a lawyer's duty of confidentiality is contained in a rule of professional conduct that has been adopted by the jurisdiction's highest court, California's duty of confidentiality is contained in a statutory provision passed by the California legislature and enacted in 1872. The history of current rule 3-100 provides insight into proposed rule 1.6. First, because current rule 3-100 is an outgrowth of a legislative amendment to Business and Professions Code § 6068(e), the rule was never intended to function solely as a disciplinary rule, but was instead drafted with the intent of providing guidance to California lawyers on how to proceed when confronted with circumstances addressed in the sole statutory exception to the rule. Understanding this intent helps explain the relatively large number of lengthy comments that this proposed rule contains. Second, the history further suggests that any substantive amendment, including concepts contained in the ABA Model Rules, would require amendment of Business and Professions Code § 6068(e). This is especially true of any express exceptions to the duty of confidentiality and is one of the principal reasons why proposed rule 1.6 contains no major deviations from current rule 3-100.

Paragraph (a)(1) carries forward the language of current rule 3-100 and provides a duty to protect client confidential information to the extent mandated by Business and Professions Code § 6068(e)(1) unless the client gives informed consent or as provided by paragraph (b).

Paragraph (b) carries forward the language of current rule 3-100 and provides that a lawyer may reveal confidential information to the extent necessary to prevent a criminal act resulting in serious bodily injury or death.

Paragraph (c) carries forward the language of current rule 3-100 and provides the steps that a lawyer must take, if reasonable, before disclosing client confidential information.

Paragraph (d) carries forward the language of current rule 3-100 and provides that a lawyer may not disclose any more confidential information than is necessary to prevent a criminal act resulting in serious bodily injury or death.

Paragraph (e) carries forward the language of current rule 3-100 and provides that a lawyer does not violate the rule by declining to reveal confidential information permitted by paragraph (b).

Comment [1] provides context for the rule and explains the policy underlying the duty of confidentiality. The term "detrimental subjects" has been substituted for the phrase "legally damaging subject matter" in current rule 3-100. The language is derived from California ethics opinions that have traditionally understood the term "secrets" in Business and Professions Code § 6068(e)(1) to mean information that the client has requested be kept confidential or which would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client.

Comment [2] provides the scope of the information protected under Business and Professions Code § 6068(e)(1). It clarifies that the duty of confidentiality is broader than the lawyer-client privilege and also includes information acquired by virtue of the representation, regardless of the source, and information protected under the work product doctrine.

Comment [3] explains that the rule provides a narrow exception to the duty of confidentiality derived from Business and Professions Code § 6068(e)(2). Moreover, by distinguishing between "past, completed" and "future or ongoing" criminal acts, the comment provides important guidance to lawyers regarding the scope of the exception.

Comment [4] is a counterpoint to paragraph (e) and provides that a lawyer is not subject to discipline if the lawyer discloses confidential information in compliance with the provisions provided in paragraph (c). The comment also provides the rationale for the provision, i.e., the balance between protecting client confidential information and the prevention of a criminal act resulting in serious bodily injury or death.

Comment [5] provides that there is no duty to disclose confidential information and that the decision to disclose rests solely with the lawyer.

Comment [6] provides critical guidance to lawyers in the form of a list of non-exclusive factors a lawyer should balance in deciding whether to disclose confidential information in order to prevent a criminal act resulting in serious bodily injury or death. The comment further clarifies that the threatened harm need not be imminent for the exception to apply.

Comment [7] provides critical guidance to a lawyer deciding whether and when to counsel either a client or a third person not to commit or continue a criminal act resulting in serious bodily injury or death as required under paragraph (c)(1).

Comment [8] clarifies what is meant by the limiting clause in paragraph (a), "to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary." Because of the numerous ways in which a lawyer may disclose confidential information, the comment provides guidance, including examples of relevant circumstances that a lawyer might consider in determining the extent of the permitted disclosure under the circumstances.

Comment [9] requires a lawyer, if reasonable under the circumstances, to inform the client of the lawyer's ability or decision to disclose confidential information to prevent a criminal act resulting in serious bodily injury or death. The comment provides critical guidance by setting forth seven non-exclusive factors to assist a lawyer in determining when such a disclosure should be made.

Comment [10] further elaborates upon paragraph (c)(2)'s requirement of informing a client of the ability or decision to disclose. The comment explains that there is no specific time when the disclosure must be made and provides a range of possibilities.

Comment [11] provides that disclosure of confidential information permitted by paragraph (b) will likely result in a deterioration of the lawyer-client relationship such that withdrawal may be necessary.

Comment [12] provides that other consequences may arise from disclosure permitted by paragraph (b) and identifies other rules a lawyer should consult in determining the lawyer's course of action.

Comment [13] addresses the fact that the rule does not comprehensively address a lawyer's duty of confidentiality and puts the lawyer on notice that there may be other obligations or exceptions not addressed in the rule, none of which the rule is designed to supersede.

Post-Public Comment Revisions

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission added "informed" consent in Comment [2] for consistency to paragraph (a) and deleted the term "employment or" in Comment [9] as redundant to the concept of "representation." The Commission voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 1.6 at its November 17, 2016 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as submitted by the State Bar to be effective November 1, 2018. But see, stylistic changes made by the Court in Comments [8] and [9] and, in Comment [12], the addition of a period after the word "rule" and before the "3.7." The addition of the period in Comment [12] appears to be an inadvertent copyediting error.

Supreme Court Action (September 26, 2018)

Subsequently, the Board adopted staff recommended "clean-up" revisions to various rules, including this rule. All of these changes were non-substantive and, for example, implemented copy editing corrections to style and punctuation. The Supreme Court approved the "clean-up" revisions operative November 1, 2018 by order dated September 26, 2018.

Rule 1.6 [3-100] Confidential Information of a Client
(Redline Comparison to the California Rule Operative Until October 31, 2018)

(Aa) A memberlawyer shall not reveal information protected from disclosure by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) withoutunless the client gives informed consent of the client,* or as provided inthe disclosure is permitted by paragraph (Bb) of this rule.

(Bb) A memberlawyer may, but is not required to, reveal confidential information relating to the representation of a client to theprotected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) to the extent that the memberlawyer reasonably believes* the disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the memberlawyer reasonably believes* is likely to result in death of, or substantial* bodily harm to, an individual, as provided in paragraph (c).

(Cc) Before revealing confidential information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) to prevent a criminal act as provided in paragraph (Bb), a memberlawyer shall, if reasonable* under the circumstances:

(1) make a good faith effort to persuade the client: (i) not to commit or to continue the criminal act or (ii) to pursue a course of conduct that will prevent the threatened death or substantial* bodily harm; or do both (i) and (ii); and

(2) inform the client, at an appropriate time, of the member'slawyer's ability or decision to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as provided in paragraph (Bb).

(Dd) In revealing confidential information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as provided in paragraph (Bb), the member'slawyer's disclosure must be no more than is necessary to prevent the criminal act, given the information known* to the memberlawyer at the time of the disclosure.

(Ee) A memberlawyer who does not reveal information permitted by paragraph (Bb) does not violate this rule.

DiscussionComment

Duty of confidentiality

[1] Duty of confidentiality. Paragraph (Aa) relates to a member'slawyer's obligations under Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), which provides it is a duty of a memberlawyer: "To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." A member'slawyer's duty to preserve the confidentiality of client information involves public policies of paramount importance. (*In Re Jordan* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575, 580 [116 Cal.Rptr. 371].)

Preserving the confidentiality of client information contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the ~~client-lawyer~~lawyer-client relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or ~~legally damaging subject matter~~detrimental subjects. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. Paragraph (~~A~~a) thus recognizes a fundamental principle in the ~~client-lawyer~~lawyer-client relationship, that, in the absence of the ~~client's~~client's informed consent,* a ~~member~~lawyer must not reveal information ~~relating to the representation~~protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). (See, e.g., *Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court* (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 934, 945 [155 Cal.Rptr.393].)

~~[2]~~ ~~Client-lawyer~~*Lawyer-client confidentiality encompasses the ~~attorney-client~~lawyer-client privilege, the work-product doctrine and ethical standards of confidentiality*

[2] The principle of ~~client-lawyer~~lawyer-client confidentiality applies to information ~~relating to~~a lawyer acquires by virtue of the representation, whatever its source, and encompasses matters communicated in confidence by the client, and therefore protected by the ~~attorney-client~~lawyer-client privilege, matters protected by the work product doctrine, and matters protected under ethical standards of confidentiality, all as established in law, rule and policy. (See *In the Matter of Johnson* (Rev. Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179; *Goldstein v. Lees* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621 [120 Cal.Rptr. 253].) The ~~attorney-client~~lawyer-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a ~~member~~lawyer may be called as a witness or be otherwise compelled to produce evidence concerning a client. A ~~member's~~lawyer's ethical duty of confidentiality is not so limited in its scope of protection for the ~~client-lawyer~~lawyer-client relationship of trust and prevents a ~~member~~lawyer from revealing the ~~client's confidential~~client's information even when not ~~confronted with~~subjected to such compulsion. Thus, a ~~member~~lawyer may not reveal such information except with the informed consent* of the client or as authorized or required by the State Bar Act, these rules, or other law.

Narrow exception to duty of confidentiality under this rule

[3] ~~Narrow exception to duty of confidentiality under this Rule.~~ Notwithstanding the important public policies promoted by lawyers adhering to the core duty of confidentiality, the overriding value of life permits disclosures otherwise prohibited ~~under~~by Business ~~&~~and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). Paragraph (~~B), which restates~~b) is based on Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(2), ~~identifies a narrow confidentiality exception, absent the client's informed consent, when a member reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that the member reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to an individual~~which narrowly permits a lawyer to disclose information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068,

subdivision (e)(1) even without client consent. Evidence Code section 956.5, which relates to the evidentiary ~~attorney-client~~lawyer-client privilege, sets forth a similar express exception. Although a ~~member~~lawyer is not permitted to reveal ~~confidential~~ information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) concerning a ~~client's~~client's past, completed criminal acts, the policy favoring the preservation of human life that underlies this exception to the duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary privilege permits disclosure to prevent a future or ongoing criminal act.

~~[4] Member~~*Lawyer not subject to discipline for revealing ~~confidential~~ information ~~as permitted under this Rule. Rule 3-100, which restates~~protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(~~2~~1)~~,~~ as permitted under this rule*

[4] Paragraph (b) reflects a balancing between the interests of preserving client confidentiality and of preventing a criminal act that a ~~member~~lawyer reasonably believes* is likely to result in death or substantial* bodily harm to an individual. A ~~member~~lawyer who reveals information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted under this rule is not subject to discipline.

No duty to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1)

[5] ~~No duty to reveal confidential information.~~ Neither Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(2) nor ~~this rule~~paragraph (b) imposes an affirmative obligation on a ~~member~~lawyer to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) in order to prevent harm. ~~(See rule 1-100(~~A~~).) A member~~ lawyer may decide not to reveal ~~confidential~~such information. Whether a ~~member~~lawyer chooses to reveal ~~confidential~~ information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted under this rule is a matter for the individual ~~member~~lawyer to decide, based on all the facts and circumstances, such as those discussed in ~~paragraph~~Comment [6] of this ~~discussion~~rule.

Whether to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted under paragraph (b)

[6] ~~Deciding to reveal confidential information as permitted under paragraph (B).~~ Disclosure permitted under paragraph (~~B~~b) is ordinarily a last resort, when no other available action is reasonably* likely to prevent the criminal act. Prior to revealing information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted ~~under~~by paragraph (~~B~~b), the ~~member~~lawyer must, if reasonable* under the circumstances, make a good faith effort to persuade the client to take steps to avoid the criminal act or threatened harm. Among the factors to be considered in determining whether to disclose ~~confidential~~ information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) are the following:

(1) the amount of time that the ~~member~~lawyer has to make a decision about disclosure;

(2) whether the client or a ~~third party~~third-party has made similar threats before and whether they have ever acted or attempted to act upon them;

(3) whether the ~~member~~lawyer believes* the ~~member's~~lawyer's efforts to persuade the client or a third person* not to engage in the criminal conduct have or have not been successful;

(4) the extent of adverse effect to the ~~client's~~client's rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and analogous rights and privacy rights under Article ~~1~~I of the Constitution of the State of California that may result from disclosure contemplated by the ~~member~~lawyer;

(5) the extent of other adverse effects to the client that may result from disclosure contemplated by the ~~member~~lawyer; and

(6) the nature and extent of information that must be disclosed to prevent the criminal act or threatened harm.

A ~~member~~lawyer may also consider whether the prospective harm to the victim or victims is imminent in deciding whether to disclose the ~~confidential~~ information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1). However, the imminence of the harm is not a prerequisite to disclosure and a ~~member~~lawyer may disclose the information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) without waiting until immediately before the harm is likely to occur.

~~[7]~~ ~~Counseling~~*Whether to counsel client or third person* not to commit a criminal act reasonably* likely to result in death ~~of~~or substantial* bodily harm*

[7] Paragraph (c) ~~Subparagraph(C)~~(1) provides that before a ~~member~~lawyer may reveal ~~confidential~~ information~~, the member~~ protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), the lawyer must, if reasonable* under the circumstances, make a good faith effort to persuade the client not to commit or to continue the criminal act, or to persuade the client to otherwise pursue a course of conduct that will prevent the threatened death or substantial* bodily harm, ~~or if~~including persuading the client to take action to prevent a third person* from committing or continuing a criminal act. If necessary, the client may be persuaded to do both. The interests protected by such counseling ~~is the client's interest~~are the client's interests in limiting disclosure of ~~confidential~~ information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e) and in taking responsible action to deal with situations attributable to the client. If a client, whether in response to the ~~member's~~lawyer's counseling or otherwise, takes corrective action - such as by ceasing the client's own criminal act or by dissuading a third person* from committing or continuing a criminal act before harm is caused - the option for permissive disclosure by the ~~member~~lawyer would cease ~~as~~because the threat posed by the criminal act would no longer be present. When the actor is a nonclient or when the act is deliberate or malicious, the ~~member~~lawyer who contemplates making adverse disclosure of ~~confidential~~protected information may

reasonably* conclude that the compelling interests of the ~~member~~lawyer or others in their own personal safety preclude personal contact with the actor. Before counseling an actor who is a nonclient, the ~~member~~lawyer should, if reasonable* under the circumstances, first advise the client of the ~~member's~~lawyer's intended course of action. If a client or another person* has already acted but the intended harm has not yet occurred, the ~~member~~lawyer should consider, if reasonable* under the circumstances, efforts to persuade the client or third person* to warn the victim or consider other appropriate action to prevent the harm. Even when the ~~member~~lawyer has concluded that paragraph (~~B~~b) does not permit the ~~member~~lawyer to reveal ~~confidential~~ information~~, the member~~ protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), the lawyer nevertheless is permitted to counsel the client as to why it may be in the ~~client's~~client's best interest to consent to the ~~attorney's~~attorney's disclosure of that information.

~~[8]~~ *Disclosure of ~~confidential~~ information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) must be no more than is reasonably* necessary to prevent the criminal act~~ Under paragraph (D),~~*

[8] Paragraph (d) requires that disclosure of ~~confidential~~ information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted by paragraph (b), when made, must be no more extensive than ~~the member reasonably believes~~is necessary to prevent the criminal act. Disclosure should allow access to the ~~confidential~~ information to only those persons* who the ~~member~~lawyer reasonably believes* can act to prevent the harm. Under some circumstances, a ~~member~~lawyer may determine that the best course to pursue is to make an anonymous disclosure to the potential victim or relevant law-enforcement authorities. What particular measures are reasonable* depends on the circumstances known* to the ~~member~~lawyer. Relevant circumstances include the time available, whether the victim might be unaware of the threat, the ~~member's~~lawyer's prior course of dealings with the client, and the extent of the adverse effect on the client that may result from the disclosure contemplated by the ~~member~~lawyer.

Informing client pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of lawyer's ability or decision to reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1)

[9] ~~Informing client of member's ability or decision to reveal confidential information under subparagraph (C)(2).~~ A ~~member~~lawyer is required to keep a client reasonably* informed about significant developments regarding the ~~employment or~~ representation. (See rule ~~Rule 3-500; Business and Professions~~1.4; Bus. & Prof. Code, ~~section~~§ 6068, ~~subdivision~~subd. (m).) Paragraph (~~C~~c)(2), however, recognizes that under certain circumstances, informing a client of the ~~member's~~lawyer's ability or decision to reveal ~~confidential~~ information ~~under~~protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted in paragraph (~~B~~b) would likely increase the risk of death or substantial* bodily harm, not only to the originally-intended victims of the criminal act, but also to the client or members of the ~~client's~~client's family, or to the ~~member~~lawyer or the ~~member's~~lawyer's family or associates. Therefore, paragraph (~~C~~c)(2) requires a ~~member~~lawyer to inform the client of the ~~member's~~lawyer's ability or decision to reveal ~~confidential~~ information ~~as~~

~~provided~~protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted in paragraph (~~B~~b) only if it is reasonable* to do so under the circumstances. Paragraph (~~C~~c)(2) further recognizes that the appropriate time for the ~~member~~lawyer to inform the client may vary depending upon the circumstances. (See ~~paragraph~~Comment [10] of this ~~discussion~~rule.) Among the factors to be considered in determining an appropriate time, if any, to inform a client are:

(1) whether the client is an experienced user of legal services;

(2) the frequency of the ~~member's~~lawyer's contact with the client;

(3) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(4) whether the ~~member~~lawyer and client have discussed the ~~member's~~lawyer's duty of confidentiality or any exceptions to that duty;

(5) the likelihood that the ~~client's~~client's matter will involve information within paragraph (~~B~~b);

(6) the ~~member's~~lawyer's belief,* if applicable, that so informing the client is likely to increase the likelihood that a criminal act likely to result in the death of, or substantial* bodily harm to, an individual; and

(7) the ~~member's~~lawyer's belief,* if applicable, that good faith efforts to persuade a client not to act on a threat have failed.

Avoiding a chilling effect on the lawyer-client relationship

[10] ~~Avoiding a chilling effect on the lawyer client relationship.~~ The foregoing flexible approach to the ~~member's~~lawyer's informing a client of his or her ability or decision to reveal ~~confidential~~ information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) recognizes the concern that informing a client about limits on confidentiality may have a chilling effect on client communication. (See ~~Discussion paragraph~~Comment [1].) To avoid that chilling effect, one ~~member~~lawyer may choose to inform the client of the ~~member's~~lawyer's ability to reveal information protected by section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as early as the outset of the representation, while another ~~member~~lawyer may choose to inform a client only at a point when that client has imparted information that ~~may fall under~~comes within paragraph (~~B~~b), or even choose not to inform a client until such time as the ~~member~~lawyer attempts to counsel the client as contemplated in ~~Discussion paragraph~~Comment [7]. In each situation, the ~~member will have discharged properly the requirement under subparagraph (C~~lawyer will have satisfied the lawyer's obligation under paragraph (c)(2), and will not be subject to discipline.

~~[11]~~ ~~*Informing client that disclosure has been made; termination of the lawyer-client relationship*~~

[11] When a ~~member~~lawyer has revealed ~~confidential~~ information ~~under~~protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) as permitted in paragraph (~~B~~b), in all but extraordinary cases the relationship between ~~member~~lawyer and client that is based on trust and confidence will have deteriorated so as to make the ~~member's~~lawyer's representation of the client impossible. Therefore, when the ~~member~~relationship has deteriorated because of the lawyer's disclosure, the lawyer is required to seek to withdraw from the representation ~~(see rule 3-700(B))~~, unless the ~~member is able to obtain the client's~~client has given informed consent* to the ~~member's~~lawyer's continued representation. The ~~member~~lawyer normally must inform the client of the fact of the ~~member's~~lawyer's disclosure ~~unless~~. If the ~~member~~lawyer has a compelling interest in not informing the client, such as to protect the ~~member~~lawyer, the ~~member's~~lawyer's family or a third person* from the risk of death or substantial* bodily harm~~.~~, the lawyer must withdraw from the representation. (See rule 1.16.)

Other consequences of the lawyer's disclosure

[12] ~~Other consequences of the member's disclosure.~~ Depending upon the circumstances of a ~~member's~~lawyer's disclosure of ~~confidential~~ information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) as permitted by this rule, there may be other important issues that a ~~member~~lawyer must address. For example, ~~if~~ a ~~member will be called~~lawyer who is likely to testify as a witness in ~~the client's matter, then rule 5-210 should be considered~~a matter involving a client must comply with rule 3.7. Similarly, the ~~member should~~lawyer must also consider his or her duties of loyalty and ~~competency (rule 3-110).~~competence. (See rules 1.7 and 1.1.)

Other exceptions to confidentiality under California law

[13] ~~Other exceptions to confidentiality under California law. Rule 3-100~~This rule is not intended to augment, diminish, or preclude ~~reliance upon,~~ any other exceptions to the duty to preserve ~~the confidentiality of client~~ information protected by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) recognized under California law.

Rule 3.2 Delay of Litigation
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial* purpose other than to delay or prolong the proceeding or to cause needless expense.

Comment

See rule 1.3 with respect to a lawyer's duty to act with reasonable* diligence and rule 3.1(b) with respect to a lawyer's representation of a defendant in a criminal proceeding. See also Business and Professions Code section 6128, subdivision (b).

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.2
(No Former Rule)
Delay of Litigation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") evaluated ABA Model Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation) for which there is no California counterpart. The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rule. The result of the Commission's evaluation is proposed rule 3.2 (Delay of Litigation).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

Proposed rule 3.2 in context within the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Proposed rule 3.2 is one of nine rules in Chapter 3 of the proposed Rules of Professional Conduct. The general content, framework and numbering scheme of this subset of the rules is based on Chapter 3 of the ABA Model Rules, which is entitled "Advocate". Model Rules Chapter 3 corresponds to Chapter 5 of the current California Rules, entitled "Advocacy and Representation." The following table shows the Chapter 3 Model Rules and the corresponding California Rules:

Model Rule	California Rule
3.1 (Meritorious Claims & Contentions)	3-200 (Prohibited Objectives of Employment)
3.2 (Expediting Litigation)	No Cal. rule counterpart.
3.3 (Candor Toward The Tribunal)	5-200 (Trial Conduct)
3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party & Counsel)	5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) 5-310 (Prohibited Contact with Witnesses) 5-200(E)
3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of Tribunal)	5-300 (Contact with Officials) 5-320 (Contact with Jurors)
3.6 (Trial Publicity)	5-120 (Trial Publicity)
3.7 (Lawyer As Witness)	5-210 (Member As Witness)
3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor)	5-110 (Performing the Duty of Member in Government Service) 5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) 5-120 (Trial Publicity)
3.9 (Advocate In Non-adjudicative Proceedings)	No Cal. rule counterpart.
3.10 (Threatening Criminal, Administrative, or Disciplinary Charges)	5-100 (Threatening Criminal, Administrative, or Disciplinary Charges)

The Commission is recommending the adoption of the Model Rule framework and numbering for this series of rules.

Proposed rule 3.2 prohibits a lawyer from using means that have no substantial purpose other than to delay or prolong a proceeding, or to cause needless expense. The Commission recommends adoption of New York Rule 3.2 (Delay of Litigation) instead of Model Rule 3.2

(Expediting Litigation),[1] which requires a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to "expedite" litigation, for several reasons. First, it has been widely recognized that delay tactics in litigation that greatly increase the cost for prosecuting a lawsuit threaten to limit access to the justice except for the most affluent. Second, prohibiting undue delay and needless expense are significant concerns in the litigation process that will help protect the administration of justice and the public. Such tactics are rightfully prohibited when they are used to frustrate an opposing party's ability or attempt to obtain a rightful remedy or redress. Third, establishing such prohibitory conduct as a minimum standard of professional responsibility is consistent with the first principle of the Commission's Charter: "The Commission's work should promote confidence in the legal profession and the administration of justice, and ensure adequate protection of the public." Finally, the Model Rule imposes an affirmative duty on a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to "expedite" litigation, which is a rule structure more appropriate for an aspirational statement. The proposed rule prohibits delay, which is more appropriate for a disciplinary rule, as is required by the Commission's Charter.

There is one comment to the rule. The comment provides cross-reference to other rules addressing unnecessary delay. The reference to proposed rule 1.3 informs the reader that attorneys are required to act with reasonable diligence and the reference to proposed rule 3.1(b) is intended to address concerns that rule 3.2, standing alone, would prohibit use of delaying tactics by a lawyer who represents a criminal defendant in a capital case. The reference to Business and Professions Code section 6128(b) informs the reader that attorneys are guilty of a misdemeanor who willfully delay their client's suit with a view to the lawyer's own gain.

National Background – Adoption of Model Rule 3.2

As California does not presently have a direct counterpart to Model Rule 3.2, this section reports on the adoption of the Model Rule in United States' jurisdictions.

Other than California, all jurisdictions but three have adopted some version of ABA Model Rule 3.2.

The ABA State Adoption Chart for ABA Model Rule 3.2 is posted at:

- http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_3_2.authcheckdam.pdf

Thirty-nine states have adopted Model Rule 3.2 verbatim. Two jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 3.2. Six jurisdictions have adopted a version of the rule that substantially diverges from Model Rule 3.2.

Post-Public Comment Revisions

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 3.2 at its November 17, 2016 meeting.

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[1] ABA Model Rule 3.2 states:

"A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as submitted by the State Bar to be effective November 1, 2018. But see, a change made by the Court to the Comment that conforms citation style to the California Style Manual.

Rule 3.2 ~~Expediting~~Delay of Litigation
(Redline Comparison to the ABA Model Rule)

~~A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.~~

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial* purpose other than to delay or prolong the proceeding or to cause needless expense.

Comment

See rule 1.3 with respect to a lawyer's duty to act with reasonable* diligence and rule 3.1(b) with respect to a lawyer's representation of a defendant in a criminal proceeding. See also Business and Professions Code section 6128, subdivision (b).

~~[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.~~

Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal*
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) knowingly* make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal* or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal* by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal* legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known* to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, or knowingly* misquote to a tribunal* the language of a book, statute, decision or other authority; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows* to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence, and the lawyer comes to know* of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable* remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal,* unless disclosure is prohibited by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes* is false.

(b) A lawyer who represents a client in a proceeding before a tribunal* and who knows* that a person* intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent* conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable* remedial measures to the extent permitted by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6.

(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding where notice to the opposing party in the proceeding is not required or given and the opposing party is not present, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal* of all material facts known* to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal* to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse to the position of the client.

Comment

[1] This rule governs the conduct of a lawyer in proceedings of a tribunal,* including ancillary proceedings such as a deposition conducted pursuant to a tribunal's* authority. See rule 1.0.1(m) for the definition of "tribunal."

[2] The prohibition in paragraph (a)(1) against making false statements of law or failing to correct a material misstatement of law includes citing as authority a decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed or declared unconstitutional, or failing to correct such a citation previously made to the tribunal* by the lawyer.

Legal Argument

[3] Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction may include legal authority outside the jurisdiction in which the tribunal* sits, such as a federal statute or case that is determinative of an issue in a state court proceeding or a Supreme Court decision that is binding on a lower court.

[4] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. If a lawyer knows* that a client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered and, if unsuccessful, must refuse to offer the false evidence. If a criminal defendant insists on testifying, and the lawyer knows* that the testimony will be false, the lawyer may offer the testimony in a narrative form if the lawyer made reasonable* efforts to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of conduct and the lawyer has sought permission from the court to withdraw as required by rule 1.16. (See, e.g., *People v. Johnson* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 608 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 805]; *People v. Jennings* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 899 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) The obligations of a lawyer under these rules and the State Bar Act are subordinate to applicable constitutional provisions.

Remedial Measures

[5] Reasonable* remedial measures under paragraphs (a)(3) and (b) refer to measures that are available under these rules and the State Bar Act, and which a reasonable* lawyer would consider appropriate under the circumstances to comply with the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal.* (See, e.g., rules 1.2.1, 1.4(a)(4), 1.16(a), 8.4; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6068, subd. (d), 6128.) Remedial measures also include explaining to the client the lawyer's obligations under this rule and, where applicable, the reasons for the lawyer's decision to seek permission from the tribunal* to withdraw, and remonstrating further with the client to take corrective action that would eliminate the need for the lawyer to withdraw. If the client is an organization, the lawyer should also consider the provisions of rule 1.13. Remedial measures do not include disclosure of client confidential information, which the lawyer is required to protect under Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6.

Duration of Obligation

[6] A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. A prosecutor may have obligations that go beyond the scope of this rule. (See, e.g., rule 3.8(f) and (g).)

Ex Parte Communications

[7] Paragraph (d) does not apply to ex parte communications that are not otherwise prohibited by law or the tribunal.*

Withdrawal

[8] A lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation. The lawyer may, however, be required by rule 1.16 to seek permission of the tribunal* to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this rule results in a deterioration of the lawyer-client relationship such that the lawyer can no longer competently and diligently represent the client, or where continued employment will result in a violation of these rules. A lawyer must comply with Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6 with respect to a request to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct.

[9] In addition to this rule, lawyers remain bound by Business and Professions Code sections 6068, subdivision (d) and 6106.

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3
(Former Rule 5-200)
Candor Toward The Tribunal

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") evaluated current rule 5-200 (Trial Conduct) in accordance with the Commission Charter. In addition, the Commission considered the national standard of ABA Model Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward The Tribunal). The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rules. The result of the Commission's evaluation is proposed rule 3.3 (Candor Toward The Tribunal).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

Proposed Rule 3.3 in context within the Rules of Professional Conduct. Proposed rule 3.3 is one of ten rules in Chapter 3 of the proposed Rules of Professional Conduct. The content, framework and numbering scheme of this subset of the rules is generally based on Chapter 3 of the ABA Model Rules, which is entitled "Advocate." Model Rules Chapter 3 corresponds to Chapter 5 of the current California rules, entitled "Advocacy and Representation." The following table shows the Chapter 3 Model Rules and the corresponding California rules:

Model Rule	California Rule
3.1 (Meritorious Claims & Contentions)	3-200 (Prohibited Objectives of Employment)
3.2 (Expediting Litigation)	No Cal. rule counterpart.
3.3 (Candor Toward The Tribunal)	5-200 (Trial Conduct)
3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party & Counsel)	5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) 5-310 (Prohibited Contact with Witnesses) 5-200(E)
3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of Tribunal)	5-300 (Contact with Officials) 5-320 (Contact with Jurors)
3.6 (Trial Publicity)	5-120 (Trial Publicity)
3.7 (Lawyer As Witness)	5-210 (Member As Witness)
3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor)	5-110 (Performing the Duty of Member in Government Service) 5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) 5-120 (Trial Publicity)
3.9 (Advocate In Non-adjudicative Proceedings)	No Cal. Rule counterpart.
3.10 (Threatening Criminal, Administrative, or Disciplinary Charges)	5-100 (Threatening Criminal, Administrative, or Disciplinary Charges)

The Commission is recommending the adoption of the Model Rule framework and numbering for this series of rules, but for many of the rules recommends retaining the language of the California rules, which is more specific and precise, and accordingly more appropriate for a set of disciplinary rules. However, in the case of proposed rule 3.3, the Commission determined that a rule patterned on Model Rule 3.3 would be more appropriate as a disciplinary rule.

Proposed Rule 3.3. Proposed rule 3.3 is based on Model Rule 3.3, a version of which has been adopted in every jurisdiction in the country. (See National Backdrop – Adoption of Model Rule 3.3, below.) The Commission believes that the Model Rule approach regarding a lawyer's duty of candor is superior to the approach of current rule 5-200 (Trial Conduct) because it more clearly identifies the kind of conduct that the rule is intended to regulate, an attribute preferable in a disciplinary rule. For example, current rule 5-200(A) and (B) are nearly verbatim transcriptions of the two clauses of Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(d), a provision that has remained virtually unchanged since the California Legislature adopted the Field Code in 1872.[1] Paragraph (A) cautions a lawyer to "employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to the lawyer, such means only as are consistent with the truth," but provides no insight into what "such means" are consistent with the truth, and thus what "means" are not. Similarly, paragraph (B) prohibits a lawyer from "seeking to mislead the judge . . . by an artifice," but does not clarify what a prohibited "artifice" might be.

In sum, the Model Rule approach, under which specific prohibited conduct is identified, is preferable in a disciplinary rule. The greater detail of the proposed rule should enhance compliance by lawyers in performing the duties they owe the court as officers of the legal system, as well as facilitate enforcement. The need for increased detail in the rule is particularly evident regarding measures a lawyer is permitted to take to correct fraudulent or criminal conduct of another in relation to a proceeding before a tribunal. That is because, contrary to Model Rule jurisdictions under which duties under their versions of rule 3.3 trump a lawyer's duty of confidentiality, the text of proposed rule 3.3 expressly states that the lawyer's duty to take reasonable remedial measures is subordinate to California's strict duty of confidentiality under rule 1.6 and Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e).

Text of Rule 3.3. The proposed rule's language, based on the Model Rule, provides a clearer statement of what conduct is required and prohibited under the rule.

Paragraph (a)'s introductory clause incorporates a "knowledge" standard. The requirement of known falsity is important from a practical as well as a policy standpoint. A rule that could be violated by gross negligence would have an improper chilling effect on advocacy and could render the lawyer a guarantor of the truth of the facts presented.

Subparagraph (a)(1) [based on Model Rule 3.3(a)(1)] provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly "make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer." A lawyer is on notice that the lawyer may not knowingly make *any* false statement of fact or law or fail to correct a *material* false statement of fact or law.

Subparagraph (a)(2) [derived from Model Rule 3.3(a)(2)], prohibits a lawyer from failing "to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse" to the client's position. It states the lawyer's duty to disclose to the tribunal adverse legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction, which is preferable to the narrowly defined duties in current rule 5-200(C) and (D). Nevertheless, to further clarify the provision's intent, the Commission recommends adding language from rule 5-200(C), which provides a lawyer shall not

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[1] Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(d) provides it is the duty of an attorney:

> (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her those means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.

The only change since 1872 has been to render the provision gender neutral.

"misquote to a tribunal the language of a book, statute, decision or other authority."[2] The Commission determined that a generalized statement of what is prohibited together with a specific example, is better than a narrowly-defined statement of prohibited conduct.

Subparagraph (a)(3) [based on Model Rule 3.3(a)(3)], states with precision what conduct is prohibited – offering false evidence – and then identifies steps the lawyer must take to remediate harm to the tribunal should the lawyer subsequently learn that of the evidence's falsity."

Paragraph (b) confronts head-on a lawyer's duty when the lawyer knows that a person *has* engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to a proceeding. Unlike Model Rule jurisdictions, however, the provision is limited by the lawyer's confidentiality duties under rule 1.6 and Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e).

Paragraph (c) importantly delimits the duration of the lawyer's duties under the preceding three paragraphs. As initially circulated for 90-day public comment, paragraph (c) provided that a lawyer's duties continue to the end of the proceeding and do not terminate upon discharge by the client or the lawyer's withdrawal. (See Revisions Following 90-Day Public Comment Period, below.)

Paragraph (d) proscribes appropriate conduct when a lawyer is appearing in an ex parte proceeding where the other side is not given notice or an opportunity to be heard.

As initially circulated for 90-day public comment, there were seven comments to the proposed rule, each of which provided interpretative guidance or clarified how the proposed rule, which is intended to govern a broad array of situations, should be applied.

Comment [1] describes the scope of the rule's application, i.e., that it also applies to ancillary proceedings such as depositions, a concept that might not be apparent in a rule addressing conduct before a "tribunal."

Comment [2], as noted (see footnote 2), has been included to address concerns the Office of Chief Trial Counsel expressed in its 2010 Comment about the deletion of the language in current rule 5-200(C) [now incorporated into subparagraph (a)(2)] and (D). The comment incorporates nearly verbatim the language in current rule 5-200(D).

Comment [3], regarding the term "legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction," provides critical interpretative guidance for the term, which in some instances can encompass legal authority outside of the jurisdiction in which a court is physically located. The comment is not strictly a definition but instead explains how a strict interpretation of the term "controlling jurisdiction," i.e., to mean the politically-defined jurisdiction in which the court is located, would be inaccurate.

Comment [4] provides a suggested course of conduct for a lawyer to preserve the integrity of the legal process by identifying preventive measures a lawyer might take to prevent another from engaging in fraudulent or criminal conduct related to a tribunal proceeding. It also notes that under paragraphs (a) and (b), if the lawyer is unsuccessful in averting the conduct, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. In addition, the comment identifies the narrative

[2] In response to a request by the Office of Chief Trial Counsel, the Commission is also recommending that the substance of 5-200(D) (a lawyer "shall not, knowing its invalidity, cite as authority a decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed or declared unconstitutional") be retained in a comment to clarify the application of paragraph (a)(1). (See Comment [2].)

approach, a procedure sanctioned in California case law that is cited, when the person who intends to testify falsely is the lawyer's criminal defendant client.

Comment [5] provides important guidance for a lawyer who seeks to perform the lawyer's duties to engage in "reasonable remedial measures" as required under paragraph (b) when a fraud has been perpetrated on the court. In particular, the comment provides cross-references to rules and statutes that provide further guidance.

Comment [6] provides interpretative guidance on when a proceeding is deemed to have concluded and the lawyer's duties under the rule are terminated. In particular, it recognizes that the duties under paragraph (b) to rectify fraudulent conduct before a tribunal do not apply when the lawyer learns of the fraudulent or criminal course of conduct only after the lawyer's representation has terminated.

Comment [7], regarding a lawyer's withdrawal from representation occasioned by events contemplated by the rule's provisions, provides important guidance that when a lawyer complies with the lawyer's duties under the rule, the lawyer does not necessarily need to withdraw. However, the comment also notes that withdrawal may be mandatory when, as a consequence of the lawyer's compliance, the lawyer-client relationship deteriorates to the extent the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client or continued representation will result in a violation of the rules.

In addition to the recommended provisions, the Commission declined to recommend a provision suggested in public comment that would expressly bar plagiarism in briefs or other submissions to a court. The Commission determined a specific prohibition on plagiarism is not necessary and not appropriate in a disciplinary rule. In any event, such conduct would be better addressed under proposed rule 8.4(c) or Bus. & Prof. Code § 6106.[3] Moreover, there is no evidence that adopting such a provision would promote a national standard as the Commission is unaware of any jurisdiction that has expressly addressed plagiarism in its rules.

National Background – Adoption of Model Rule 3.3

Every jurisdiction except California has adopted some version of Model Rule 3.3. Twenty-one jurisdictions have adopted Model Rule 3.3 verbatim. Sixteen jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 3.3. Thirteen jurisdictions have adopted a version of the rule that is substantially different from Model Rule 3.3.

Revisions Following 90-Day Public Comment Period

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission revised paragraphs (a) and (d) for clarity. Paragraph (c) was substantively revised to provide that the duration of a lawyer's duty under paragraphs (a) and (b) would continue until the conclusion of the representation or the proceeding, whichever comes first. Two new Comments were added, bringing the total number of Comments in the rule to nine. Comment [7] was added to clarify that paragraph (d) does not apply to ex parte communications otherwise not prohibited by law or by the tribunal. Comment [9] was added to make clear that in addition to this rule, lawyers are remain bound

[3] Proposed rule 8.4 (c) provides it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(c) engage in conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, fraud, deceit or reckless or intentional misrepresentation

by their statutory obligations to never mislead a judge or judicial officer, nor commit an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption.

With these changes, the Board authorized an additional 45-day public comment period on the revised proposed rule.

Final Commission Action on the Proposed Rule Following 45-Day Public Comment Period

After consideration of comments received in response to the additional 45-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule. Members of the Commission submitted dissents to this rule that can be found following the Report and Recommendation.

The Board adopted proposed rule 3.3 at its March 9, 2017 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as modified by the Court to be effective November 1, 2018. At the end of paragraph (c), the phrase "or the representation, whichever comes first" was deleted.

In Comment [6], the second sentence was deleted in its entirety. Also in Comment [6], the third sentence was revised as follows: "~~However, there may be~~ A prosecutor may have obligations that go beyond the scope of this rule. In addition, the parenthetical cross reference to rule 3.8 was revised to refer to paragraphs (f) and (g) of that rule.

For Comment [7], the heading "Ex Parte Communications" was added.

Other nonsubstantive changes were implemented, including changes to conform to the California Style Manual. (See, e.g., Comment [5] and the rule title.) Lastly, omitted asterisks for defined terms were added.

Supreme Court Action (September 26, 2018)

Subsequently, the Board adopted staff recommended "clean-up" revisions to various rules, including this rule. All of these changes were non-substantive and, for example, implemented copy editing corrections to style and punctuation. The Supreme Court approved the "clean-up" revisions operative November 1, 2018 by order dated September 26, 2018.

~~Rule 5-200 Trial Conduct~~

Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal*

(Redline Comparison to the California Rule Operative Until October 31, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) knowingly* make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal* or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal* by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal* legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known* to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, or knowingly* misquote to a tribunal* the language of a book, statute, decision or other authority; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows* to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence, and the lawyer comes to know* of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable* remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal,* unless disclosure is prohibited by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes* is false.

(b) A lawyer who represents a client in a proceeding before a tribunal* and who knows* that a person* intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent* conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable* remedial measures to the extent permitted by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6.

(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding where notice to the opposing party in the proceeding is not required or given and the opposing party is not present, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal* of all material facts known* to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal* to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse to the position of the client.

~~In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a member:~~

~~(A) Shall employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to the member such means only as are consistent with truth;~~

~~(B) Shall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;~~

~~(C) Shall not intentionally misquote to a tribunal the language of a book, statute, or decision;~~

Comment

[1] This rule governs the conduct of a lawyer in proceedings of a tribunal,* including ancillary proceedings such as a deposition conducted pursuant to a tribunal's* authority. See rule 1.0.1(m) for the definition of "tribunal."

~~(D) Shall not, knowing its invalidity, cite~~[2] The prohibition in paragraph (a)(1) against making false statements of law or failing to correct a material misstatement of law includes citing as authority a decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed or declared unconstitutional~~; and~~, or failing to correct such a citation previously made to the tribunal* by the lawyer.

~~(E) Shall not assert personal knowledge of the facts at issue, except when testifying as a witness~~

Legal Argument

[3] Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction may include legal authority outside the jurisdiction in which the tribunal* sits, such as a federal statute or case that is determinative of an issue in a state court proceeding or a Supreme Court decision that is binding on a lower court.

[4] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. If a lawyer knows* that a client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered and, if unsuccessful, must refuse to offer the false evidence. If a criminal defendant insists on testifying, and the lawyer knows* that the testimony will be false, the lawyer may offer the testimony in a narrative form if the lawyer made reasonable* efforts to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of conduct and the lawyer has sought permission from the court to withdraw as required by rule 1.16. (See, e.g., *People v. Johnson* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 608 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 805]; *People v. Jennings* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 899 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) The obligations of a lawyer under these rules and the State Bar Act are subordinate to applicable constitutional provisions.

Remedial Measures

[5] Reasonable* remedial measures under paragraphs (a)(3) and (b) refer to measures that are available under these rules and the State Bar Act, and which a reasonable* lawyer would consider appropriate under the circumstances to comply with the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal.* (See, e.g., rules 1.2.1, 1.4(a)(4), 1.16(a), 8.4; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6068, subd. (d), 6128.) Remedial measures also include explaining to the client the lawyer's obligations under this rule and, where applicable, the reasons for the lawyer's decision to seek permission from the tribunal* to withdraw, and remonstrating further with the client to take corrective action that would eliminate the need

for the lawyer to withdraw. If the client is an organization, the lawyer should also consider the provisions of rule 1.13. Remedial measures do not include disclosure of client confidential information, which the lawyer is required to protect under Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6.

Duration of Obligation

[6] A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. A prosecutor may have obligations that go beyond the scope of this rule. (See, e.g., rule 3.8(f) and (g).)

Ex Parte Communications

[7] Paragraph (d) does not apply to ex parte communications that are not otherwise prohibited by law or the tribunal.*

Withdrawal

[8] A lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation. The lawyer may, however, be required by rule 1.16 to seek permission of the tribunal* to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this rule results in a deterioration of the lawyer-client relationship such that the lawyer can no longer competently and diligently represent the client, or where continued employment will result in a violation of these rules. A lawyer must comply with Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6 with respect to a request to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct.

[9] In addition to this rule, lawyers remain bound by Business and Professions Code sections 6068, subdivision (d) and 6106.

**Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal*
(Redline Comparison to the ABA Model Rule)**

(a) A lawyer shall not ~~knowingly~~:

(1) knowingly* make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal* or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal* by the lawyer;

(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal* legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known* to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, or knowingly* misquote to a tribunal* the language of a book, statute, decision or other authority; or

(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows* to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence, and the lawyer comes to know* of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable* remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal,* unless disclosure is prohibited by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes* is false.

(b) A lawyer who represents a client in ~~an adjudicative~~a proceeding before a tribunal* and who knows* that a person* intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent* conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable* remedial measures~~, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal~~ to the extent permitted by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6.

(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding~~, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6~~.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding where notice to the opposing party in the proceeding is not required or given and the opposing party is not present, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal* of all material facts known* to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal* to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse to the position of the client.

Comment

[1] This ~~Rule~~rule governs the conduct of a lawyer ~~who is representing a client in the~~in proceedings of a tribunal,* including ancillary proceedings such as a deposition conducted pursuant to a tribunal's* authority. See ~~Rule 1.0~~rule 1.0.1(m) for the definition of "tribunal." ~~It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable~~

remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false.

[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence thatThe prohibition in paragraph (a)(1) against making false statements of law or failing to correct a material misstatement of law includes citing as authority a decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed or declared unconstitutional, or failing to correct such a citation previously made to the tribunal* by the lawyer knows to be false.

Representations by a Lawyer

[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b).

Legal Argument

[43] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(2), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.may include legal authority outside the jurisdiction in which the tribunal* sits, such as a federal statute or case that is determinative of an issue in a state court proceeding or a Supreme Court decision that is binding on a lower court.

~~*Offering Evidence*~~

~~[5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.~~

[~~6~~4] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. If a lawyer knows* that ~~the~~a client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered~~. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer~~ and, if unsuccessful, must refuse to offer the false evidence. If ~~only a portion of a witness's~~a criminal defendant insists on testifying, and the lawyer knows* that the testimony will be false, the lawyer may ~~call the witness to testify but may not elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present the testimony that the lawyer knows is false.~~offer the testimony in a narrative form if the lawyer made reasonable* efforts to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of conduct and the lawyer has sought permission from the court to withdraw as required by rule 1.16. (See, e.g., *People v. Johnson* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 608 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 805]; *People v. Jennings* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 899 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].) The obligations of a lawyer under these rules and the State Bar Act are subordinate to applicable constitutional provisions.

~~[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9].~~

~~[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(f). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.~~

~~[9] Although paragraph (a)(3) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7].~~

Remedial Measures

[5] Reasonable* remedial measures under paragraphs (a)(3) and (b) refer to measures that are available under these rules and the State Bar Act, and which a reasonable* lawyer would consider appropriate under the circumstances to comply with the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal.* (See, e.g., rules 1.2.1, 1.4(a)(4), 1.16(a), 8.4; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6068, subd. (d), 6128.) Remedial measures also include explaining to the client the lawyer's obligations under this rule and, where applicable, the reasons for the lawyer's decision to seek permission from the tribunal* to withdraw, and remonstrating further with the client to take corrective action that would eliminate the need for the lawyer to withdraw. If the client is an organization, the lawyer should also consider the provisions of rule 1.13. Remedial measures do not include disclosure of client confidential information, which the lawyer is required to protect under Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6.

~~[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done — making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing.~~

~~[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.~~

~~*Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process*~~

~~[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court~~

official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer's client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.

Duration of Obligation

[136] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rulerule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. A prosecutor may have obligations that go beyond the scope of this rule. (See, e.g., rule 3.8(f) and (g).)

*Ex Parte Proceedings**Communications*

[7] Paragraph (d) does not apply to ex parte communications that are not otherwise prohibited by law or the tribunal.*

[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision.

Withdrawal

[8] A lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation. The lawyer may, however, be required by rule 1.16 to seek permission of the tribunal* to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this rule results in a deterioration of the lawyer-client relationship such that the lawyer can no longer competently and diligently represent the client, or where continued employment will result in a violation of these rules. A lawyer must comply with Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6 with respect to a request to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct.

[9] In addition to this rule, lawyers remain bound by Business and Professions Code sections 6068, subdivision (d) and 6106.

[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose

~~interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.~~

Rule 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

A lawyer shall not:

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence, including a witness, or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person* to do any such act;

(b) suppress any evidence that the lawyer or the lawyer's client has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce;

(c) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;

(d) directly or indirectly pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness's testimony or the outcome of the case. Except where prohibited by law, a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:

(1) expenses reasonably* incurred by a witness in attending or testifying;

(2) reasonable* compensation to a witness for loss of time in attending or testifying; or

(3) a reasonable* fee for the professional services of an expert witness;

(e) advise or directly or indirectly cause a person* to secrete himself or herself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal* for the purpose of making that person* unavailable as a witness therein;

(f) knowingly* disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal* except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; or

(g) in trial, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused.

Comment

[1] Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. It is a criminal offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 135; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520.) Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 132; 18 U.S.C. § 1519.) Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. Applicable law may require a lawyer to turn evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authorities, depending on the

circumstances. (See *People v. Lee* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 514, 526 [83 Cal.Rptr. 715]; *People v. Meredith* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682 [175 Cal.Rptr. 612].)

[2] A violation of a civil or criminal discovery rule or statute does not by itself establish a violation of this rule. See rule 3.8 for special disclosure responsibilities of a prosecutor.

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4
(Former Rules 5-310, 5-220 & 5-200(E))
Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") evaluated current rules 5-310 (Prohibited Contact With Witnesses), 5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) and 5-200(E) (Asserting Personal Knowledge of Facts) in accordance with the Commission Charter. In addition, the Commission considered the national standard of the ABA counterpart, Model Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel). The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rules. The result of the Commission's evaluation is proposed rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

Proposed Rule 3.4 in context within the Rules of Professional Conduct. Proposed Rule 3.4 is one of ten rules in Chapter 3 of the proposed Rules of Professional Conduct. The general content, framework and numbering scheme of this subset of the Rules is based on Chapter 3 of the ABA Model Rules, which is entitled "Advocate." Model Rules Chapter 3 corresponds to Chapter 5 of the current California rules, entitled "Advocacy and Representation." The following table shows the Chapter 3 Model Rules and the corresponding California rules:

Model Rule	California Rule
3.1 (Meritorious Claims & Contentions)	3-200 (Prohibited Objectives of Employment)
3.2 (Expediting Litigation)	No Cal. rule counterpart.
3.3 (Candor Toward The Tribunal)	5-200 (Trial Conduct)
3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party & Counsel)	5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) 5-310 (Prohibited Contact with Witnesses) 5-200(E)
3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of Tribunal)	5-300 (Contact with Officials) 5-320 (Contact with Jurors)
3.6 (Trial Publicity)	5-120 (Trial Publicity)
3.7 (Lawyer As Witness)	5-210 (Member As Witness)
3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor)	5-110 (Performing the Duty of Member in Government Service) 5-220 (Suppression of Evidence) 5-120 (Trial Publicity)
3.9 (Advocate In Non-adjudicative Proceedings)	No Cal. rule counterpart.
3.10 (Threatening Criminal, Administrative, or Disciplinary Charges)	5-100 (Threatening Criminal, Administrative, or Disciplinary Charges)

The Commission is recommending the adoption of the Model Rule framework and numbering for this series of rules, but for many of the rules recommends retaining the language of the California rules, which is more specific and precise, and accordingly more appropriate for a set of disciplinary rules and, with respect to rule 3.4, to reject the adoption of language in Model Rule that is vague or ambiguous.

Recommendation that proposed Rule 3.4 be circulated for public comment. Proposed rule 3.4 incorporates several concepts that are intended to promote fair competition in an adversarial system of justice. Specifically, the rule includes prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery, and so forth. The concepts in Model Rule 3.4, on whose structure proposed rule 3.4 is based, are found in three current California Rules of Professional Conduct: rule 5-310 (Prohibited Contact With Witnesses); rule 5-220 (Suppression of Evidence); and rule 5-200 (Trial Conduct). In conformance with the Charter principle that the Commission is to start with the relevant California rule, the Commission began its study of this rule topic with those California rules. However, in acknowledgement of its decision early in the rules revision process to recommend adoption of the Model Rules' format and numbering, the Commission determined that the three concepts should be combined in a single rule numbered 3.4.

In drafting the proposed rule, the Commission largely agreed with the first Commission's approach to its proposed rule 3.4 by:

(i) retaining rule 5-310 as paragraphs (d) and (e) largely unchanged in the structure of Model Rule 3.4, as these provisions contain specific prohibitions on lawyer conduct;
(ii) retaining rule 5-220 as paragraph (b) as a general statement of the prohibition against suppressing evidence;
(iii) incorporating several provisions of Model Rule 3.4 [paragraphs (a), (c) and (f)] that more precisely identify and describe evidence-suppressing conduct that the rule is intended to prevent;
(iv) retaining rule 5-200(E) in paragraph (g); and
(v) rejecting several provisions of Model Rule 3.4 [Model Rule 3.4(d), (e) and (f)] as vague and overbroad, and likely to chill legitimate advocacy.

The principal reason for the foregoing approach is that a disciplinary rule should clarify with precision the kind of the conduct that can subject a lawyer to discipline rather than simply provide a generalized prohibition against suppressing evidence, (rule 5-220). There are several provisions in Model Rule 3.4 that identify with more precision than current rule 5-220 the kind of conduct a disciplinary rule intended at least in part to promote fair competition in the adversarial system of justice should prohibit. Specifically Model Rule 3.4(a), (b) and (c) have been retained as paragraphs (a), (c) and (f). Several other Model Rule paragraphs, specifically paragraphs (d), (e) and (f), on the other hand, conflict with California law, are overbroad and likely to chill legitimate advocacy, or both.[1]

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[1] The rejected Model Rule 3.4 provisions provide that a lawyer shall not:

(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;

(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or

(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:

(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.

Text of Rule 3.4.

Paragraph (a) is identical to Model Rule 3.4(a) and prohibits a lawyer from destroying or altering documents, or counseling or assisting another to do so.

Paragraph (b) carries forward rule 5-220 to provide a general statement prohibiting the suppression of evidence.

Paragraph (c) is identical to Model Rule 3.4 and prohibits a lawyer from falsifying evidence or assisting a witness to testify falsely.

Paragraph (d) carries forward rule 5-310(B) nearly verbatim, the only change being to substitute "lawyer" for "member."

Paragraph (e) carries forward rule 5-310(A) verbatim.

Paragraph (f) is identical to Model Rule 3.4(c) and prohibits a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal but clarifies that a lawyer may openly refuse to obey based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.

Paragraph (g) carries forward the language of rule 5-200(E), but adds a provision from Model Rule 3.4(e) that prohibits a lawyer from stating an opinion about the guilt or innocence of an accused.

There are two comments to proposed rule 3.4, both of which explain how the rule should be applied. Comment [1] clarifies that a lawyer may take temporary possession of evidence for examination but may not alter or destroy it, and provides cross-references to California statutes and case law that impose further obligations on the handling of evidence.

Comment [1] also provides specific references to statutes and case law that impose legal obligations on lawyers and clients to preserve evidence. Comment [2] clarifies an important limitation on the rule's application, i.e., that a violation of a civil or criminal discovery rule does not by itself constitute a violation of the rule.

Non-substantive aspects of the proposed rule include rule numbering to track the Commission's general proposal to use the Model Rules' numbering system and the substitution of the term "lawyer" for "member."

National Background – Adoption of Model Rule 3.4

Every jurisdiction except California has adopted some version of Model Rule 3.4. Thirty-three jurisdictions have adopted Model Rule 3.4 verbatim. Ten jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 3.4. Seven jurisdictions have adopted a version of the rule that substantially diverges from Model Rule 3.4.

Post-Public Comment Revisions

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 3.4 at its November 17, 2016 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as modified by the Court to be effective November 1, 2018. In Comment [2], a new second sentence was added which provides that: “See rule 3.8 for special disclosure responsibilities of a prosecutor.”

~~Rule 5-310 Prohibited Contact With Witnesses~~
Rule 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
(Redline Comparison to the California Rule Operative Until October 31, 2018)

A ~~member~~lawyer shall not:

~~Rule 5-220 Suppression of Evidence~~

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence, including a witness, or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person* to do any such act;

(b) ~~A member shall not~~suppress any evidence that the ~~member~~lawyer or the ~~member's~~lawyer's client has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce~~.~~;

~~(A) Advise or directly or indirectly cause a person to secrete himself or herself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making that person unavailable as a witness therein.~~

(c) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;

(~~B~~d) ~~Directly~~directly or indirectly pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness's testimony or the outcome of the case. Except where prohibited by law, a ~~member~~lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:

(1) ~~Expenses~~expenses reasonably* incurred by a witness in attending or testifying~~.~~;

(2) ~~Reasonable~~reasonable* compensation to a witness for loss of time in attending or testifying~~.~~; or

(3) ~~A~~a reasonable* fee for the professional services of an expert witness~~.~~;

~~Rule 5-200 Trial Conduct~~

(e) advise or directly or indirectly cause a person* to secrete himself or herself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal* for the purpose of making that person* unavailable as a witness therein;

(f) knowingly* disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal* except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; or

(~~E~~g) ~~Shall not~~in trial, assert personal knowledge of ~~the~~ facts ~~at~~in issue~~,~~ except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused.

Comment

[1] Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. It is a criminal offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 135; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520.) Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 132; 18 U.S.C. § 1519.) Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence. Applicable law may require a lawyer to turn evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authorities, depending on the circumstances. (See *People v. Lee* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 514, 526 [83 Cal.Rptr. 715]; *People v. Meredith* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682 [175 Cal.Rptr. 612].)

[2] A violation of a civil or criminal discovery rule or statute does not by itself establish a violation of this rule. See rule 3.8 for special disclosure responsibilities of a prosecutor.

Rule 4.4 Duties Concerning Inadvertently Transmitted Writings*
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

Where it is reasonably* apparent to a lawyer who receives a writing* relating to a lawyer's representation of a client that the writing* was inadvertently sent or produced, and the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* that the writing* is privileged or subject to the work product doctrine, the lawyer shall:

(a) refrain from examining the writing* any more than is necessary to determine that it is privileged or subject to the work product doctrine, and

(b) promptly notify the sender.

Comment

[1] If a lawyer determines this rule applies to a transmitted writing,* the lawyer should return the writing* to the sender, seek to reach agreement with the sender regarding the disposition of the writing,* or seek guidance from a tribunal.* (See *Rico v. Mitsubishi* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807, 817 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 758].) In providing notice required by this rule, the lawyer shall comply with rule 4.2.

[2] This rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a writing* that the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* may have been inappropriately disclosed by the sending person.* (See *Clark v. Superior Court* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 37 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 361].)

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4.4
(No Former Rule)
Duties Concerning Inadvertently Transmitted Writings

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") reviewed and evaluated ABA Model Rule 4.4 (Respect For Rights Of Third Persons) for which there is no California counterpart. The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rule. The result of this evaluation is proposed rule 4.4 (Duties Concerning Inadvertently Transmitted Writings).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

Proposed rule 4.4 is derived from ABA Model Rule 4.4(b). ABA Model Rule 4.4(a) seeks to regulate lawyer conduct that embarrasses, delays, or burdens a third party. It also prohibits a lawyer from obtaining evidence through means that violate the rights of a third person. The Commission did not recommend adoption of ABA Model Rule 4.4(a) because, similar to the First Commission, this Commission believes the rule is vague and overbroad with use of the terms "embarrass, delay, or burden a third party." In addition, there is a concern that such a rule could be used for mischief in discovery disputes if one were to assert a discovery motion was being used in violation of the rule.

Proposed rule 4.4 requires a lawyer who receives a writing relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the writing is either privileged or subject to the work product doctrine, when it is reasonably apparent to the receiving lawyer that the writing was inadvertently sent or produced, to promptly notify the sender. The Commission is recommending that California adopt this duty as a rule of professional conduct because California case law[1] affirmatively states it is an ethical obligation of an attorney who receives inadvertently produced materials that obviously appear to be subject to the attorney-client privilege or otherwise clearly appear to be confidential and privileged that the attorney shall immediately notify the sender. In California, this duty is currently only found in case law and the Commission believes capturing the obligation in a rule of professional conduct will help protect the public and the administration of justice, as well as inform attorneys of their ethical obligation.

The main issue debated when evaluating this rule was whether to recommend an "obviously appear" standard regarding a writing's status as privileged or subject to the attorney work product doctrine, instead of a "knows or reasonably should know" standard. The argument in favor of an "obviously appear" standard was that California case law uses the phrase "materials that obviously appear to be subject to an attorney-client privilege or otherwise clearly appear to be confidential and privileged . . ." (*Rico v. Mitsubishi* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807, 817, quoting favorably *State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644, 656-657).[2] The Commission ultimately determined to recommend the objective standard of "knows or reasonably should know" because this standard accomplishes the same result articulated in the case by using a known disciplinary standard that is used in several proposed rules and in our

[1] See, *Rico v. Mitsubishi* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807; *State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644.

[2] But see, *Rico*, 42 Cal.4th at 818: "The *State Fund* rule is an objective standard. In applying the rule, courts must consider whether reasonably competent counsel, knowing the circumstances of the litigation, would have concluded the materials were privileged, how much review was reasonably necessary to draw that conclusion, and when counsel's examination should have ended."

current rules. Further, an objective standard should be more protective of privileged information because the standard will be that of a reasonably competent attorney. Such a standard will prevent an attorney from raising as a defense that the document did not obviously appear privileged or subject to the attorney work product doctrine "to me."

There is one comment to the rule. As initially circulated for public comment, the rule comment provided guidance as to what steps the receiving lawyer should take in addition to promptly notifying the sender: Those steps were to refrain from reading the document and then (i) return the writing to the sender, (ii) seek to reach agreement with the sender regarding the disposition of the writing, or (iii) seek guidance from a tribunal. These steps are consistent with what the California Supreme Court has stated a lawyer should do in this situation.

Although the concept contained in proposed rule 4.4 is currently addressed in case law, the proposed rule is a substantive change to the current rules because the duty is now being included as a rule of discipline.

National Background – Adoption of Model Rule 4.4

As California does not presently have a direct counterpart to Model Rule 4.4, this section reports on the adoption of the Model Rule in United States' jurisdictions. Other than California, all jurisdictions have adopted some version of ABA Model Rule 4.4; however, three jurisdictions do not have a version of Model Rule 4.4(b).

The ABA State Adoption Chart for ABA Model Rule 4.4 is posted at:

- http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_4_4.authcheckdam.pdf

- Fourteen states have adopted Model Rule 4.4 verbatim. Thirty-one jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 4.4. Two states have adopted a version of the rule that substantially diverges from Model Rule 4.4.

Revisions Following 90-Day Public Comment Period

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission made several changes to the text and comment of proposed rule 4.4.

Text. The Commission modified the syntax of the black letter text to clarify the rule's application. This change is non-substantive. The Commission also moved from the comment in the 90-day public comment version and added as a requirement, the lawyer's duty to "refrain from examining the writing* any more than is necessary to determine that it is privileged or subject to the work product doctrine." This latter change conforms the rule to the holding in *Rico v. Mitsubishi* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807, 817 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 758].

Comment. The Commission made a non-substantive change to the second sentence of Comment [1] (formerly the only comment to the rule] to include a cross-reference to rule 4.2, which comprehensively regulates communications with a represented person. The public comment draft had provided: "If the sender is known to be represented by counsel, the lawyer must communicate with the sender's counsel."

The Commission also added proposed Comment [2], derived in part from Model Rule 4.4, Comment [4], to clarify that the rule does not apply to writings that may have been

inappropriately been disclosed by the sending person to the lawyer. A citation to California case law that governs such disclosures has also been added.

With these changes, the Board authorized an additional 45-day public comment period on the revised proposed rule.

Final Commission Action on the Proposed Rule Following 45-Day Public Comment Period

After consideration of comments received in response to the additional 45-day public comment period, the Commission made a minor citation format change. In Comment [4], the Commission added the word "See" before the citation *Clark v. Superior Court* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 37 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 361]. This was the only change to the rule.

With this change, the Commission voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 4.4 at its March 9, 2017 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as modified by the Court to be effective November 1, 2018. An omitted asterisk for a defined term was added.

Rule 4.4 ~~Respect For Rights Of Third Persons~~Duties Concerning Inadvertently Transmitted Writings*
(Redline Comparison to the ABA Model Rule)

~~(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.~~

~~(b) A~~Where it is reasonably* apparent to a lawyer who receives a ~~document or electronically stored information~~writing* relating to ~~the~~a lawyer's representation of ~~the lawyer's client and~~a client that the writing* was inadvertently sent or produced, and the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* that the ~~document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent~~writing* is privileged or subject to the work product doctrine, the lawyer shall:

(a) refrain from examining the writing* any more than is necessary to determine that it is privileged or subject to the work product doctrine, and

(b) promptly notify the sender.

Comment

[1] If a lawyer determines this rule applies to a transmitted writing,* the lawyer should return the writing* to the sender, seek to reach agreement with the sender regarding the disposition of the writing,* or seek guidance from a tribunal.* (See *Rico v. Mitsubishi* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807, 817 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 758].) In providing notice required by this rule, the lawyer shall comply with rule 4.2.

[2] This rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a writing* that the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* may have been inappropriately disclosed by the sending person.* (See *Clark v. Superior Court* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 37 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 361].)

~~[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer relationship.~~

~~[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive a document or electronically stored information that was mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. A document or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent when it is accidentally transmitted, such as when an email or letter is misaddressed or a document or electronically stored information is accidentally included with information that was intentionally transmitted. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document or electronically stored information was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional~~

steps, such as returning the document or electronically stored information, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document or electronically stored information has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been inappropriately obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, ‘‘document or electronically stored information’’ includes, in addition to paper documents, email and other forms of electronically stored information, including embedded data (commonly referred to as “metadata”), that is subject to being read or put into readable form. Metadata in electronic documents creates an obligation under this Rule only if the receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the metadata was inadvertently sent to the receiving lawyer.

[3] Some lawyers may choose to return a document or delete electronically stored information unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving it that it was inadvertently sent. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document or delete electronically stored information is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.

Rule 5.1 Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm,* shall make reasonable* efforts to ensure that the firm* has in effect measures giving reasonable* assurance that all lawyers in the firm* comply with these rules and the State Bar Act.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer, whether or not a member or employee of the same law firm,* shall make reasonable* efforts to ensure that the other lawyer complies with these rules and the State Bar Act.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of these rules and the State Bar Act if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer, individually or together with other lawyers, possesses managerial authority in the law firm* in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, whether or not a member or employee of the same law firm,* and knows* of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable* remedial action.

Comment

Paragraph (a) – Duties Of Managerial Lawyers To Reasonably Assure Compliance with the Rules*

[1] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm* to make reasonable* efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed, for example, to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property, and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.

[2] Whether particular measures or efforts satisfy the requirements of paragraph (a) might depend upon the law firm's structure and the nature of its practice, including the size of the law firm,* whether it has more than one office location or practices in more than one jurisdiction, or whether the firm* or its partners* engage in any ancillary business.

[3] A partner,* shareholder or other lawyer in a law firm* who has intermediate managerial responsibilities satisfies paragraph (a) if the law firm* has a designated managing lawyer charged with that responsibility, or a management committee or other body that has appropriate managerial authority and is charged with that responsibility. For example, the managing lawyer of an office of a multi-office law firm* would not necessarily be required to promulgate firm-wide policies intended to reasonably* assure that the law firm's lawyers comply with the rules or State Bar Act. However, a lawyer

remains responsible to take corrective steps if the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* that the delegated body or person* is not providing or implementing measures as required by this rule.

[4] Paragraph (a) also requires managerial lawyers to make reasonable* efforts to assure that other lawyers in an agency or department comply with these rules and the State Bar Act. This rule contemplates, for example, the creation and implementation of reasonable* guidelines relating to the assignment of cases and the distribution of workload among lawyers in a public sector legal agency or other legal department. (See, e.g., State Bar of California, Guidelines on Indigent Defense Services Delivery Systems (2006).)

Paragraph (b) – Duties of Supervisory Lawyers

[5] Whether a lawyer has direct supervisory authority over another lawyer in particular circumstances is a question of fact.

Paragraph (c) – Responsibility for Another's Lawyer's Violation

[6] The appropriateness of remedial action under paragraph (c)(2) would depend on the nature and seriousness of the misconduct and the nature and immediacy of its harm. A managerial or supervisory lawyer must intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the lawyer knows* that the misconduct occurred.

[7] A supervisory lawyer violates paragraph (b) by failing to make the efforts required under that paragraph, even if the lawyer does not violate paragraph (c) by knowingly* directing or ratifying the conduct, or where feasible, failing to take reasonable* remedial action.

[8] Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) create independent bases for discipline. This rule does not impose vicarious responsibility on a lawyer for the acts of another lawyer who is in or outside the law firm.* Apart from paragraph (c) of this rule and rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner,* associate, or subordinate lawyer. The question of whether a lawyer can be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is beyond the scope of these rules.

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.1
(See Former Rule 3-110 Discussion)
Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In connection with consideration of current rule 3-110 (Failing to Act Competently), the Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") has reviewed and evaluated ABA Model Rules 5.1 (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers), 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer), and 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants). The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rules. The evaluation was made with a focus on the function of the rules as disciplinary standards, and with the understanding that the rule comments should be included only when necessary to explain a rule and not for providing aspirational guidance. Although these proposed rules have no direct counterpart in the current California rules, the concept of the duty to supervise is found in the first Discussion paragraph to current rule 3-110, which states: "The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents."[1] The result of this evaluation is proposed rules 5.1 (Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers), 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer), and 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

The main issue considered when evaluating a lawyer's duty to supervise was whether to adopt versions of ABA Model Rules 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, or retain the duty to supervise only as an element of the duty of competence. The Commission concluded that adopting these proposed rules provides important public protection and critical guidance to lawyers possessing managerial authority by more specifically describing a lawyer's duty to supervise other lawyers (proposed rule 5.1) and non-lawyer personnel (proposed rule 5.3). Proposed rules 5.1 and 5.3 extend beyond the duty to supervise that is implicit in current rule 3-110 and include a duty on firm managers to have procedures and practices that foster ethical conduct within a law firm. Current rule 3-110 includes a duty to supervise but says nothing about the subordinate lawyer's duties. Proposed rule 5.2 addresses this omission by stating that a subordinate lawyer generally cannot defend a disciplinary charge by blaming the supervisor. Although California's current rules have no equivalent to proposed rule 5.2, there appears to be no conflict with the proposed rule and current California law in that there is no known California authority that permits a subordinate lawyer to defend a disciplinary charge based on clearly improper directions from a senior lawyer.

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[1] The first Discussion paragraph to current rule 3-110 provides:

> The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents. (See, e.g., *Waysman v. State Bar* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 452; *Trousil v. State Bar* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 342 [211 Cal.Rptr. 525]; *Palomo v. State Bar* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785 [205 Cal.Rptr. 834]; *Crane v. State Bar* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 122; *Black v. State Bar* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 692 [103 Cal.Rptr. 288; 499 P.2d 968]; *Vaughn v. State Bar* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 847, 857-858 [100 Cal.Rptr. 713; 494 P.2d 1257]; *Moore v. State Bar* (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 81 [41 Cal.Rptr. 161; 396 P.2d 577].)

The following is a summary of proposed rule 5.1 (Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers).[2]

Proposed rule 5.1 incorporates the substance of ABA Model Rule 5.1. Paragraph (a) requires that managing lawyers make "reasonable efforts to ensure" the law firm has measures that provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and the State Bar Act. Paragraph (b) requires that a lawyer who directly supervises another lawyer make "reasonable efforts to ensure" the other lawyer complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct and the State Bar Act, whether or not the other lawyer is a member or employee of the same firm. Neither provision imposes vicarious liability. However, a lawyer will be responsible for a subordinate's violation of a rule under paragraph (c) if a lawyer either ordered or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and specific conduct, ratifies the conduct of the subordinate, ((c)(1)), or knowing of the misconduct, failed to take remedial action when there was still time to avoid or mitigate the consequences, ((c)(2)).

As initially circulated for 90-day public comment, there were nine comments to the rule. Comments [1] – [4] describe the duties of managerial lawyers to reasonably assure compliance with the rules under paragraph (a). Comment [5] states that whether a lawyer has direct supervisory authority over another lawyer in a specific instance is a question of fact. Comments [6] – [9] clarify when a supervisory lawyer is responsible for another lawyer's violation.

National Background – Adoption of Model Rule 5.1

As California does not presently have a direct counterpart to Model Rule 5.1, this section reports on the adoption of the Model Rule in United States' jurisdictions. The ABA Comparison Chart, entitled "Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.1: Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers," revised May 5, 2015, is available at:

- http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_5_1.pdf

Thirty-one states have adopted Model Rule 5.1 verbatim. Fourteen jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 5.1. Five states have adopted a version of the rule that is substantially different to Model Rule 5.1. One state has not adopted a version Model Rule 5.1.[3]

Revisions Following 90-Day Public Comment Period

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission added Comment [6], the concept of which is derived from proposed rule 5.2(b). In addition, the Commission modified Comment [3] for clarity and deleted Comment [9] as unnecessary.

With these changes, the Board authorized an additional 45-day public comment period on the revised proposed rule.

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[2] The executive summaries for proposed rules 5.2 and 5.3 are provided separately.

[3] The one state is California.

Final Commission Action on the Proposed Rule Following 45-Day Public Comment Period

After consideration of comments received in response to the additional 45-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 5.1 at its March 9, 2017 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as modified by the Court to be effective November 1, 2018. Comment [6] was deleted in its entirety and subsequent Comments were renumbered accordingly.

Rule 5.1 Responsibilities of ~~a Partner or~~Managerial and Supervisory ~~Lawyer~~Lawyers
(Redline Comparison to the ABA Model Rule)

(a) A ~~partner in a law firm, and a~~ lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses ~~comparable~~ managerial authority in a law firm,* shall make reasonable* efforts to ensure that the firm* has in effect measures giving reasonable* assurance that all lawyers in the firm ~~conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct~~* comply with these rules and the State Bar Act.

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer, whether or not a member or employee of the same law firm,* shall make reasonable* efforts to ensure that the other lawyer ~~conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct~~complies with these rules and the State Bar Act.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another ~~lawyer's~~lawyer's violation of ~~the Rules of Professional Conduct~~these rules and the State Bar Act if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer ~~is a partner or has comparable~~, individually or together with other lawyers, possesses managerial authority in the law firm* in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, whether or not a member or employee of the same law firm,* and knows* of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable* remedial action.

Comment

~~[1] *Paragraph (a)* applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(c). This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm.~~ *– Duties Of Managerial Lawyers To Reasonably* Assure Compliance with the Rules*

[~~2~~1] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm* to make reasonable* efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed ~~to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed~~, for example, to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property, and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised.

[2] Whether particular measures or efforts satisfy the requirements of paragraph (a) might depend upon the law firm's structure and the nature of its practice, including the size of the law firm,* whether it has more than one office location or practices in more than one jurisdiction, or whether the firm* or its partners* engage in any ancillary business.

~~[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules.~~

[3] A partner,* shareholder or other lawyer in a law firm* who has intermediate managerial responsibilities satisfies paragraph (a) if the law firm* has a designated managing lawyer charged with that responsibility, or a management committee or other body that has appropriate managerial authority and is charged with that responsibility. For example, the managing lawyer of an office of a multi-office law firm* would not necessarily be required to promulgate firm-wide policies intended to reasonably* assure that the law firm's lawyers comply with the rules or State Bar Act. However, a lawyer remains responsible to take corrective steps if the lawyer knows* or reasonably should know* that the delegated body or person* is not providing or implementing measures as required by this rule.

[4] Paragraph (~~c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a).~~a) also requires managerial lawyers to make reasonable* efforts to assure that other lawyers in an agency or department comply with these rules and the State Bar Act. This rule contemplates, for example, the creation and implementation of reasonable* guidelines relating to the assignment of cases and the distribution of workload among lawyers in a public sector legal agency or other legal department. (See, e.g., State Bar of California, Guidelines on Indigent Defense Services Delivery Systems (2006).)

Paragraph (b) – Duties of Supervisory Lawyers

[5] ~~Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as~~Whether a lawyer ~~who~~ has direct supervisory authority over ~~performance of specific legal work by~~ another lawyer~~. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority~~ in particular circumstances is a question of fact. ~~Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge~~

~~of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer~~

Paragraph (c) – Responsibility for Another's Lawyer's Violation

[6] The appropriateness of remedial action under paragraph (c)(2) would depend on the ~~immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the~~nature and seriousness of the misconduct~~. A supervisor is required to~~ and the nature and immediacy of its harm. A managerial or supervisory lawyer must intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the ~~supervisor knows~~lawyer knows* that the misconduct occurred. ~~Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.~~

~~[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation.~~

[7] ~~Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.~~A supervisory lawyer violates paragraph (b) by failing to make the efforts required under that paragraph, even if the lawyer does not violate paragraph (c) by knowingly* directing or ratifying the conduct, or where feasible, failing to take reasonable* remedial action.

[8] ~~The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a). the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a).~~Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) create independent bases for discipline. This rule does not impose vicarious responsibility on a lawyer for the acts of another lawyer who is in or outside the law firm.* Apart from paragraph (c) of this rule and rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner,* associate, or subordinate lawyer. The question of whether a lawyer can be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is beyond the scope of these rules.

Rule 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

(a) A lawyer shall comply with these rules and the State Bar Act notwithstanding that the lawyer acts at the direction of another lawyer or other person.*

(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate these rules or the State Bar Act if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable* resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

Comment

When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to the lawyers' responsibilities under these rules or the State Bar Act and the question can reasonably* be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. Accordingly, the subordinate lawyer must comply with his or her obligations under paragraph (a). If the question reasonably* can be answered more than one way, the supervisory lawyer may assume responsibility for determining which of the reasonable* alternatives to select, and the subordinate may be guided accordingly. If the subordinate lawyer believes* that the supervisor's proposed resolution of the question of professional duty would result in a violation of these rules or the State Bar Act, the subordinate is obligated to communicate his or her professional judgment regarding the matter to the supervisory lawyer.

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.2
(No Former Rule)
Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In connection with consideration of current rule 3-110 (Failing to Act Competently), the Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") has reviewed and evaluated American Bar Association ABA Model Rules 5.1 (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers), 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer), and 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants). The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rules. Although these proposed rules have no direct counterpart in the current California rules, the concept of the duty to supervise is found in the first Discussion paragraph to current rule 3-110, which states: "The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents."[1] The result of this evaluation is proposed rules 5.1 (Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers), 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer), and 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

The main issue considered when evaluating a lawyer's duty to supervise was whether to adopt versions of ABA Model Rules 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, or retain the duty to supervise only as an element of the duty of competence. The Commission concluded adopting these proposed rules provides important public protection and critical guidance to lawyers possessing managerial authority by more specifically describing a lawyer's duty to supervise other lawyers (proposed rule 5.1) and non-lawyer personnel (proposed rule 5.3). Proposed rules 5.1 and 5.3 extend beyond the duty to supervise that is implicit in current rule 3-110 and include a duty on firm managers to have procedures and practices that foster ethical conduct within a law firm. Current rule 3-110 includes a duty to supervise but says nothing about the subordinate lawyer's duties. Proposed rule 5.2 addresses this omission by stating a subordinate lawyer generally cannot defend a disciplinary charge by blaming the supervisor. Although California's current rules have no equivalent to proposed rule 5.2, there appears to be no conflict with the proposed rule and current California law in that there is no known California authority that permits a subordinate lawyer to defend a disciplinary charge based on clearly improper directions from a senior lawyer.

The following is a summary of proposed rule 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer).[2] This proposed rule has been adopted by the Commission for submission to the Board of

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[1] The first Discussion paragraph to current rule 3-110 provides:

> The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents. (See, e.g., *Waysman v. State Bar* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 452; *Trousil v. State Bar* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 342 [211 Cal.Rptr. 525]; *Palomo v. State Bar* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785 [205 Cal.Rptr. 834]; *Crane v. State Bar* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 122; *Black v. State Bar* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 692 [103 Cal.Rptr. 288; 499 P.2d 968]; *Vaughn v. State Bar* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 847, 857-858 [100 Cal.Rptr. 713; 494 P.2d 1257]; *Moore v. State Bar* (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 81 [41 Cal.Rptr. 161; 396 P.2d 577].)

[2] The Executive Summaries for proposed rules 5.1 and 5.3 are provided separately.

Trustees for public comment authorization. A final recommended rule will follow the public comment process.

Proposed rule 5.2 adopts the substance of ABA Model Rule 5.2. Paragraph (a) provides that a subordinate lawyer has an independent duty to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct. For example, a lawyer cannot claim he or she was just following the orders of a supervisor and therefore is not subject to discipline. However, paragraph (b) provides that when the supervising lawyer reasonably resolves an "arguable question of professional duty," the subordinate does not commit a violation by following the supervisor's direction.

There is one comment to the rule. The comment explains how the rule should be applied when a subordinate lawyer encounters a question involving professional judgment as to the lawyer's responsibilities under the Rules of Professional Conduct or the State Bar Act.

National Background – Adoption of Model Rule 5.2

As California does not presently have a direct counterpart to Model Rule 5.2, this section reports on the adoption of the Model Rule in United States' jurisdictions. The ABA Comparison Chart, entitled "Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5.2: Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer," revised May 5, 2015, is available at:

- http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_5_2.pdf

Forty-three jurisdictions have adopted Model Rule 5.2 verbatim. Five jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 5.2. Three jurisdictions have not adopted a version of Model Rule 5.2.

Post-Public Comment Revisions

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 5.2 at its November 17, 2016 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as modified by the Court to be effective November 1, 2018. An omitted asterisk for a defined term was added.

Rule 5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer
(Redline Comparison to the ABA Model Rule)

(a) A lawyer ~~is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct~~shall comply with these rules and the State Bar Act notwithstanding that the lawyer ~~acted~~acts at the direction of another lawyer or other person.*

(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate ~~the Rules of Professional Conduct~~these rules or the State Bar Act if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory ~~lawyer's~~lawyer's reasonable* resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

Comment

~~[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character.~~

~~[2]~~ When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ~~ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If~~the lawyers' responsibilities under these rules or the State Bar Act and the question can reasonably* be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. ~~However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate~~Accordingly, the subordinate lawyer must comply with his or her obligations under paragraph (a). If the question reasonably* can be answered more than one way, the supervisory lawyer may assume responsibility for determining which of the reasonable* alternatives to select, and the subordinate may be guided accordingly. ~~For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor's reasonable~~If the subordinate lawyer believes* that the supervisor's proposed resolution of the question ~~should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.~~of professional duty would result in a violation of these rules or the State Bar Act, the subordinate is obligated to communicate his or her professional judgment regarding the matter to the supervisory lawyer.

Rule 5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants
(Rule Approved by the Supreme Court, Effective November 1, 2018)

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

(a) a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm,* shall make reasonable* efforts to ensure that the firm* has in effect measures giving reasonable* assurance that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer, whether or not an employee of the same law firm,* shall make reasonable* efforts to ensure that the person's* conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person* that would be a violation of these rules or the State Bar Act if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer, individually or together with other lawyers, possesses managerial authority in the law firm* in which the person* is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person,* whether or not an employee of the same law firm,* and knows* of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable* remedial action.

Comment

Lawyers often utilize nonlawyer personnel, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning all ethical aspects of their employment. The measures employed in instructing and supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they might not have legal training.

NEW RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.3
(See Former Rule 3-110 Discussion)
Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In connection with consideration of current rule 3-110 (Failing to Act Competently), the Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Commission") has reviewed and evaluated ABA Model Rules 5.1 (Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers), 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer), and 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants). The Commission also reviewed relevant California statutes, rules, and case law relating to the issues addressed by the proposed rules. Although these proposed rules have no direct counterpart in the current California rules, the concept of the duty to supervise is found in the first Discussion paragraph to current rule 3-110, which states: "The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents."[1] The result of this evaluation is proposed rules 5.1 (Responsibilities of Managerial and Supervisory Lawyers), 5.2 (Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer), and 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants).

Rule As Issued For 90-day Public Comment

The main issue considered when evaluating a lawyer's duty to supervise was whether to adopt versions of ABA Model Rules 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, or retain the duty to supervise only as an element of the duty of competence. The Commission concluded adopting these proposed rules provides important public protection and critical guidance to lawyers possessing managerial authority by more specifically describing a lawyer's duty to supervise other lawyers (proposed rule 5.1) and non-lawyer personnel (proposed rule 5.3). Proposed rules 5.1 and 5.3 extend beyond the duty to supervise that is implicit in current rule 3-110 and include a duty on firm managers to have procedures and practices that foster ethical conduct within a law firm. Current rule 3-110 includes a duty to supervise but says nothing about the subordinate lawyer's duties. Proposed rule 5.2 addresses this omission by stating a subordinate lawyer generally cannot defend a disciplinary charge by blaming the supervisor. Although California's current rules have no equivalent to proposed rule 5.2, there appears to be no conflict with the proposed rule and current California law in that there is no known California authority that permits a subordinate lawyer to defend a disciplinary charge based on clearly improper directions from a senior lawyer.

The following is a summary of proposed rule 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants).[2]

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[1] The first Discussion paragraph to current rule 3-110 provides:

> The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents. (See, e.g., *Waysman v. State Bar* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 452; *Trousil v. State Bar* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 342 [211 Cal.Rptr. 525]; *Palomo v. State Bar* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785 [205 Cal.Rptr. 834]; *Crane v. State Bar* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 122; *Black v. State Bar* (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 692 [103 Cal.Rptr. 288; 499 P.2d 968]; *Vaughn v. State Bar* (1972) 6 Cal.3d 847, 857-858 [100 Cal.Rptr. 713; 494 P.2d 1257]; *Moore v. State Bar* (1964) 62 Cal.2d 74, 81 [41 Cal.Rptr. 161; 396 P.2d 577].)

[2] The Executive Summaries for proposed rules 5.1 and 5.2 are provided separately.

Proposed rule 5.3 adopts the substance of ABA Model Rule 5.3. Proposed rule 5.3 is very similar to proposed rule 5.1. The major difference is that proposed rule 5.3 applies to the supervision of nonalwyer assistants and other legal support services, whereas proposed rule 5.1 applies to the supervision of lawyers. Proposed rule 5.3(a) requires that managing lawyers make "reasonable efforts to ensure" the law firm has measures that provide reasonable assurance that a nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. Paragraph (b) requires that a lawyer who directly supervises a nonlawyer make "reasonable efforts to ensure" the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer, whether or not the nonlawyer is an employee of the same firm. Neither provision imposes vicarious liability. However, a lawyer will be responsible for the conduct of a nonlawyer under paragraph (c) if a lawyer either ordered or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and specific conduct, ratifies the conduct of the nonlawyer, ((c)(1)), or knowing of the misconduct, failed to take remedial action when there was still time to avoid or mitigate the consequences, ((c)(2)).

There is one comment to the rule. The comment states the policy underlying the rule and explains the lawyer's obligation in complying with the rule.

National Background – Adoption of Model Rule 5.3

As California does not presently have a direct counterpart to Model Rule 5.3, this section reports on the adoption of the Model Rule in United States' jurisdictions. The ABA Comparison Chart, entitled "Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants," revised May 5, 2015, is available at:

- http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_5_3.pdf

Thirty-four jurisdictions have adopted Model Rule 5.3 verbatim. Ten jurisdictions have adopted a slightly modified version of Model Rule 5.3. Six jurisdictions have adopted a version of the rule that is substantially different from Model Rule 5.3. Only one jurisdiction has not adopted a version Model Rule 5.3: California.

Post-Public Comment Revisions

After consideration of comments received in response to the initial 90-day public comment period, the Commission made no changes to the proposed rule and voted to recommend that the Board adopt the proposed rule.

The Board adopted proposed rule 5.3 at its November 17, 2016 meeting.

Supreme Court Action (May 10, 2018)

The Supreme Court approved the rule as modified by the Court to be effective November 1, 2018. An omitted asterisk for a defined term was added.

Rule 5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer ~~Assistance~~Assistants
(Redline Comparison to the ABA Model Rule)

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

(a) a ~~partner, and a~~ lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses ~~comparable~~ managerial authority in a law firm,* shall make reasonable* efforts to ensure that the firm* has in effect measures giving reasonable* assurance that the ~~person's~~nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer, whether or not an employee of the same law firm,* shall make reasonable* efforts to ensure that the person's* conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person* that would be a violation of ~~the Rules of Professional Conduct~~these rules or the State Bar Act if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with ~~the~~ knowledge of the relevant facts and of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer ~~is a partner or has comparable~~, individually or together with other lawyers, possesses managerial authority in the law firm* in which the person* is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person,* whether or not an employee of the same law firm,* and knows* of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable* remedial action.

Comment

~~[1] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm and nonlawyers outside the firm who work on firm matters act in a way compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. See Comment [6] to Rule 1.1 (retaining lawyers outside the firm) and Comment [1] to Rule 5.1 (responsibilities with respect to lawyers within a firm). Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over such nonlawyers within or outside the firm. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for the conduct of such nonlawyers within or outside the firm that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer.~~

~~*Nonlawyers Within the Firm*~~

~~[2]~~ Lawyers ~~generally employ assistants in their practice~~often utilize nonlawyer personnel, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act

for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning ~~the~~all ethical aspects of their employment~~, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product~~. The measures employed in instructing and supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they ~~do~~might not have legal training ~~and are not subject to professional discipline~~.

~~*Nonlawyers Outside the Firm*~~

~~[3] A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client. Examples include the retention of an investigative or paraprofessional service, hiring a document management company to create and maintain a database for complex litigation, sending client documents to a third party for printing or scanning, and using an Internet-based service to store client information. When using such services outside the firm, a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the services are provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations. The extent of this obligation will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, experience and reputation of the nonlawyer; the nature of the services involved; the terms of any arrangements concerning the protection of client information; and the legal and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly with regard to confidentiality. See also Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.2 (allocation of authority), 1.4 (communication with client), 1.6 (confidentiality), 5.4(a) (professional independence of the lawyer), and 5.5(a) (unauthorized practice of law). When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, a lawyer should communicate directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.~~

~~[4] Where the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer service provider outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the client concerning the allocation of responsibility for monitoring as between the client and the lawyer. See Rule 1.2. When making such an allocation in a matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules.~~

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT
FORMAL OPINION NO. 2010-179

ISSUE: Does an attorney violate the duties of confidentiality and competence he or she owes to a client by using technology to transmit or store confidential client information when the technology may be susceptible to unauthorized access by third parties?

DIGEST: Whether an attorney violates his or her duties of confidentiality and competence when using technology to transmit or store confidential client information will depend on the particular technology being used and the circumstances surrounding such use. Before using a particular technology in the course of representing a client, an attorney must take appropriate steps to evaluate: 1) the level of security attendant to the use of that technology, including whether reasonable precautions may be taken when using the technology to increase the level of security; 2) the legal ramifications to a third party who intercepts, accesses or exceeds authorized use of the electronic information; 3) the degree of sensitivity of the information; 4) the possible impact on the client of an inadvertent disclosure of privileged or confidential information or work product; 5) the urgency of the situation; and 6) the client's instructions and circumstances, such as access by others to the client's devices and communications.

AUTHORITIES INTERPRETED: Rules 3-100 and 3-110 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct.

Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1).

Evidence Code sections 917(a) and 952.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Attorney is an associate at a law firm that provides a laptop computer for his use on client and firm matters and which includes software necessary to his practice. As the firm informed Attorney when it hired him, the computer is subject to the law firm's access as a matter of course for routine maintenance and also for monitoring to ensure that the computer and software are not used in violation of the law firm's computer and Internet-use policy. Unauthorized access by employees or unauthorized use of the data obtained during the course of such maintenance or monitoring is expressly prohibited. Attorney's supervisor is also permitted access to Attorney's computer to review the substance of his work and related communications.

Client has asked for Attorney's advice on a matter. Attorney takes his laptop computer to the local coffee shop and accesses a public wireless Internet connection to conduct legal research on the matter and email Client. He also takes the laptop computer home to conduct the research and email Client from his personal wireless system.

DISCUSSION

Due to the ever-evolving nature of technology and its integration in virtually every aspect of our daily lives, attorneys are faced with an ongoing responsibility of evaluating the level of security of technology that has increasingly become an indispensable tool in the practice of law. The Committee's own research – including conferring with computer security experts – causes it to understand that, without appropriate safeguards (such as firewalls, secure username/password combinations, and encryption), data transmitted wirelessly can be intercepted and read with increasing ease. Unfortunately, guidance to attorneys in this area has not kept pace with technology. Rather than engage in a technology-by-technology analysis, which would likely become obsolete shortly, this

opinion sets forth the general analysis that an attorney should undertake when considering use of a particular form of technology.

1. The Duty of Confidentiality

In California, attorneys have an express duty "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client."[1/] (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (e)(1).) This duty arises from the relationship of trust between an attorney and a client and, absent the informed consent of the client to reveal such information, the duty of confidentiality has very few exceptions. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-100 & discussion ["[A] member may not reveal such information except with the consent of the client or as authorized or required by the State Bar Act, these rules, or other law."].)[2/]

Unlike Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC"), the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality under rule 3-100 do not expressly include disclosure "impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation." (MRPC, Rule 1.6.) Nevertheless, the absence of such language in the California Rules of Professional Conduct does not prohibit an attorney from using postal or courier services, telephone lines, or other modes of communication beyond face-to-face meetings, in order to effectively carry out the representation. There is a distinction between actually disclosing confidential information to a third party for purposes ancillary to the representation,[3/] on the one hand, and using appropriately secure technology provided by a third party as a method of communicating with the client or researching a client's matter,[4/] on the other hand.

Section 952 of the California Evidence Code, defining "confidential communication between client and lawyer" for purposes of application of the attorney-client privilege, includes disclosure of information to third persons "to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted." (Evid. Code, § 952.) While the duty to protect confidential client information is broader in scope than the attorney-client privilege (Discussion [2] to rule 3-100; *Goldstein v. Lees* (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614, 621, fn. 5 [120 Cal.Rptr. 253]), the underlying principle remains the same, namely, that transmission of information through a third party reasonably necessary for purposes of the representation should not be deemed to have destroyed the confidentiality of the information. (See Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2003-161 [repeating the Committee's prior observation "that the duty of confidentiality and the evidentiary privilege share the same basic policy foundation: to encourage clients to disclose all possibly pertinent information to their attorneys so that the attorneys may effectively represent the clients' interests."].) Pertinent here, the manner in which an attorney acts to safeguard confidential client information is governed by the duty of competence, and determining whether a third party has the ability to access and use confidential client information in a manner that is unauthorized by the client is a subject that must be considered in conjunction with that duty.

2. The Duty of Competence

Rule 3-110(A) prohibits the intentional, reckless or repeated failure to perform legal services with competence. Pertinent here, "competence" may apply to an attorney's diligence and learning with respect to handling matters for clients. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-110(B).) The duty of competence also applies to an attorney's "duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents." (Discussion to rule 3-110.)

1/ "Secrets" include "[a]ny 'information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client.'" (Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 1981-58.)

2/ Unless otherwise indicated, all future references to rules in this opinion will be to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California.

3/ In this regard, compare Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 1971-25 (use of an outside data processing center without the client's consent for bookkeeping, billing, accounting and statistical purposes, if such information includes client secrets and confidences, would violate section 6068, subdivision (e)), with Los Angeles County Bar Assn. Formal Opn. No. 374 (1978) (concluding that in most circumstances, if protective conditions are observed, disclosure of client's secrets and confidences to a central data processor would not violate section 6068(e) and would be the same as disclosures to non-lawyer office employees).

4/ Cf. Evid. Code, § 917(b) ("A communication … does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication.").

With respect to acting competently to preserve confidential client information, the comments to Rule 1.6 of the MRPC[5/] provide:

> [16] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3.
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> [17] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.

(MRPC, cmts. 16 & 17 to Rule 1.6.) In this regard, the duty of competence includes taking appropriate steps to ensure both that secrets and privileged information of a client remain confidential and that the attorney's handling of such information does not result in a waiver of any privileges or protections.

3. Factors to Consider

In accordance with the duties of confidentiality and competence, an attorney should consider the following before using a specific technology:[6/]

a) The attorney's ability to assess the level of security afforded by the technology, including without limitation:

   i) Consideration of how the particular technology differs from other media use. For example, while one court has stated that, "[u]nlike postal mail, simple e-mail generally is not 'sealed' or secure, and can be accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and recipient (unless the message is encrypted)" (*American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno* (E.D.Pa. 1996) 929 F.Supp. 824, 834, aff'd (1997) 521 U.S. 844 [117 S.Ct. 2329]), most bar associations have taken the position that the risks of a third party's unauthorized review of email (whether by interception or delivery to an unintended recipient) are similar to the risks that confidential client information transmitted by standard mail service will be opened by any of the many hands it passes through on the way to its recipient or will be misdirected[7/] (see, e.g., ABA Formal Opn. No. 99-413[8/] [concluding that attorneys have a reasonable expectation of privacy in email communications, even if unencrypted, "despite some risk of interception and disclosure"]; Los Angeles County Bar Assn. Formal Opn. No. 514 (2005) ["Lawyers are not required

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[5/] In the absence of on-point California authority and conflicting state public policy, the MRPC may serve as guidelines. (*City & County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc.* (2006) 38 Cal. 4th 839, 852 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 771].)

[6/] These factors should be considered regardless of whether the attorney practices in a law firm, a governmental agency, a non-profit organization, a company, as a sole practitioner or otherwise.

[7/] Rule 1-100(A) provides that "[e]thics opinions and rules and standards promulgated by other jurisdictions and bar associations may . . . be considered" for professional conduct guidance.

[8/] In 1999, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility reviewed state bar ethics opinions across the country and determined that, as attorneys' understanding of technology has improved, the opinions generally have transitioned from concluding that use of Internet email violates confidentiality obligations to concluding that use of unencrypted Internet email is permitted without express client consent. (ABA Formal Opn. No. 99-413 [detailing various positions taken in state ethics opinions from Alaska, Washington D.C., Kentucky, New York, Illinois, North Dakota, South Carolina, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Iowa and North Carolina].)

to encrypt e-mail containing confidential client communications because e-mail poses no greater risk of interception and disclosure than regular mail, phones or faxes."]; Orange County Bar Assn. Formal Opn. No. 97-0002 [concluding use of encrypted email is encouraged, but not required].) (See also *City of Reno v. Reno Police Protective Assn.* (2003) 118 Nev. 889, 897-898 [59 P.3d 1212] [referencing an earlier version of section 952 of the California Evidence Code and concluding "that a document transmitted by e-mail is protected by the attorney-client privilege as long as the requirements of the privilege are met."].)

ii) Whether reasonable precautions may be taken when using the technology to increase the level of security.[9/] As with the above-referenced views expressed on email, the fact that opinions differ on whether a particular technology is secure suggests that attorneys should take reasonable steps as a precautionary measure to protect against disclosure.[10/] For example, depositing confidential client mail in a secure postal box or handing it directly to the postal carrier or courier is a reasonable step for an attorney to take to protect the confidentiality of such mail, as opposed to leaving the mail unattended in an open basket outside of the office door for pick up by the postal service. Similarly, encrypting email may be a reasonable step for an attorney to take in an effort to ensure the confidentiality of such communications remain so when the circumstance calls for it, particularly if the information at issue is highly sensitive and the use of encryption is not onerous. To place the risks in perspective, it should not be overlooked that the very nature of digital technologies makes it easier for a third party to intercept a much greater amount of confidential information in a much shorter period of time than would be required to transfer the same amount of data in hard copy format. In this regard, if an attorney can readily employ encryption when using public wireless connections and has enabled his or her personal firewall, the risks of unauthorized access may be significantly reduced.[11/] Both of these tools are readily available and relatively inexpensive, and may already be built into the operating system. Likewise, activating password protection features on mobile devices, such as laptops and PDAs, presently helps protect against access to confidential client information by a third party if the device is lost, stolen or left unattended. (See David Ries & Reid Trautz, *Law Practice Today*, "Securing Your Clients' Data While On the Road," October 2008 [noting reports that "as many as 10% of laptops used by American businesses are stolen during their useful lives and 97% of them are never recovered"].)

iii) Limitations on who is permitted to monitor the use of the technology, to what extent and on what grounds. For example, if a license to use certain software or a technology service imposes a requirement of third party access to information related to the attorney's use of the technology, the attorney may need to confirm that the terms of the requirement or authorization do not permit the third party to disclose confidential client information to others or use such information for any purpose other than to ensure the functionality of the software or that the technology is not being used for an improper purpose, particularly if the information at issue is highly sensitive.[12/] "Under Rule 5.3 [of the MRPC], a lawyer retaining such an outside service provider is required to make reasonable efforts to ensure that

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[9/] Attorneys also should employ precautions to protect confidential information when in public, such as ensuring that the person sitting in the adjacent seat on an airplane cannot see the computer screen or moving to a private location before discussing confidential information on a mobile phone.

[10/] Section 60(1)(b) of the Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers provides that "a lawyer must take steps reasonable in the circumstances to protect confidential client information against impermissible use or disclosure by the lawyer's associates or agents that may adversely affect a material interest of the client or otherwise than as instructed by the client."

[11/] Similarly, this Committee has stated that if an attorney is going to maintain client documents in electronic form, he or she must take reasonable steps to strip any metadata containing confidential information of other clients before turning such materials over to a current or former client or his or her new attorney. (See Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. 2007-174.)

[12/] A similar approach might be appropriate if the attorney is employed by a non-profit or governmental organization where information may be monitored by a person or entity with interests potentially or actually in conflict with the attorney's client. In such cases, the attorney should not use the technology for the representation, absent informed consent by the client or the ability to employ safeguards to prevent access to confidential client information. The attorney also may need to consider whether he or she can competently represent the client without the technology.

the service provider will not make unauthorized disclosures of client information. Thus when a lawyer considers entering into a relationship with such a service provider he must ensure that the service provider has in place, or will establish, reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality of information to which it gains access, and moreover, that it fully understands its obligations in this regard. [Citation.] In connection with this inquiry, a lawyer might be well-advised to secure from the service provider in writing, along with or apart from any written contract for services that might exist, a written statement of the service provider's assurance of confidentiality." (ABA Formal Opn. No. 95-398.)

Many attorneys, as with a large contingent of the general public, do not possess much, if any, technological savvy. Although the Committee does not believe that attorneys must develop a mastery of the security features and deficiencies of each technology available, the duties of confidentiality and competence that attorneys owe to their clients do require a basic understanding of the electronic protections afforded by the technology they use in their practice. If the attorney lacks the necessary competence to assess the security of the technology, he or she must seek additional information or consult with someone who possesses the necessary knowledge, such as an information technology consultant.[13/] (Cf. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-110(C) ["If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal service is undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform such services competently by 1) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent, or 2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required."].)

b) Legal ramifications to third parties of intercepting, accessing or exceeding authorized use of another person's electronic information. The fact that a third party could be subject to criminal charges or civil claims for intercepting, accessing or engaging in unauthorized use of confidential client information favors an expectation of privacy with respect to a particular technology. (See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. [Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986]; 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. [Computer Fraud and Abuse Act]; Pen. Code, § 502(c) [making certain unauthorized access to computers, computer systems and computer data a criminal offense]; Cal. Pen. Code, § 629.86 [providing a civil cause of action to "[a]ny person whose wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of [Chapter 1.4 on Interception of Wire, Electronic Digital Pager, or Electronic Cellular Telephone Communications]."]; *eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.* (N.D.Cal. 2000) 100 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1070 [in case involving use of web crawlers that exceeded plaintiff's consent, court stated "[c]onduct that does not amount to a substantial interference with possession, but which consists of intermeddling with or use of another's personal property, is sufficient to establish a cause of action for trespass to chattel."].)[14/]

c) The degree of sensitivity of the information. The greater the sensitivity of the information, the less risk an attorney should take with technology. If the information is of a highly sensitive nature and there is a risk of disclosure when using a particular technology, the attorney should consider alternatives unless the client provides informed consent.[15/] As noted above, if another person may have access to the communications transmitted between the attorney and the client (or others necessary to the representation), and may have an interest in the information being disclosed that is in conflict with the client's interest, the attorney should take precautions to ensure that the person will not be able to access the information or should avoid using the technology. These types of situations increase the likelihood for intrusion.

[13/] Some potential security issues may be more apparent than others. For example, users of unsecured public wireless connections may receive a warning when accessing the connection. However, in most instances, users must take affirmative steps to determine whether the technology is secure.

[14/] Attorneys also have corresponding legal and ethical obligations not to invade the confidential and privileged information of others.

[15/] For the client's consent to be informed, the attorney should fully advise the client about the nature of the information to be transmitted with the technology, the purpose of the transmission and use of the information, the benefits and detriments that may result from transmission (both legal and nonlegal), and any other facts that may be important to the client's decision. (Los Angeles County Bar Assn. Formal Opn. No. 456 (1989).) It is particularly important for an attorney to discuss the risks and potential harmful consequences of using the technology when seeking informed consent.

d) Possible impact on the client of an inadvertent disclosure of privileged or confidential information or work product, including possible waiver of the privileges.[16/] Section 917(a) of the California Evidence Code provides that "a communication made in confidence in the course of the lawyer-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, clergy-penitent, husband-wife, sexual assault counselor-victim, or domestic violence counselor-victim relationship … is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential." (Evid. Code, § 917(a).) Significantly, subsection (b) of section 917 states that such a communication "does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication." (Evid. Code, § 917(b). See also Penal Code, § 629.80 ["No otherwise privileged communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of [Chapter 1.4] shall lose its privileged character."]; 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) ["No otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of [18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.] shall lose its privileged character."].) While these provisions seem to provide a certain level of comfort in using technology for such communications, they are not a complete safeguard. For example, it is possible that, if a particular technology lacks essential security features, use of such a technology could be deemed to have waived these protections. Where the attorney-client privilege is at issue, failure to use sufficient precautions may be considered in determining waiver.[17/] Further, the analysis differs with regard to an attorney's duty of confidentiality. Harm from waiver of attorney-client privilege is possible depending on if and how the information is used, but harm from disclosure of confidential client information may be immediate as it does not necessarily depend on use or admissibility of the information, including as it does matters which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client if disclosed.

e) The urgency of the situation. If use of the technology is necessary to address an imminent situation or exigent circumstances and other alternatives are not reasonably available, it may be reasonable in limited cases for the attorney to do so without taking additional precautions.

f) Client instructions and circumstances. If a client has instructed an attorney not to use certain technology due to confidentiality or other concerns or an attorney is aware that others have access to the client's electronic devices or accounts and may intercept or be exposed to confidential client information, then such technology should not be used in the course of the representation.[18/]

4. Application to Fact Pattern[19/]

In applying these factors to Attorney's situation, the Committee does not believe that Attorney would violate his duties of confidentiality or competence to Client by using the laptop computer because access is limited to authorized individuals to perform required tasks. However, Attorney should confirm that personnel have been appropriately instructed regarding client confidentiality and are supervised in accordance with rule 3-110. (See *Crane v. State Bar* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 123 [177 Cal.Rptr. 670] ["An attorney is responsible for the work product of his employees which is performed pursuant to his direction and authority."]; *In re Complex Asbestos Litig.* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 588 [283 Cal.Rptr. 732] [discussing law firm's ability to supervise employees and ensure they protect client confidences]; Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 1979-50 [discussing lawyer's duty to explain to

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16/ Consideration of evidentiary issues is beyond the scope of this opinion, which addresses only the ethical implications of using certain technologies.

17/ For example, with respect to the impact of inadvertent disclosure on the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, rule 502(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "When made in a Federal proceeding or to a Federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a Federal or State proceeding if: 1. the disclosure is inadvertent; 2. the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and 3. the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B)." As a practical matter, attorneys also should use appropriate confidentiality labels and notices when transmitting confidential or privileged client information.

18/ In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to obtain a client's informed consent to the use of a particular technology.

19/ In this opinion, we are applying the factors to the use of computers and wireless connections to assist the reader in understanding how such factors function in practice. Use of other electronic devices would require similar considerations.

employee what obligations exist with respect to confidentiality].) In addition, access to the laptop by Attorney's supervisor would be appropriate in light of her duty to supervise Attorney in accordance with rule 3-110 and her own fiduciary duty to Client to keep such information confidential.

With regard to the use of a public wireless connection, the Committee believes that, due to the lack of security features provided in most public wireless access locations, Attorney risks violating his duties of confidentiality and competence in using the wireless connection at the coffee shop to work on Client's matter unless he takes appropriate precautions, such as using a combination of file encryption, encryption of wireless transmissions and a personal firewall.[20/] Depending on the sensitivity of the matter, Attorney may need to avoid using the public wireless connection entirely or notify Client of possible risks attendant to his use of the public wireless connection, including potential disclosure of confidential information and possible waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protections, and seek her informed consent to do so.[21/]

Finally, if Attorney's personal wireless system has been configured with appropriate security features,[22/] the Committee does not believe that Attorney would violate his duties of confidentiality and competence by working on Client's matter at home. Otherwise, Attorney may need to notify Client of the risks and seek her informed consent, as with the public wireless connection.

CONCLUSION

An attorney's duties of confidentiality and competence require the attorney to take appropriate steps to ensure that his or her use of technology in conjunction with a client's representation does not subject confidential client information to an undue risk of unauthorized disclosure. Because of the evolving nature of technology and differences in security features that are available, the attorney must ensure the steps are sufficient for each form of technology being used and must continue to monitor the efficacy of such steps.

This opinion is issued by the Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the State Bar of California. It is advisory only. It is not binding upon the courts, the State Bar of California, its Board of Governors, any persons, or tribunals charged with regulatory responsibilities, or any member of the State Bar.

[20/] Local security features available for use on individual computers include operating system firewalls, antivirus and antispam software, secure username and password combinations, and file permissions, while network safeguards that may be employed include network firewalls, network access controls such as virtual private networks (VPNs), inspection and monitoring. This list is not intended to be exhaustive.

[21/] Due to the possibility that files contained on a computer may be accessed by hackers while the computer is operating on an unsecure network connection and when appropriate local security features, such as firewalls, are not enabled, attorneys should be aware that *any* client's confidential information stored on the computer may be at risk regardless of whether the attorney has the file open at the time.

[22/] Security features available on wireless access points will vary and should be evaluated on an individual basis.

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT
FORMAL OPINION NO. 2015-193

ISSUE: What are an attorney's ethical duties in the handling of discovery of electronically stored information?

DIGEST: An attorney's obligations under the ethical duty of competence evolve as new technologies develop and become integrated with the practice of law. Attorney competence related to litigation generally requires, among other things, and at a minimum, a basic understanding of, and facility with, issues relating to e-discovery, including the discovery of electronically stored information ("ESI"). On a case-by-case basis, the duty of competence may require a higher level of technical knowledge and ability, depending on the e-discovery issues involved in a matter, and the nature of the ESI. Competency may require even a highly experienced attorney to seek assistance in some litigation matters involving ESI. An attorney lacking the required competence for e-discovery issues has three options: (1) acquire sufficient learning and skill before performance is required; (2) associate with or consult technical consultants or competent counsel; or (3) decline the client representation. Lack of competence in e-discovery issues also may lead to an ethical violation of an attorney's duty of confidentiality.

AUTHORITIES INTERPRETED: Rules 3-100 and 3-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California.[1/]

Business and Professions Code section 6068(e).

Evidence Code sections 952, 954 and 955.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Attorney defends Client in litigation brought by Client's Chief Competitor in a judicial district that mandates consideration of e-discovery[2/] issues in its formal case management order, which is consistent with California Rules of Court, rule 3.728. Opposing Counsel demands e-discovery; Attorney refuses. They are unable to reach an agreement by the time of the initial case management conference. At that conference, an annoyed Judge informs both attorneys they have had ample prior notice that e-discovery would be addressed at the conference and tells them to return in two hours with a joint proposal.

In the ensuing meeting between the two lawyers, Opposing Counsel suggests a joint search of Client's network, using Opposing Counsel's chosen vendor, based upon a jointly agreed search term list. She offers a clawback agreement that would permit Client to claw back any inadvertently produced ESI that is protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine ("Privileged ESI").

[1/] Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules in this opinion will be to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California.

[2/] Electronically stored information ("ESI") is information that is stored in technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities (e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.020, sub. (d) – (e)). Electronic Discovery, also known as e-discovery, is the use of legal means to obtain ESI in the course of litigation for evidentiary purposes.

Attorney believes the clawback agreement will allow him to pull back anything he "inadvertently" produces. Attorney concludes that Opposing Counsel's proposal is acceptable and, after advising Client about the terms and obtaining Client's authority, agrees to Opposing Counsel's proposal. Judge thereafter approves the attorneys' joint agreement and incorporates it into a Case Management Order, including the provision for the clawback of Privileged ESI. The Court sets a deadline three months later for the network search to occur.

Back in his office, Attorney prepares a list of keywords he thinks would be relevant to the case, and provides them to Opposing Counsel as Client's agreed upon search terms. Attorney reviews Opposing Counsel's additional proposed search terms, which on their face appear to be neutral and not advantageous to one party or the other, and agrees that they may be included.

Attorney has represented Client before, and knows Client is a large company with an information technology ("IT") department. Client's CEO tells Attorney there is no electronic information it has not already provided to Attorney in hard copy form. Attorney assumes that the IT department understands network searches better than he does and, relying on that assumption and the information provided by CEO, concludes it is unnecessary to do anything further beyond instructing Client to provide Vendor direct access to its network on the agreed upon search date. Attorney takes no further action to review the available data or to instruct Client or its IT staff about the search or discovery. As directed by Attorney, Client gives Vendor unsupervised direct access to its network to run the search using the search terms.

Subsequently, Attorney receives an electronic copy of the data retrieved by Vendor's search and, busy with other matters, saves it in an electronic file without review. He believes that the data will match the hard copy documents provided by Client that he already has reviewed, based on Client's CEO's representation that all information has already been provided to Attorney.

A few weeks later, Attorney receives a letter from Opposing Counsel accusing Client of destroying evidence and/or spoliation. Opposing Counsel threatens motions for monetary and evidentiary sanctions. After Attorney receives this letter, he unsuccessfully attempts to open his electronic copy of the data retrieved by Vendor's search. Attorney hires an e-discovery expert ("Expert"), who accesses the data, conducts a forensic search, and tells Attorney potentially responsive ESI has been routinely deleted from Client's computers as part of Client's normal document retention policy, resulting in gaps in the document production. Expert also advises Attorney that, due to the breadth of Vendor's execution of the jointly agreed search terms, both privileged information and irrelevant but highly proprietary information about Client's upcoming revolutionary product were provided to Chief Competitor in the data retrieval. Expert advises Attorney that an IT professional with litigation experience likely would have recognized the overbreadth of the search and prevented the retrieval of the proprietary information.

What ethical issues face Attorney relating to the e-discovery issues in this hypothetical?

DISCUSSION

I. Duty of Competence

A. Did Attorney Violate The Duty of Competence Arising From His Own Acts/Omissions?

While e-discovery may be relatively new to the legal profession, an attorney's core ethical duty of competence remains constant. Rule 3-110(A) provides: "A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence." Under subdivision (B) of that rule, "competence" in legal services shall mean to apply the diligence, learning and skill, and mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such service. Read together, a mere failure to act competently does not trigger discipline under rule 3-110. Rather, it is the failure to do so in a manner that is intentional, reckless or repeated that would result in a disciplinable rule 3-110 violation. (See *In the Matter of Torres* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 138, 149 ("We have repeatedly held that negligent legal representation, even that amounting to legal malpractice, does not establish a [competence] rule 3-110(A) violation."); see also, *In the Matter of Gadda* (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 416 (reckless and repeated acts); *In the Matter of Riordan* (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41 (reckless and repeated acts).)

Legal rules and procedures, when placed alongside ever-changing technology, produce professional challenges that attorneys must meet to remain competent. Maintaining learning and skill consistent with an attorney's duty of competence includes keeping "abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, . . ." ABA Model Rule 1.1, Comment [8].[3/] Rule 3-110(C) provides: "If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal service is undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform such services competently by 1) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent, or 2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required." Another permissible choice would be to decline the representation. When e-discovery is at issue, association or consultation may be with a non-lawyer technical expert, if appropriate in the circumstances. Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2010-179.

Not every litigated case involves e-discovery. Yet, in today's technological world, almost every litigation matter *potentially* does. The chances are significant that a party or a witness has used email or other electronic communication, stores information digitally, and/or has other forms of ESI related to the dispute. The law governing e-discovery is still evolving. In 2009, the California Legislature passed California's Electronic Discovery Act adding or amending several California discovery statutes to make provisions for electronic discovery. See, e.g., Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010, paragraph (a) (expressly providing for "copying, testing, or sampling" of "electronically stored information in the possession, custody, or control of any other party to the action.")[4/] However, there is little California case law interpreting the Electronic Discovery Act, and much of the development of e-discovery law continues to occur in the federal arena. Thus, to analyze a California attorney's current ethical obligations relating to e-discovery, we look to the federal jurisprudence for guidance, as well as applicable Model Rules, and apply those principles based upon California's ethical rules and existing discovery law.[5/]

We start with the premise that "competent" handling of e-discovery has many dimensions, depending upon the complexity of e-discovery in a particular case. The ethical duty of competence requires an attorney to assess at the outset of each case what electronic discovery issues might arise during the litigation, including the likelihood that e-discovery will or should be sought by either side. If e-discovery will probably be sought, the duty of competence requires an attorney to assess his or her own e-discovery skills and resources as part of the attorney's duty to provide the client with competent representation. If an attorney lacks such skills and/or resources, the attorney must try to acquire sufficient learning and skill, or associate or consult with someone with expertise to assist. Rule 3-110(C). Attorneys handling e-discovery should be able to perform (either by themselves or in association with competent co-counsel or expert consultants) the following:

- initially assess e-discovery needs and issues, if any;
- implement/cause to implement appropriate ESI preservation procedures;[6/]

[3/] Although not binding, opinions of ethics committees in California should be consulted by members for guidance on proper professional conduct. Ethics opinions and rules and standards promulgated by other jurisdictions and bar associations may also be considered. Rule 1-100(A).

[4/] In 2006, revisions were made to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37 and 45, to address e-discovery issues in federal litigation. California modeled its Electronic Discovery Act to conform with mostly-parallel provisions in those 2006 federal rules amendments. (See Evans, *Analysis of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary regarding AB 5* (2009). (http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_5_cfa_20090302_114942_asm_comm.html).)

[5/] Federal decisions are compelling where the California law is based upon a federal statute or the federal rules. (See *Toshiba America Electronic Components, Inc. v. Superior Court (Lexar Media, Inc.)* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 762, 770 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 532]*; Vasquez v. Cal. School of Culinary Arts, Inc.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 35 [178 Cal.Rptr.3d 10]; see also footnote 4, *supra.*)

[6/] This opinion does not directly address ethical obligations relating to litigation holds. A litigation hold is a directive issued to, by, or on behalf of a client to persons or entities associated with the client who may possess potentially relevant documents (including ESI) that directs those custodians to preserve such documents, pending further direction. See generally Redgrave, *Sedona Conference ® Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger and The Process* (Fall 2010) The Sedona Conference Journal, Vol. 11 at pp. 260 – 270, 277 – 279. Prompt issuance of a litigation hold may prevent spoliation of evidence, and the duty to do so falls on both the party and outside counsel working on the matter. See

- analyze and understand a client's ESI systems and storage;
- advise the client on available options for collection and preservation of ESI;
- identify custodians of potentially relevant ESI;
- engage in competent and meaningful meet and confer with opposing counsel concerning an e-discovery plan;
- perform data searches;
- collect responsive ESI in a manner that preserves the integrity of that ESI; and
- produce responsive non-privileged ESI in a recognized and appropriate manner.[7/]

See, e.g., *Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC* (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 685 F.Supp.2d 456, 462 – 465 (defining gross negligence in the preservation of ESI), (abrogated on other grounds in *Chin v. Port Authority* (2nd Cir. 2012) 685 F.3d 135 (failure to institute litigation hold did not constitute gross negligence per se)).

In our hypothetical, Attorney had a general obligation to make an e-discovery evaluation early, prior to the initial case management conference. The fact that it was the standard practice of the judicial district in which the case was pending to address e-discovery issues in formal case management highlighted Attorney's obligation to conduct an early initial e-discovery evaluation.

Notwithstanding this obligation, Attorney made *no* assessment of the case's e-discovery needs or of his own capabilities. Attorney exacerbated the situation by not consulting with another attorney or an e-discovery expert prior to agreeing to an e-discovery plan at the initial case management conference. He then allowed that proposal to become a court order, again with no expert consultation, although he lacked sufficient expertise. Attorney participated in preparing joint e-discovery search terms without experience or expert consultation, and he did not fully understand the danger of overbreadth in the agreed upon search terms.

Even after Attorney stipulated to a court order directing a search of Client's network, Attorney took no action other than to instruct Client to allow Vendor to have access to Client's network. Attorney did not instruct or supervise Client regarding the direct network search or discovery, nor did he try to pre-test the agreed upon search terms or otherwise review the data before the network search, relying on his assumption that Client's IT department would know what to do, and on the parties' clawback agreement.

After the search, busy with other matters and under the impression the data matched the hard copy documents he had already seen, Attorney took no action to review the gathered data until after Opposing Counsel asserted spoliation and threatened sanctions. Attorney then unsuccessfully attempted to review the search results. It was only then, at the end of this long line of events, that Attorney finally consulted an e-discovery expert and learned of the e-discovery problems facing Client. By this point, the potential prejudice facing Client was significant, and much of the damage already had been done.

At the least, Attorney risked breaching his duty of competence when he failed at the outset of the case to perform a timely e-discovery evaluation. Once Opposing Counsel insisted on the exchange of e-discovery, it became certain that e-discovery would be implicated, and the risk of a breach of the duty of competence grew considerably; this should have prompted Attorney to take additional steps to obtain competence, as contemplated under rule 3-110(C), such as consulting an e-discovery expert.

[Footnote Continued…]

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 and *Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC* (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 229 F.R.D. 422, 432. Spoliation of evidence can result in significant sanctions, including monetary and/or evidentiary sanctions, which may impact a client's case significantly.

[7/] This opinion focuses on an attorney's ethical obligations relating to his own client's ESI and, therefore, this list focuses on those issues. This opinion does not address the scope of an attorney's duty of competence relating to obtaining an opposing party's ESI.

Had the e-discovery expert been consulted at the beginning, or at the latest once Attorney realized e-discovery would be required, the expert could have taken various steps to protect Client's interest, including possibly helping to structure the search differently, or drafting search terms less likely to turn over privileged and/or irrelevant but highly proprietary material. An expert also could have assisted Attorney in his duty to counsel Client of the significant risks in allowing a third party unsupervised direct access to Client's system due to the high risks and how to mitigate those risks. An expert also could have supervised the data collection by Vendor.[8/]

Whether Attorney's acts/omissions in this single case amount to a disciplinable offense under the "intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly" standard of rule 3-110 is beyond this opinion, yet such a finding could be implicated by these facts.[9/] See, e.g., *In the Matter of Respondent G.* (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 175, 179 (respondent did not perform competently where he was reminded on repeated occasions of inheritance taxes owed and repeatedly failed to advise his clients of them); *In re Matter of Copren* (Review Dept. 2005) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 861, 864 (respondent did not perform competently when he failed to take several acts in single bankruptcy matter); *In re Matter of Layton* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 366, 377 – 378 (respondent did not perform competently where he "recklessly" exceeded time to administer estate, failed to diligently sell/distribute real property, untimely settled supplemental accounting and did not notify beneficiaries of intentions not to sell/lease property).

B. Did Attorney Violate The Duty of Competence By Failing To Supervise?

The duty of competence in rule 3-110 includes the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorneys and non-attorney employees or agents. See Discussion to rule 3-110. This duty to supervise can extend to outside vendors or contractors, and even to the client itself. See California State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2004-165 (duty to supervise outside contract lawyers); San Diego County Bar Association Formal Opn. No. 2012-1 (duty to supervise clients relating to ESI, citing *Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc.* (D. Kan. 2006) 2006 WL 1537394).

Rule 3-110(C) permits an attorney to meet the duty of competence through association with another lawyer or consultation with an expert. See California State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2010-179. Such expert may be an outside vendor, a subordinate attorney, or even the client, if they possess the necessary expertise. This consultation or association, however, does not absolve an attorney's obligation to supervise the work of the expert under rule 3-110, which is a non-delegable duty belonging to the attorney who is counsel in the litigation, and who remains the one primarily answerable to the court. An attorney must maintain overall responsibility for the work of the expert he or she chooses, even if that expert is the client or someone employed by the client. The attorney must do so by remaining regularly engaged in the expert's work, by educating everyone involved in the e-discovery workup about the legal issues in the case, the factual matters impacting discovery, including witnesses and key evidentiary issues, the obligations around discovery imposed by the law or by the court, and of any relevant risks associated with the e-discovery tasks at hand. The attorney should issue appropriate instructions and guidance and, ultimately, conduct appropriate tests until satisfied that the attorney is meeting his ethical obligations prior to releasing ESI.

Here, relying on his familiarity with Client's IT department, Attorney assumed the department understood network searches better than he did. He gave them no further instructions other than to allow Vendor access on the date of the network search. He provided them with no information regarding how discovery works in litigation, differences

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[8/] See Advisory Committee Notes to the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 34 ("Inspection or testing of certain types of electronically stored information or of a responding party's electronic information system may raise issues of confidentiality or privacy. The addition of testing and sampling to Rule 34(a) . . . is not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party's electronic information system, although such access might be justified in some circumstances. Courts should guard against undue intrusiveness resulting from inspecting or testing such systems."). See also The Sedona Principles Addressing Electronic Document Production (2nd Ed. 2007), Comment 10(b) ("Special issues may arise with any request to secure direct access to electronically stored information or to computer devices or systems on which it resides. Protective orders should be in place to guard against any release of proprietary, confidential, or personal electronically stored information accessible to the adversary or its expert.").

[9/] This opinion does not intend to set or define a standard of care of attorneys for liability purposes, as standards of care can be highly dependent on the factual scenario and other factors not applicable to our analysis herein.

between a party affiliated vendor and a neutral vendor, what could constitute waiver under the law, what case-specific issues were involved, or the applicable search terms. Client allowed Vendor direct access to its entire network, without the presence of any Client representative to observe or monitor Vendor's actions. Vendor retrieved proprietary trade secret and privileged information, a result Expert advised Attorney could have been prevented had a trained IT individual been involved from the outset. In addition, Attorney failed to warn Client of the potential significant legal effect of not suspending its routine document deletion protocol under its document retention program.

Here, as with Attorney's own actions/inactions, whether Attorney's reliance on Client was reasonable and sufficient to satisfy the duty to supervise in this setting is a question for a trier of fact. Again, however, a potential finding of a competence violation is implicated by the fact pattern. See, e.g., *Palomo v. State Bar* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785, 796 [205 Cal.Rptr. 834] (evidence demonstrated lawyer's pervasive carelessness in failing to give the office manager any supervision, or instruction on trust account requirements and procedures).

II. Duty of Confidentiality

A fundamental duty of an attorney is "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068 (e)(1).) "Secrets" includes "information, other than that protected by the attorney-client privilege, that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." (Cal. State Bar Formal Opinion No. 1988-96.) "A member shall not reveal information protected from disclosure by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1), without the informed consent of the client, or as provided in paragraph (B) of this rule." (Rule 3-100(A).)

Similarly, an attorney has a duty to assert the attorney-client privilege to protect confidential communications between the attorney and client. (Evid. Code, §§ 952, 954, 955.) In civil discovery, the attorney-client privilege will protect confidential communications between the attorney and client in cases of inadvertent disclosure *only if* the attorney and client act reasonably to protect that privilege. See *Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (Aquila Merchant Services, Inc.)* (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 672, 683 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 186]. This approach also echoes federal law. [10/] A lack of reasonable care to protect against disclosing privileged and protected information when producing ESI can be deemed a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See *Kilopass Tech. Inc. v. Sidense Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 1534065 at 2 – 3 (attorney-client privilege deemed waived as to privileged documents released through e-discovery because screening procedures employed were unreasonable).

In our hypothetical, because of the actions taken by Attorney prior to consulting with any e-discovery expert, Client's privileged information has been disclosed. Due to Attorney's actions, Chief Competitor can argue that such disclosures were not "inadvertent" and that any privileges were waived. Further, non-privileged, but highly confidential proprietary information about Client's upcoming revolutionary new product has been released into the hands of Chief Competitor. Even absent any indication that Opposing Counsel did anything to engineer the overbroad disclosure, it remains true that the disclosure occurred because Attorney participated in creating overbroad search terms. All of this happened unbeknownst to Attorney, and only came to light after Chief Competitor accused Client of evidence spoliation. Absent Chief Competitor's accusation, it is not clear when any of this would have come to Attorney's attention, if ever.

The clawback agreement on which Attorney heavily relied may not work to retrieve the information from the other side. By its terms, the clawback agreement was limited to inadvertently produced Privileged ESI. Both privileged information, and non-privileged, but confidential and proprietary information, have been released to Chief Competitor.

[10/] See Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 502(b): "Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B)."

Under these facts, Client may have to litigate whether Client (through Attorney) acted diligently enough to protect its attorney-client privileged communications. Attorney took no action to review Client's network prior to allowing the network search, did not instruct or supervise Client prior to or during Vendor's search, participated in drafting the overbroad search terms, and waited until after Client was accused of evidence spoliation before reviewing the data – all of which could permit Opposing Counsel viably to argue Client failed to exercise due care to protect the privilege, and the disclosure was not inadvertent.[11/]

Client also may have to litigate its right to the return of non-privileged but confidential proprietary information, which was not addressed in the clawback agreement.

Whether a waiver has occurred under these circumstances, and what Client's rights are to return of its non-privileged/confidential proprietary information, again are legal questions beyond this opinion. Attorney did not reasonably try to minimize the risks. Even if Client can retrieve the information, Client may never "un-ring the bell."

The State Bar Court Review Department has stated, "Section 6068, subdivision (e) is the most strongly worded duty binding on a California attorney. It requires the attorney to maintain 'inviolate' the confidence and 'at every peril to himself or herself' preserve the client's secrets." (See *Matter of Johnson* (Rev. Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179.) While the law does not require perfection by attorneys in acting to protect privileged or confidential information, it requires the exercise of reasonable care. Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2010-179. Here, Attorney took only minimal steps to protect Client's ESI, or to instruct/supervise Client in the gathering and production of that ESI, and instead released everything without prior review, inappropriately relying on a clawback agreement. Client's secrets are now in Chief Competitor's hands, and further, Chief Competitor may claim that Client has waived the attorney-client privilege. Client has been exposed to that potential dispute as the direct result of Attorney's actions. Attorney may have breached his duty of confidentiality to Client.

CONCLUSION

Electronic document creation and/or storage, and electronic communications, have become commonplace in modern life, and discovery of ESI is now a frequent part of almost any litigated matter. Attorneys who handle litigation may not ignore the requirements and obligations of electronic discovery. Depending on the factual circumstances, a lack of technological knowledge in handling e-discovery may render an attorney ethically incompetent to handle certain litigation matters involving e-discovery, absent curative assistance under rule 3-110(C), even where the attorney may otherwise be highly experienced. It also may result in violations of the duty of confidentiality, notwithstanding a lack of bad faith conduct.

This opinion is issued by the Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the State Bar of California. It is advisory only. It is not binding upon the courts, the State Bar of California, its Board of Trustees, any persons or tribunals charged with regulatory responsibilities, or any member of the State Bar.

*[**Publisher's Note**: Internet resources cited in this opinion were last accessed by staff on June 30, 2015. Copies of these resources are on file with the State Bar's Office of Professional Competence.]*

[11/] Although statute, rules, and/or case law provide some limited authority for the legal claw back of certain inadvertently produced materials, even in the absence of an express agreement, those provisions may not work to mitigate the damage caused by the production in this hypothetical. These "default" claw back provisions typically only apply to privilege and work product information, and require both that the disclosure at issue has been truly inadvertent, and that the holder of the privilege has taken reasonable steps to prevent disclosure in the first instance. See Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 502; see also generally *State Compensation Insurance Fund v. WPS, Inc.* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 799]; *Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807, 817 – 818 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 758]. As noted above, whether the disclosures at issue in our hypothetical truly were "inadvertent" under either the parties' agreement or the relevant law is an open question. Indeed, Attorney will find even less assistance from California's discovery clawback statute than he will from the federal equivalent, as the California statute merely addresses the procedure for litigating a dispute on a claim of inadvertent production, and not the legal issue of waiver at all. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.285.)

SDCBA Legal Ethics Opinion 2011-2

(Adopted by the San Diego County Bar Legal Ethics Committee May 24, 2011.)

I. FACTUAL SCENARIO

Attorney is representing Client, a plaintiff former employee in a wrongful discharge action. While the matter is in its early stages, Attorney has by now received former employer's answer to the complaint and therefore knows that the former employer is represented by counsel and who that counsel is. Attorney obtained from Client a list of all of Client's former employer's employees. Attorney sends out a "friending"[1] request to two high-ranking company employees whom Client has identified as being dissatisfied with the employer and therefore likely to make disparaging comments about the employer on their social media page. The friend request gives only Attorney's name. Attorney is concerned that those employees, out of concern for their jobs, may not be as forthcoming with their opinions in depositions and intends to use any relevant information he obtains from these social media sites to advance the interests of Client in the litigation.

II. QUESTION PRESENTED

Has Attorney violated his ethical obligations under the California Rules of Professional Conduct, the State Bar Act, or case law addressing the ethical obligations of attorneys?

III. DISCUSSION

A. Applicability of Rule 2-100

California Rule of Professional Conduct 2-100 says, in pertinent part: "(A) While representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation with a party the member knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has the consent of the other lawyer. (B) [A] "party" includes: (1) An officer, director, or managing agent of a corporation . . . or (2) an. . . employee of a . . .corporation . . . if the subject of the communication is any act or omission of such person in connection with the matter which may be binding upon or imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization." "Rule 2-100 is intended to control communication between a member and persons the member knows to be represented by counsel unless a statutory scheme or case law will override the rule." (Rule 2-100 Discussion Note.)

Similarly, ABA Model Rule 4.2 says: **"**In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order." Comment 7 to ABA Model Rule 4.2 adds: "In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability."

1. Are the High-ranking Employees Represented Parties?

The threshold question is whether the high-ranking employees of the represented corporate adversary are "parties" for purposes of this rule.
In *Snider v. Superior Court* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1187 (2003), a trade secrets action, the Court of Appeal reversed an order disqualifying counsel for the defendant-former sales manager for ex parte contact with plaintiff-event management company's current sales manager and productions director. The contacted employees were not "managing agents" for purposes of the rule because neither "exercise[d] substantial discretionary authority over decisions that determine organizational policy." Supervisory status and the power to enforce corporate policy are not enough. (*Id*. at 1209.) There also was no

evidence that either employee had authority from the company to speak concerning the dispute or that their actions could bind or be imputed to the company concerning the subject matter of the litigation. (*Id*. at 1211.)

The term "high-ranking employee" suggests that these employees "exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that determine organizational policy" and therefore should be treated as part of the represented corporate party for purposes of Rule 2-100. At minimum, the attorney should probe his client closely about the functions these employees actually perform for the company-adversary before treating those high-ranking employees as unrepresented persons.

2. Does a Friend request Constitute Unethical Ex Parte Contact with the High-Ranking Employees?

Assuming these employees are represented for purposes of Rule 2-100, the critical next question is whether a friend request is a direct or indirect communication by the attorney to the represented party "about the subject of the representation." When a Facebook user clicks on the "Add as Friend" button next to a person's name without adding a personal message, Facebook sends a message to the would-be friend that reads: "[Name] wants to be friends with you on Facebook." The requester may edit this form request to friend to include additional information, such as information about how the requester knows the recipient or why the request is being made. The recipient, in turn, my send a message to the requester asking for further information about him or her before deciding whether to accept the sender as a friend.

A friend request nominally generated by Facebook and not the attorney is at least an indirect ex parte communication with a represented party for purposes of Rule 2-100(A). The harder question is whether the statement Facebook uses to alert the represented party to the attorney's friend request is a communication "about the subject of the representation." We believe the context in which that statement is made and the attorney's motive in making it matter. Given what results when a friend request is accepted, the statement from Facebook to the would-be friend could just as accurately read: "[Name] wants to have access to the information you are sharing on your Facebook page." If the communication to the represented party is motivated by the quest for information about the subject of the representation, the communication with the represented party is about the subject matter of that representation.

This becomes clearer when the request to friend, with all it entails, is transferred from the virtual world to the real world. Imagine that instead of making a friend request by computer, opposing counsel instead says to a represented party in person and outside of the presence of his attorney: "Please give me access to your Facebook page so I can learn more about you." That statement on its face is no more "about the subject of the representation" than the robo-message generated by Facebook. But what the attorney is hoping the other person will say in response to that facially innocuous prompt is "Yes, you may have access to my Facebook page. Welcome to my world. These are my interests, my likes and dislikes, and this is what I have been doing and thinking recently."

A recent federal trial court ruling addressing Rule 2-100 supports this textual analysis. In *U.S. v. Sierra Pacific Industries* (E.D. Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 4778051, the question before the District Court was whether counsel for a corporation in an action brought by the government alleging corporate responsibility for a forest fire violated Rule 2-100 when counsel, while attending a Forest Service sponsored field trip to a fuel reduction project site that was open to the public, questioned Forest Service employees about fuel breaks, fire severity, and the contract provisions the Forest Service requires for fire prevention in timber sale projects without disclosing to the employees that he was seeking the information for use in the pending litigation and that he was representing a party opposing the government in the litigation. The Court concluded that counsel had violated the Rule and its reasoning is instructive. It was undisputed that defense counsel communicated directly with the Forest Service employees, knew they were represented by counsel, and did not have the consent of opposing counsel to question them. (2010 WL 4778051, *5.) Defense counsel claimed, however, that his questioning of the Forest Service employees fell within the exception found in Rule 2-100(C)(1), permitting "[c]ommunications with a public officer. . .," and within his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances because he indisputably had the right to attend the publicly open Forest Service excursion.

While acknowledging defense counsel's First Amendment right to attend the tour (*id*. at *5), the Court found no evidence that defense counsel's questioning of the litigation related questioning of the employees, who had no "authority to change a policy or grant some specific request for redress that [counsel] was presenting," was an exercise of his right to petition the government for redress of grievances. (*Id*. at *6.) "Rather, the facts show and the court finds that he was *attempting to obtain information for use in the litigation* that should have been pursued through counsel and through the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery." (*Ibid*., emphasis added.) Defense counsel's interviews of the Forest Service employees on matters his corporate client considered part of the litigation without notice to, or the consent of, government counsel "strikes at . . . the very policy purpose for the no contact rule." (*Ibid*.) In other words, counsel's motive for making the contact with the represented party was at the heart of why the contact was prohibited by Rule 2-100, that is, he was "attempting to obtain information for use in the litigation," a motive shared by the attorney making a friend request to a represented party opponent.

The Court further concluded that, while the ABA Model Rule analog to California Rule of Professional Conduct 2-100 was not controlling, defense counsel's ex parte contacts violated that rule as well. "Unconsented questioning of an opposing party's employees on matters that counsel has reason to believe are at issue in the pending litigation is barred under ABA Rule 4.2 *unless the sole purpose of the communication* is to exercise a constitutional right of access to officials having the authority to act upon or decide the policy matter being presented. In addition, advance notice to the government's counsel is required." (*Id*. at *7, emphasis added.) Thus, under both the California Rule of Professional Conduct and the ABA Model Rule addressing ex parte communication with a represented party, the purpose of the attorney's ex parte communication is at the heart of the offense.
The Discussion Note for Rule 2-100 opens with a statement that the rule is designed to control communication between an attorney and an opposing party. The purpose of the rule is undermined by the contemplated friend request and there is no statutory scheme or case law that overrides the rule in this context. The same Discussion Note recognizes that nothing under Rule 2-100 prevents the parties themselves from communicating about the subject matter of the representation and "nothing in the rule precludes the attorney from advising the client that such a communication can be made." (Discussion Note to Rule 2-100). But direct communication with an attorney is different.

3. Response to Objections

a. Objection 1: The friend request is not about the subject of the representation because the request does not refer to the issues raised by the representation.

It may be argued that a friend request cannot be "about the subject of the representation" because it makes no reference to the issues in the representation. Indeed, the friend request makes no reference to anything at all other than the name of the sender. Such a request is a far cry from the vigorous ex parte questioning to which the government employees were subjected by opposing counsel in *U.S. v. Sierra Pacific Industries*.[2]

The answer to this objection is that as a matter of logic and language, the subject of the representation need not be directly referenced in the query for the query to be "about," or concerning, the subject of the representation. The extensive ex parte questioning of the represented party in *Sierra Pacific Industries* is different in degree, not in kind, from an ex parte friend request to a represented opposing party. It is not uncommon in the course of litigation or transactional negotiations for open-ended, generic questions to impel the other side to disclose information that is richly relevant to the matter. The motive for an otherwise anodyne inquiry establishes its connection to the subject matter of the representation.

It is important to underscore at this point that a communication "about the subject of the representation" has a broader scope than a communication relevant to the issues in the representation, which determines admissibility at trial. (*Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1392.) In litigation, discovery is permitted "regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending matter. . . ." (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Discovery casts a wide net. "For discovery purposes, information should be regarded as 'relevant to the subject matter' if it might reasonably assist a party in *evaluating* the case, *preparing* for trial, or facilitating *settlement* thereof." (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2010), 8C-1, ¶8:66.1, emphasis in the original, citations omitted.) The breadth of the attorney's duty to avoid ex parte communication with a represented party about the subject of a representation extends at least as far as the breadth of the attorney's right to seek formal discovery from a represented party about the subject of litigation. Information uncovered in the immediate

aftermath of a represented party's response to a friend request at least "might reasonably assist a party in *evaluating* the case, *preparing* for trial, or facilitating *settlement* thereof." (*Ibid*.) Similar considerations are transferable to the transactional context, even though the rules governing discovery are replaced by the professional norms governing due diligence.

In *Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc.* (8th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 693, Franchisee A of South Dakota sued Franchisor of Minnesota for wrongfully terminating its franchise and for installing Franchisee B, also named as a defendant, in Franchisee A's place. A "critical portion" of this litigation was Franchisee A's expert's opinion that Franchisee A had sustained one million dollars in damages as a result of the termination. (*Id*. at 697.) Franchisor's attorney sent a private investigator into both Franchisee A's and Franchisee B's showroom to speak to, and surreptitiously tape record, their employees about their sales volumes and sales practices. Among others to whom the investigator spoke and tape-recorded was Franchisee B's president.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's order issuing evidentiary sanctions against Franchisor for engaging in unethical ex parte contact with represented parties. The Court held that the investigator's inquiry about Franchisee B's sales volumes of Franchisor's machines was impermissible ex parte communication about the subject of the representation for purposes of Model Rule 4.2, adopted by South Dakota. "Because every [Franchisor machine] sold by [Franchisee B] was a machine not sold by [Franchisee A], the damages estimate [by Franchisee A's expert] could have been challenged in part by how much [Franchisor machine] business [Franchisee B] was actually doing." (*Id*. at 697-698.) It was enough to offend the rule that the inquiry was designed to elicit information about the subject of the representation; it was not necessary that the inquiry directly refer to that subject.

Similarly, in the hypothetical case that frames the issue in this opinion, defense counsel may be expected to ask plaintiff former employee general questions in a deposition about her recent activities to obtain evidence relevant to whether plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. (BAJI 10.16.) That is the same information, among other things, counsel may hope to obtain by asking the represented party to friend him and give him access to her recent postings. An open-ended inquiry to a represented party in a deposition seeking information about the matter in the presence of opposing counsel is qualitatively no different from an open-ended inquiry to a represented party in cyberspace seeking information about the matter outside the presence of opposing counsel. Yet one is sanctioned and the other, as *Midwest Motors* demonstrated, is sanctionable.

b. Objection 2: Friending an represented opposing party is the same as accessing the public website of an opposing party

The second objection to this analysis is that there is no difference between an attorney who makes a friend request to an opposing party and an attorney suing a corporation who accesses the corporation's website or who hires an investigator to uncover information about a party adversary from online and other sources of information.

Not so. The very reason an attorney must make a friend request here is because obtaining the information on the Facebook page, to which a user may restrict access, is unavailable without first obtaining permission from the person posting the information on his social media page. It is that restricted access that leads an attorney to believe that the information will be less filtered than information a user, such as a corporation but not limited to one, may post in contexts to which access is unlimited. Nothing blocks an attorney from accessing a represented party's public Facebook page. Such access requires no communication to, or permission from, the represented party, even

though the attorney's motive for reviewing the page is the same as his motive in making a friend request. Without ex parte communication with the represented party, an attorney's motivated action to uncover information about a represented party does not offend Rule 2-100. But to obtain access to *restricted* information on a Facebook page, the attorney must make a request to a represented party outside of the actual or virtual presence of defense counsel. And for purposes of Rule 2-100, that motivated communication with the represented party makes all the difference.[3]

The New York State Bar Association recently has reached the same conclusion. (NYSBA Ethics Opinion 843 (2010).) The Bar concluded that New York's prohibition on attorney ex parte contact with a represented person does not prohibit an attorney from viewing and accessing the social media page of an adverse party to secure information about the party for use in the lawsuit as long as "the lawyer does not 'friend' the party and instead relies on public pages posted by the party that are accessible to all members in the network." That, said the New York Bar, is "because the lawyer is not engaging in deception by accessing a public website that is available to anyone in the network, provided that the lawyer does not employ deception in any other way (including, for example, employing deception to become a member of the network). Obtaining information about a party available in the Facebook or MySpace profile is similar to obtaining information that is available in publicly accessible online or print media, or through a subscription research service such as Nexis or Factiva, and that is plainly permitted. Accordingly, we conclude that the lawyer may ethically view and access the Facebook and MySpace profiles of a party other than the lawyer's client in litigation as long as the party's profile is available to all members in the network and the lawyer neither "friends" the other party nor directs someone else to do so."

c. Objection 3: The attorney-client privilege does not protect anything a party posts on a Facebook page, even a page accessible to only a limited circle of people.

The third objection to this analysis may be that nothing that a represented party says on Facebook is protected by the attorney-client privilege. No matter how narrow the Facebook user's circle, those communications reach beyond "those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the [Facebook user's] lawyer is consulted. . . ." (Evid. Code §952, defining "confidential communication between client and lawyer." Cf. *Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 4789099, holding that plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege over communications with her attorney related to her motivation for bringing the lawsuit by e-mailing a friend that her counsel was very interested in "getting their teeth" into the opposing party, a major music company.)

That observation may be true as far as it goes[4], but it overlooks the distinct, though overlapping purposes served by the attorney-client privilege, on the one hand, and the prohibition on ex parte communication with a represented party, on the other. The privilege is designed to encourage parties to share freely with their counsel information needed to further the purpose of the representation by protecting attorney-client communications from disclosure.
"[T]he public policy fostered by the privilege seeks to insure the right of every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one having knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the former may have adequate advice and a proper defense." (*Mitchell v. Superior Court* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 599, citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)

The rule barring ex parte communication with a represented party is designed to avoid disrupting the trust essential to the attorney-client relationship. "The rule against communicating with a represented party without the consent of that party's counsel shields a party's substantive interests against encroachment by opposing counsel and safeguards the relationship between the party and her

attorney. . . . [T]he trust necessary for a successful attorney-client relationship is eviscerated when the client is lured into clandestine meetings with the lawyer for the opposition." (*U.S. v. Lopez* (9th Cir. 1993) 4 F.3d 1455, 1459.) The same could be said where a client is lured into clandestine communication with opposing counsel through the unwitting acceptance of an ex parte friend request.

d. Objection 4: A recent Ninth Circuit ruling appears to hold that Rule 2-100 is not violated by engaging in deceptive tactics to obtain damaging information from a represented party.

Fourth and finally, objectors may argue that the Ninth Circuit recently has ruled that Rule 2-100 does not prohibit outright deception to obtain information from a source. Surely, then, the same rule does not prohibit a friend request which states only truthful information, even if it does not disclose the reason for the request. The basis for this final contention is *U.S. v. Carona* (9th Cir. 2011) 630 F.3d 917, 2011 WL 32581. In that case, the question before the Court of Appeals was whether a prosecutor violated Rule 2-100 by providing fake subpoena attachments to a cooperating witness to elicit pre-indictment, non-custodial incriminating statements during a conversation with defendant, a former county sheriff accused of political corruption whose counsel had notified the government that he was representing the former sheriff in the matter. "There was no direct communications here between the prosecutors and [the defendant]. The indirect communications did not resemble an interrogation. Nor did the use of fake subpoena attachments make the informant the alter ego of the prosecutor." (*Id*. at *5.) The Court ruled that, even if the conduct did violate Rule 2-100, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not suppressing the statements, on the ground that state bar discipline was available to address any prosecutorial misconduct, the tapes of an incriminating conversation between the cooperating witness and the defendant obtained by using the fake documents. "The fact that the state bar did not thereafter take action against the prosecutor here does not prove the inadequacy of the remedy. It may, to the contrary, (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the corporate attorney-client privilege may be waived only by an authorized agent of the corporation.
suggest support for our conclusion that there was no ethical violation to begin with." (*Id*. at *6.)

There are several responses to this final objection. First, *Carona* was a ruling on the appropriateness of excluding evidence, not a disciplinary ruling as such. The same is true, however, of *U.S. v. Sierra Pacific Industries*, which addressed a party's entitlement to a protective order as a result of a Rule 2-100 violation. Second, the Court ruled that the exclusion of the evidence was unnecessary because of the availability of state bar discipline if the prosecutor had offended Rule 2-100. The Court of Appeals' discussion of Rule 2-100 therefore was dicta. Third, the primary reason the Court of Appeals found no violation of Rule 2-100 was because there was no direct contact between the prosecutor and the represented criminal defendant. The same cannot be said of an attorney who makes a direct ex parte friend request to a represented party.

4. Limits of Rule 2-100 Analysis

Nothing in our opinion addresses the discoverability of Facebook ruminations through conventional processes, either from the user-represented party or from Facebook itself. Moreover, this opinion focuses on whether Rule 2-100 is violated in this context, not the evidentiary consequences of such a violation. The conclusion we reach is limited to prohibiting attorneys from gaining access to this information by asking a represented party to give him entry to the represented party's restricted chat room, so to speak, without the consent of the party's attorney. The evidentiary, and even the disciplinary, consequences of such conduct are beyond the scope of this opinion and the purview of this Committee. (See Rule 1-100(A): Opinions of ethics committees in California are not binding, but "should be consulted by members for guidance on proper professional guidance." See also, Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee, Opinion 2009-02, p. 6: If an attorney rejects the guidance of the committee's opinion, "the question of whether or not the evidence would be usable either by him or by

subsequent counsel in the case is a matter of substantive and evidentiary law to be addressed by the court." But see Cal. Prac. Guide Fed. Civ. Proc. Before Trial, Ch. 17-A, ¶17:15: "Some federal courts have imposed sanctions for violation of applicable rules of professional conduct." (citing *Midwest Motor Sports*, *supra*.))

B. Attorney Duty Not To Deceive

We believe that the attorney in this scenario also violates his ethical duty not to deceive by making a friend request to a represented party's Facebook page without disclosing why the request is being made. This part of the analysis applies whether the person sought to be friended is represented or not and whether the person is a party to the matter or not.

ABA Model Rule 4.1(a) says: "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person. . ." ABA Model Rule 8.4(c) prohibits "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." In *Midwest Motor Sports*, *supra*, the Eighth Circuit found that the violations of the rule against ex parte contact with a represented party alone would have justified the evidentiary sanctions that the district court imposed. (*Midwest Motor Sports*, *supra,* 347 F.3d at 698.) The Court of Appeals also concluded, however, that Franchisor's attorney had violated 8.4(c) by sending a private investigator to interview Franchisees' employees "under false and misleading pretenses, which [the investigator] made no effort to correct. Not only did [the investigator] pose as a customer, he wore a hidden device that secretly recorded his conversations with" the Franchisees' employees. (*Id*., at 698-699.)[5]

Unlike many jurisdictions, California has not incorporated these provisions of the Model Rules into its Rules of Professional Conduct or its State Bar Act. The provision coming closest to imposing a generalized duty not to deceive is Business & Professions Code section 6068(d), which makes it the duty of a California lawyer "[t]o employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her those means only as are consistent with truth, and never seek to mislead the judge . . . by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." This provision is typically applied to allegations that an attorney misled a judge, suggesting that the second clause in the provision merely amplifies the first. (See e.g., *Griffith v. State Bar of Cal.* (1953) 40 Cal.2d 470.) But while no authority was found applying the provision to attorney deception of anyone other than a judicial officer, its language is not necessarily so limited. The provision is phrased in the conjunctive, arguably setting forth a general duty not to deceive *anyone* and a more specific duty not to mislead a judge by any false statement or fact or law. We could find no authority addressing the question one way or the other.

There is substantial case law authority for the proposition that the duty of an attorney under the State Bar Act not to deceive extends beyond the courtroom. The State Bar, for example, may impose discipline on an attorney for intentionally deceiving opposing counsel. "It is not necessary that actual harm result to merit disciplinary action where actual deception is intended and shown." (*Coviello v. State Bar of Cal.* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 57, 65. See also *Monroe v. State Bar of Cal.* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 145, 152; *Scofield v. State Bar of Cal.* (1965) 62 Cal.2d 624, 628.) "[U]nder CRPC 5-200 and 5-220, and BP 6068(d), as officers of the court, attorneys have a duty of candor and not to mislead the judge by any false statement of fact or law. These same rules of candor and truthfulness apply when an attorney is communicating with opposing counsel." (*In re Central European Industrial Development Co.* (Bkrtcy. N.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 779807, *6, citing *Hallinan v. State Bar of Cal.* (1948) 33 Cal.2d 246, 249.)

Regardless of whether the ethical duty under the State Bar Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct not to deceive extends to misrepresentation to those other than judges, the *common law* duty not to deceive indisputably applies to an attorney and a breach of that duty may subject an attorney to liability for fraud. "[T]he case law is clear that a duty is owed by an attorney not to defraud another, even if that other is an attorney negotiating at arm's length." (*Cicone v. URS Corp.* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 194, 202.)

In *Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 54, 74, the Court of Appeal ruled that insured's judgment creditors had the right to sue insurer's coverage counsel for misrepresenting the scope of coverage under the insurance policy. The *Shafer* Court cited as authority, *inter alia*, *Fire Ins. Exchange v. Bell by Bell* (Ind. 1994) 643 N.E.2d 310, holding that insured had a viable claim against counsel for insurer for falsely stating that the policy limits were $100,000 when he knew they were $300,000.

Similarly, in *Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 282, the Court of Appeal held that an attorney, negotiating at arm's length with an adversary in a merger transaction was not immune from liability to opposing party for fraud for not disclosing "toxic stock" provision. "A fraud claim against a

lawyer is no different from a fraud claim against anyone else." (*Id*. at 291.) "Accordingly, a lawyer communicating on behalf of a client with a nonclient may not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to the nonclient." (*Ibid*., citation omitted.) While a "casual expression of belief" that the form of financing was "standard" was not actionable, active concealment of material facts, such as the existence of a "toxic stock" provision, is actionable fraud. (*Id*. at 291-294.)

If there is a duty not to deceive opposing counsel, who is far better equipped by training than lay witnesses to protect himself against the deception of his adversary, the duty surely precludes an attorney from deceiving a lay witness. But is it impermissible deception to seek to friend a witness without disclosing the purpose of the friend request, even if the witness is not a represented party and thus, as set forth above, subject to the prohibition on ex parte contact? We believe that it is.

Two of our sister Bar Associations have addressed this question recently and reached different conclusions. In Formal Opinion 2010-02, the Bar Association of the City of New York's Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics considered whether "a lawyer, either directly or through an agent, [may] contact an unrepresented person through a social networking website and request permission to access her web page to obtain information for use in litigation." (*Id*., emphasis added.) Consistent with New York's high court's policy favoring informal discovery in litigation, the Committee concluded that "an attorney or her agent may use her real name and profile to send a 'friend request' to obtain information from an unrepresented person's social networking website without also disclosing the reasons for making the request." In a footnote to this conclusion, the Committee distinguished such a request made to a party known to be represented by counsel. And the Committee further concluded that New York's rules prohibiting acts of deception are violated "whenever an attorney 'friends' an individual under false pretenses to obtain evidence from a social networking website." (*Id*.)

In Opinion 2009-02, the Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee construed the obligation of the attorney not to deceive more broadly. The Philadelphia Committee considered whether a lawyer who wishes to access the restricted social networking pages of an adverse, unrepresented witness to obtain impeachment information may enlist a third person, "someone whose name the witness will not recognize," to seek to friend the witness, obtain access to the restricted information, and turn it over to the attorney. "The third person would state only truthful information, for example, his or her true name, but would not reveal that he or she is affiliated with the lawyer or the true purpose for which he or she is seeking access, namely, to provide the information posted on the pages to a lawyer for possible use antagonistic to the witness." (Opinion 2009-02, p. 1.) The Committee concluded that such conduct would violate the lawyer's duty under Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 not to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. . . ." The planned communication by the third party

> omits a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks to be allowed access to the witness's pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness. The omission would purposefully conceal that fact from the witness for the purpose of inducing the witness to allow access, when she may not do so if she knew the third person was associated with the [attorney] and the true purpose of the access was to obtain information for the purpose of impeaching her testimony.

(*Id*. at p. 2.) The Philadelphia opinion was cited approvingly in an April 2011 California Lawyer article on the ethical and other implications of juror use of social media. (P. McLean, "Jurors Gone Wild," p. 22 at 26, California Lawyer, April 2011.)

We agree with the scope of the duty set forth in the Philadelphia Bar Association opinion, notwithstanding the value in informal discovery on which the City of New York Bar Association focused. Even where an attorney may overcome other ethical objections to sending a friend request, the attorney should not send such a request to someone involved in the matter for which he has been retained without disclosing his affiliation and the purpose for the request.

Nothing would preclude the attorney's client himself from making a friend request to an opposing party or a potential witness in the case. Such a request, though, presumably would be rejected by the recipient who knows the sender by name. The only way to gain access, then, is for the attorney to exploit a party's unfamiliarity with the attorney's identity and therefore his adversarial relationship with the recipient. That is exactly the kind of attorney deception of which courts disapprove.

IV. CONCLUSION

Social media sites have opened a broad highway on which users may post their most private personal information. But Facebook, at least, enables its users to place limits on who may see that information. The rules of ethics impose limits on how attorneys may obtain information that is not publicly available, particularly from opposing parties who are represented by counsel.

We have concluded that those rules bar an attorney from making an ex parte friend request of a represented party. An attorney's ex parte communication to a represented party intended to elicit information about the subject matter of the representation is impermissible no matter what words are used in the communication and no matter how that communication is transmitted to the represented party. We have further concluded that the attorney's duty not to deceive prohibits him from making a friend request even of unrepresented witnesses without disclosing the purpose of the request. Represented parties shouldn't have "friends" like that and no one – represented or not, party or non-party – should be misled into accepting such a friendship. In our view, this strikes the right balance between allowing unfettered access to what is public on the Internet about parties without intruding on the attorney-client relationship of opposing parties and surreptitiously circumventing the privacy even of those who are unrepresented.

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1 Quotation marks are dropped in the balance of this opinion for this now widely used verb form of the term "friend" in the context of Facebook.

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2 *Sierra Pacific Industries* also is factually distinguishable from the scenario addressed here because it involved ex parte communication with a represented *government* party opponent rather than a private employer. But that distinction made it harder to establish a Rule 2-100 violation, not easier. That is because a finding of a violation of the rule had to overcome the attorney's constitutional right to petition government representatives. Those rights are not implicated where an attorney makes ex parte contact with a private represented party in an analogous setting, such as a corporate – or residential – open house.

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3 The Oregon Bar reached the same conclusion, but with limited analysis. Oregon State Bar Formal Opinion No. 2005-164 concluded that a lawyer's ex parte communications with represented adversary via adversary's website would be ethically prohibited. "[W]ritten communications via the Internet are directly analogous to written communications via traditional mail or messenger service and thus are subject to prohibition pursuant to" Oregon's rule against ex parte contact with a represented *person*. If the lawyer knows that the person with whom he is communicating is a represented person, "the Internet communication would be prohibited." (*Id*. at pp. 453454.)

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4 There are limits to how far this goes in the corporate context where the attorney-client privilege belongs to, and may be waived by, only the corporation itself and not by any individual employee. According to section 128 and Comment c of the Restatement

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5 The New York County Bar Association approached a similar issue differently in approving in "narrow" circumstances the use of an undercover investigator by non-government lawyers to mislead a party about the investigator's identity and purpose in gathering evidence of an alleged violation of civil rights or intellectual property rights. (NYCLA Comm. On Prof. Ethics Formal Op. 737, p. 1). The Bar explained that the kind of deception of which it was approving "is commonly associated with discrimination and trademark/copyright testers and undercover investigators and includes, but is not limited to, posing as consumers, tenants, home buyers or job seekers while negotiating or engaging in a transaction that is not by itself unlawful." (*Id*. at p. 2.) The opinion specifically "does not address whether a lawyer is ever permitted to make dissembling statements himself or herself." (*Id*. at p. 1.) The opinion also is limited to conduct that does not otherwise violate New York's Code of Professional Responsibility, "(including, but not limited to DR 7-104, the 'no-contact' rule)." (*Id*. at p. 6.) Whatever the merits of the opinion on an issue on which the Bar acknowledged there was "no nationwide consensus" (*id*. at p. 5), the opinion has no application to an ex parte friend request made by an attorney to a party where the attorney is posing as a friend to gather evidence outside of the special kind of cases and special kind of conduct addressed

by the New York opinion.

SDCBA Legal Ethics Opinion 2012-1
(Adopted by the San Diego County Bar Legal Ethics Committee on November 28, 2012.)

I. FACTUAL SCENARIO

Corporate Client informs Litigation Attorney that it has received a demand letter from a lawyer accusing Corporate Client of specific misconduct and threatening to sue unless Corporate Client ceases the conduct and negotiates a resolution. Corporate Client informs Attorney it does not intend to comply. Attorney gives the issue no further thought.

Three months later Corporate Client informs Attorney that the lawyer who authored the demand letter has sued Corporate Client in federal court alleging the same misconduct identified in the letter. Attorney, while an experienced trial lawyer, is not particularly sophisticated in his understanding or use of digital technology. Attorney accepts the engagement.

II. QUESTION PRESENTED

What conditions, consistent with the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the State Bar Act, must an attorney meet to represent a client in litigation when that client regularly transmits and stores information digitally, including by email?

III. ANSWER

A California attorney may represent a client that regularly transmits and stores information digitally in litigation only if the attorney is reasonably competent in understanding the client's data storage and transmission technology, or professionally consults with another attorney who has the requisite technological competence.[1]

IV. APPLICABLE LAW AND ETHICAL RULES

This opinion analyzes the issue with reference to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-110; Rule 3-100; Rule 3-500; Rule 5-200 and the State Bar Act, Business & Professions Code section 6068(d) and (e)(1); ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1; 1.6; 4.4; and 5.3 as well as relevant ethics opinions and case law.

V. DISCUSSION

A. A Digital World.

It is hardly a revelation that we now live in a digital world. Today more than 90% of all information is created digitally and 80-90% of that information remains digital. The vast majority of documents containing such information are email. Moreover, 45-50% of stored documents are duplicates or near-duplicates and 85-90% are never referred to after the first

[1] This opinion assumes that the attorney otherwise has the requisite legal skill and learning to represent the client.

transaction. The United States produces well over 50% of the world's digitally stored content each year.[2]

As the cost of digital storage has decreased dramatically, many businesses have concluded that the cost to eliminate unnecessary and out-of-date digitally stored documents vastly outweighs any benefit. As a consequence, the amount of digitally stored information continues to increase exponentially.[3]

Digitally or electronically stored information[4] differs from its analog (paper) predecessor in at least three significant respects. The first is volume. By way of example, a smart phone (16 to 64 GB models) usually have the following equivalent storage capacities: 16 GB, 800,000 to 1.6 million pages; 32 GB, 1.6 million to 3.2 million pages; 64 GB, 3.2 million to 6.4 million pages.[5]

Second, and more importantly, digitally stored information is dynamic. For example, back-up systems "write over" stored data in the preservation process; there are "auto-delete" features available; each email in a string "alters" the original; every time a document is opened, it changes.

Finally, unlike analog documents, some information in digitally stored documents is not apparent (e.g., metadata) but nonetheless exists and can be accessed.

Corporate Client in our facts is no different than any other business; it stores and transmits the vast majority of its information digitally and prints and preserves as paper only a tiny fraction of that information. Moreover, executives at Corporate Client also use laptops, tablets, smart phones and similar devices and many also use "cloud" storage.

B. Rule Changes and Court Decisions.

The obligation in litigation to preserve, gather, screen and produce relevant documents has not changed; nor has the duty to protect a client's confidential information in the process; nor, ultimately, the duty of candor to the court in representing that the lawyer has done so. The almost universal use of digital technology, however, has altered the way lawyers have to address these obligations. This rapid evolution, perhaps revolution, in technology has far out-paced the legal system's recognition that the landscape has changed.

Recent changes in federal and California procedural and discovery rules are attempting to address this new reality.[6] In addition, judicial decisions continue to map the responsibilities of

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2 San Diego ESI Forum, www.sandiegoesiforum.com, and sources cited there ("ESI Forum").

3 *Id.*

4 Electronically stored information (ESI) is broadly defined as "electronically stored information … stored in any medium from which information may be retrieved" (Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a)(1)(A)); "information that is stored in an electronic medium" (CCP § 2016.020(e)).

5 ESI Forum, *supra*.

6 The 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure identified specifically ESI and, in particular, its preservation, accessibility and sanctions for the failure to preserve and produce it. California's Electronic Discovery Act (2009) modified existing provisions of the CCP to deal specifically with ESI.

clients and attorneys to comply with these new rules.[7] Because of the dynamic nature of digitally stored information, and because relevant information can be irretrievably lost almost in an instant, the obligation to preserve such information as soon as litigation can be reasonably anticipated has become a paramount focus of judicial scrutiny.[8] Critically, judges are becoming increasingly frustrated with parties and their lawyers' failures to meet these obligations and are imposing sanctions, at times serious sanctions, on parties, lawyers or both.[9]

In light of this new reality and the adverse consequences a client could suffer from failure to comply with litigation obligations, this opinion examines whether and in what respects the Rules of Professional Conduct impose new obligations on lawyers in their representation of clients who regularly employ digital data storage and transmission technology.

We conclude that, in litigation, the ethical obligations that a client's regular use of digital technology to transmit and store information implicate in particular are the duties of competence, of confidentiality, of communication and of candor to the courts.

C. The Duty of Competence.

The duty to act competently in the representation of a client is the ethical obligation most directly implicated in the rapid migration to a digital world.

> **Rule 3-110.**
>
> (A) A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.
>
> (B) For purposes of this rule, "competence" in any legal service shall mean to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such service.

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7 *Zubulake v. UBS Warburg*, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I); *Zubulake v. UBS Warburg*, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III); *Zubulake v. UBS Warburg*, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV); *Zubulake v. UBS Warburg*, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V).

8 *See, e.g., Pension Committee of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Bank of America Securities, LLC*, 685 F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); *Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electric Co., Ltd.*, 2012 WL 3042943 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012). What these cases make clear is that the lawyer now has the obligation to have a documented, repeatable eDiscovery plan and a firm handle on client's technology, business and ESI.

9 For example, *Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.*, 2011 WL 2552472 at *2 (D.Md. January 24, 2011) (more than $1 million in attorneys' fees and costs); *Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc.*, 2011 WL 1815975 at *15-16 (Fed.Cir. May 13, 2011); *Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc.*, 2011 WL 1815978, at *8 (Fed.Cir. May 13, 2011); *Play Visions, Inc. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. No.*, C09-1769MJP (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2011); *Green v. Blitz USA, Inc.*, 2011 WL 806011 (E.D. Tex. March 1, 2011); *In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig.*, 2012 WL 300509 (N.D. Ga. February 3, 2012); *Conner v. Sun Trust Bank*, 546 F.Supp.2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (adverse inference instruction); *In re September 11th Liability Ins. Coverage Cases*, 243 F.R.D. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (sanction of $1.25 million); *Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc.*, 239 F.R.D. 81 (D.N.J. 2006) (deeming facts admitted, precluding evidence, striking privilege claims, striking trial witnesses, and fine); *Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis*, 234 F.R.D. 102 (E.D.P.A. 2005) (spoliation inference).

> (C) If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal service is undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform such services competently by 1) associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent, or 2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required.
>
> ***Discussion:***
>
> The duties set forth in rule 3-110 include the duty to supervise the work of subordinate attorney and non-attorney employees or agents. [Citations omitted.]

1. Expanded Duty of Competence.

Previously, the duty of competence focused primarily on the lawyer's knowledge of the areas of substantive law and the experience necessary to represent the client in the particular engagement. This technology shift has now made that insufficient.[10]

Thus, when representing a client that regularly transmits and stores information digitally in litigation, the "learning and skill" element of Rule 3-110 now also includes understanding the client's technology as well as available preservation, search and review technology. In addition, the lawyer must be familiar with judicial decisions that address specific obligations under either the federal or California rules concerning ESI.

Competence now requires that the lawyer understand his or her obligation to supervise not only subordinate attorneys but also outside vendors whom the proliferation of ESI has spawned, and in addition, his or her obligation also to supervise the client itself, including its executives; the custodians of potentially relevant information; its technologists; as well as any outside vendors whom the client has engaged to assist in the preservation, capture or review of ESI.[11]

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[10] Accordingly, in August 2012 the American Bar Association amended the ABA Model Rule on competence to address the evaluation of technology: "To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice *including the benefits and risks associated with technology*, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject." 2012 Amendment to ABA Model Rule 1.1 Competence, Comment 6, Maintaining Competence. [Emphasis identifies addition.] *See also*, State Bar Formal Opinion 2010-179 the (duties of competence and confidentiality require that an attorney must be able knowledgably to assess the level of security a particular mode of technology affords in order to protect client confidences); New York State Bar Opinion 782 (2004) (reasonable care requires staying abreast of technology advances).

[11] *Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc.*, 2006 WL 1537394 (D.Kan. 2006). Lawyers have a duty to exercise a degree of oversight over the client's employees to ensure that they are acting competently, diligently and ethically in order to fulfill their responsibility to the court and opposing parties. Trial counsel have obligations to communicate with in-house counsel to identify the persons having responsibility for the matters that are the subject of the document requests and identify all employees likely to have been authors, recipients or custodians of documents falling within the request. Trial counsel also have the obligation to review all documents received from the client to see whether they indicate the existence of other documents not previously retrieved or produced.

2. Sources of ESI.

In an analog world, the location of the client's documents was relatively straightforward: file cabinets at the client's facility(ies); off-site storage; perhaps "working files" at an employee's home. Digital storage capability has dramatically changed that.

Thus, competence begins with an understanding of the sources of the client's ESI—individual desktops, laptops, tablets, smart phones; network hard drives; removable media (e.g., CDs, USB devices); archival data contained on backup tape or other storage media; or cloud storage.[12]

Competence also includes making sure the client (including each custodian) understands the types of evidence that must be preserved: email (sent, received or drafted) and corresponding dates, times, recipients and file attachments; word-processing files; tables, charts, graphs and database files; electronic calendars; proprietary software files; internet browsing applications (bookmarks, cookies, history logs).[13]

3. The Client's Technology.

Next, competence now also means understanding the client's technology: the number, types and locations of computers currently in use and in use during the relevant period if no longer in use; the operating systems and application software the client uses, including the dates of use; the client's file-naming and location/saving conventions; disc-or-tape-labeling conventions; backup and archival disc or tape inventories or schedules; the most likely locations of relevant electronic records; backup rotation schedules and archiving procedures, including any backup programs in use and at any relevant time; electronic-records-management policies and procedures; corporate policies regarding employee's use of company computers and data; and the identities of all current and former employees who have or had access to network administration, backup, archiving or other system operations during the relevant period.

4. Understanding and Issuing a "Litigation Hold."

Precisely because of the dynamic nature of digitally stored information, and the danger of spoliation by routine processes, competence demands that the lawyer instruct the client to issue a litigation hold as soon as there is a "reasonable anticipation of litigation." That anticipation can be triggered by a claim or a demand letter well before suit is filed. Ultimately it is the lawyer's duty to determine whether and when the litigation hold obligation has been triggered.

> Possibly after October, 2003, when *Zubulake IV* was issued, and definitely after July, 2004 when the final relevant *Zubulake [Zubulake V]* opinion was issued, the

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[12] For example, the New Jersey District Court Local Rule 26.1(d) requires lawyers in that district to review their clients' computer and information management systems "to understand how information is stored and how it can be retrieved" at the very start of the case. The rule sets forth specific procedures for the discovery of digital and computer-based information.

[13] In *Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Rambus, Inc.*, 2006 WL 20384170 (E.D.Va. 2006) the lawyer's general admonitions to preserve relevant documents was insufficient and the lawyer had to instruct the client on the subject matter and kinds of documents to preserve.

> failure to issue a *written* litigation hold constitutes gross negligence because that failure is likely to result in the destruction of relevant information.[14]

The scope of the written litigation hold is driven by the claims asserted but must cover relevant ESI; relevant custodians ("key players"); sources; and backup and retention programs.

Zubulake V sets out the ethical duties of lawyers in performing in a digital world. The court found that the lawyers had failed their ethical obligations to the client: a litigation hold was insufficient; the lawyer failed to communicate with key players; to monitor compliance; or to locate relevant information. Instead a lawyer must actively monitor the client's compliance with the litigation hold; must become fully familiar with the client's document retention policies, data retention and architecture and electronic systems; must communicate with all key players regarding their ESI storage and retention obligations; and must ensure that relevant backup tapes or other backup media are retained.

To do this, the lawyer must become fully familiar with the client's document retention policies, as well as the client's data retention architecture. This invariably involves speaking with information technology personnel who can explain system-wide backup procedures and the actual (as opposed to theoretical) implementation of the firm's recycling policy. It will also involve communicating with the "key players" in the litigation in order to understand how they stored information.[15]

By far, the most expensive aspect of gathering, screening and producing electronically stored documents is the screening process. Experience is now beginning to demonstrate that "key word" search protocols are the least effective, most time consuming, and most expensive.

Accordingly, competence may also require a lawyer to become familiar with Technology Assisted Review (TAR) or Computer Assisted Review (CAR), or also known as "predictive coding," because of the cost benefit to client and better results.[16]

D. Correlative of Duty of Competence: Duty to Supervise.

A necessary correlative of the duty of competence includes the duty to supervise (*see* the Comment to Rule 3-110 and explicit statement in ABA Model Rule 5.1), including not only subordinates within the lawyer's firm but also non-lawyers both within the firm and outside (*see* ABA Model Rule 5.3). Likewise, subordinates have duties to both their supervisors and the client, the courts and other parties (*see* ABA Model Rule 5.2).

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[14] *Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC*, 685 F.Supp.2d 456, 464-465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis in original). Rule 3-110(A): "A member shall not intentionally, **recklessly**, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence." [Emphasis added.]

[15] In *Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Resources Corp.*, 2006 WL 1409413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the court found counsel grossly deficient because the lawyer did not engage in the kind of etiological survey of the client's computers that *Zubulake V* requires. The court also found that the client had an obligation to be aware of *Zubulake IV* and *V*.

[16] *See* Judge Peck's opinion and order in *Da Silva v. Publicis Groupe*, Case No. 11 Civ. 1279 (S.D.N.Y. February 24, 2012).

There are any number of vendors who purport to be "experts" in eDiscovery, some of whom are even non-practicing lawyers. Lawyers representing the client, however, are responsible to supervise not only lawyers and non-lawyers in their own firms but also the outside vendors whom they hire. Accordingly, ultimately the ethical responsibility lies with the lawyer. Thus, the only way an attorney who is not especially competent in the law and practice of eDiscovery can fulfill his or her ethical duty is by taking the time and considerable effort needed to become competent, or by bringing in legal counsel who is competent to assist her or him. Vendors cannot do that.

Accordingly, a lawyer cannot avoid ethical responsibility by "hiring away" eDiscovery to outside vendors who are not lawyers responsible for the client, in spite of the temptation of some vendors to render the equivalent of legal advice. Rather, the lawyer is ultimately responsible both for the vendor's performance as well as the protection of the client's confidential information.

Thus, when the client wants to hire an outside vendor to assist in the eDiscovery process, the lawyer must become involved in the engagement process to ensure that the vendor understands its confidentiality obligations, has the requisite training, understands its duty to scrutinize its work and its obligations in handling confidential information inadvertently produced by other parties.

E. Duty of Confidentiality.

The second ethical obligation digital technology implicates is confidentiality.

California lawyers have an express duty "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client."[17] (Bus. & Prof. Code section 6068(e)(1).)

This duty arises from the relationship of trust between a lawyer and a client and, absent the informed consent of the client to reveal such information, the duty of confidentiality has rare exceptions. (Rule 3-100 & discussion ["[A] member may not reveal such information except with the consent of the client or as authorized or required by the State Bar Act, these rules, or other law."].) Rule 3-100 states: "A member shall not reveal information protected from disclosure by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e)(1) without the informed consent of the client, or as provided in paragraph (B) of this rule."

ABA Model Rule 1.6 is similar: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly

[17] "Secrets" include "[a]ny 'information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client.'" (COPRAC Formal Opn. No. 1981-58.)

authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)."[18]

1. Implications of Technology and Protection of a Client's Confidential Information.

Because of the volume of digitally stored information and the complexities and cost of the screening process, a lawyer must take special precautions that confidential information is not inadvertently disclosed. Comments 16 and 17 to ABA Model Rule 1.6 (confidentiality) provide some guidance:

> [16] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Model Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3.
>
> [17] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule.[19]

In this regard, the duty of competence includes taking appropriate steps to ensure both that secrets and privileged information of a client remain confidential—Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1) and Rule 3-100—and that the lawyer's handling of such information does not result in a waiver of any privileges.

At a minimum, in any action in federal court, protection of a client's confidential information in the event of inadvertent disclosure may require entering into a stipulation for entry of a protective order as Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) provides. No privilege or protection is waived by disclosure connected with litigation pending before that court—in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding. The protection applies, however, only if production of privileged information was an inadvertent disclosure and the client and lawyer

[18] The second paragraphs of Bus. & Prof. Code section 6068(e)(2) and Rule 3-100 and ABA Model Rule 1.6 specify the circumstances under which a lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal client confidential information relating to the threat or risk of future harm.

[19] (Model Rule 1.6, comments 16 & 17.)

took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and took reasonable steps to correct the inadvertent disclosure as soon as the lawyer discovered it.[20]

Metadata, while not apparent, nonetheless exists and can be accessed if it is included with documents produced. Some metadata can reveal client confidential information or strategic decisions in which the lawyer and client participated. Accordingly, the duty to protect a client's confidential information necessarily involves insuring that such information in metadata is not produced.

F. Duty to Communicate with Client.

Digital storage and transmission technology implicates the duty to communicate with the client (Rule 3-500) in very specific ways.

First is the imposition of the litigation hold, both at the outset of the representation, as soon as litigation is reasonably anticipated, and throughout to ensure that digitally stored documents are preserved and collected and produced; it requires communication with the client to identify key custodians and then communicate with those custodians about their preservation obligations.

The duty of communication also includes a candid disclosure to the client at the outset whether the lawyer has the requisite level of technological competence, in addition to all the other lawyering skills and experience, necessary for the engagement and the potential need, at a minimum, to consult with or engage another lawyer with the requisite technological skills.

Zubulake V extends the client's duty to preserve ESI to the attorney. As with other aspects of the representation, this can create a tension between the attorney and the client. For example, if the client chooses not to follow the attorney's advice about how the litigation hold process should be implemented, or information preserved and produced, the possibility for conflict, particularly if a motion for sanctions is filed, is obvious. If a lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may have the obligation to withdraw. Rule 3-700(B).

G. Duty of Candor Toward the Tribunal.

1. Rule 5-200(B); ABA Model Rule 3.3 Require Candor to the Court.

Ultimately, the lawyer will have to represent to the tribunal that the lawyer complied fully with his or her discovery obligations and the consequences for failure to do so can be severe.[21]

Even at the outset of discovery, however, when addressing eDiscovery protocols, candor to the tribunal requires lawyers fairly and accurately to represent what they genuinely believe is necessary—especially in staged discovery—in order to accomplish the principal purpose of discovery: obtain the facts necessary to evaluate, settle or try the case. Accordingly, to argue

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[20] *See Victor Stanley, supra.* The court found that the defendants waived their privilege on 165 inadvertently produced documents because of the failure to "take reasonable precautions." The defendants used inadequate key words searching and failed to use a quality control process to guard against inadvertent disclosure. The court endorsed The Sedona Conference® Best Practices for search and information retrieval.

[21] See *Zubulake V, supra; Pension Committee, supra; Victor Stanley, supra.*

that, at an absolute minimum, a lawyer needs, for example, 30 custodians and 50 search terms when in fact 15 custodians and 20 terms—especially at the outset—would suffice, a lawyer has not fulfilled her or his duty of candor to the tribunal. In addition, to the extent that the court sees through the persistent, exaggerated demand, a lawyer's incompetence has, arguably, done irreparable injury to the client itself.[22]

Further, while the Rules of Professional Conduct do not have a direct correlate to ABA Model Rule 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel), a court, especially a federal court, might look to the ABA Model Rule for guidance. This rule prohibits unlawfully obstructing another party's access to evidence; concealing a document the lawyer reasonably should know is relevant; making frivolous discovery requests or failing to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with proper discovery requests from an opposing party. Such unreasonableness may be improper under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii), triggering a mandatory obligation to impose sanctions.[23]

H. If a Lawyer Does Not Have the Requisite Technological Competence, May the Lawyer Represent the Client?

Rule 3-110 permits a lawyer to represent a client even when the lawyer does not have "sufficient learning and skill" by either (1) associating with or professionally consulting another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent or (2) acquiring sufficient learning and skill before the lawyer has to perform.

Accordingly, the lack of skill in, or experience with, digitally stored and transmitted information is not an impediment to representing a client. But until a lawyer has acquired sufficient skill and learning, the lawyer must either associate or consult another lawyer with the requisite skill for that aspect of the representation, or decline the representation.

I. Application of Ethical Principles to the Facts.

How do these principles apply to the facts set out above?

When Corporate Client informed Attorney of the detailed demand letter from a lawyer threatening litigation, Attorney had the duty seriously to consider whether litigation was reasonably anticipated such that it triggered the obligation to impose a litigation hold even though no suit had yet been filed. Under the facts, Attorney gave no thought to it. As a consequence, during the intervening three months, inevitably electronically stored data has been lost or has been rendered *de facto* inaccessible.

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[22] In *Magaña v. Hyundai Motor America*, the court found that a defendant—a "sophisticated multi-national corporation experienced in litigation"—improperly limited its discovery search, made false, misleading and evasive responses and willfully violated discovery rules, warranting an $8 million default judgment. 220 P.3d 191 (Wash. 2009); *see also DeGeer v. Gillis*, 755 F.Supp.2d 909, 930 (N.D.Ill. 2010). If the parties had participated in "candid, meaningful discussion of ESI at the outset of the case," expensive and time-consuming discovery and motions practice could have been avoided.

[23] *See Krueger v. Pelican Products Corp.*, Case No. 87-2385-A (W.D. Okla. 1989) (Alley, J.) ("If there is a hell to which disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it be one in which the damned are eternally locked in discovery disputes with others lawyers of equally repugnant attributes.").

After Corporate Client informed Attorney that it had been sued, Attorney first and foremost had the duty to understand what he did not know about the technology that will be critical to the engagement. Next Attorney must candidly communicate that lack of knowledge and experience to the client before accepting the engagement. Attorney, who under the facts must be presumed not to have the requisite technological knowledge, must immediately consult with another attorney who does. Time is critical because of the absence of an effective litigation hold and the danger of spoliation of relevant information. Absent such consultation, Attorney cannot accept or continue the representation.

VI. CONCLUSION

A California lawyer must either have the technical competence to understand a client's digital data storage and transmission technology, or professionally consult with another lawyer who has the requisite technological competence, in order to represent a client in litigation when that client regularly transmits and stores information digitally.

Revised October 2018

ISSUES: To what extent may lawyers use technology assisted review to identify documents to be produced in response to demands for production requiring analysis of voluminous documents?

DIGEST: Whereas lawyers may use technology assisted review products to identify responsive documents for productions, they should communicate with their clients about such use, must take care to understand the products they use, and may not cede their independent judgment.

AUTHORITY INTERPRETED:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Lawyer is litigating a matter involving a decade's worth of documents regarding a complex series of investments that Client engaged in and the financial and business performance of each of the entities invested in. As a result of the complexity of this matter, Client has over 10 million documents that relate to the negotiations and performance of these several investments. Adverse Party serves document demands that require a fairly narrow identification of particular categories of documents. Lawyer estimates that, due to the volume of potentially responsive documents, it would take even extremely efficient document reviewers over 100,000 hours to review the documents. Because that would be cost prohibitive and because Lawyer believes that Lawyer would not be able to adequately supervise the work of the several hundred contract lawyers that would be necessary to review all of the documents in a timely manner, Lawyer elects instead to use technology assisted review ("TAR") to identify responsive documents.

This, in fact, is a TAR 2.0 system with continuous active learning. Lawyer has used the particular technology before. After Lawyer provides the recommended amount of seed sets appropriately identifying documents as responsive or not responsive, the software uses the information to analyze the remaining documents. Lawyer next conducts a random review of the documents identified, provides some additional seed set samples to eliminate some documents erroneously identified as being responsive, and runs the results again. Lawyer then produces the several hundred thousand documents identified as being responsive.

Opposing Counsel identifies approximately 5,000 documents that are not responsive, accuses Lawyer of engaging in a document dump, and brings a motion for sanctions for discovery abuse. When Lawyer communicates the sanctions motion to Client and the basis thereof, Client becomes upset that Lawyer did not tell Client that Lawyer was relying on artificial intelligence and that Lawyer did not personally review every document being produced. Upon review of the production, Client then identifies two dozen documents that Client considers to be proprietary and claims should have been excluded.

DISCUSSION

Lawyers' use of TAR does not in and of itself violate ethical obligations. But, as with any services that lawyers provide, it must be performed competently. Indeed, this is also a practical necessity since lawyers must be prepared to defend the use of TAR as they would any other discovery search methodology. An ethical use of any litigation tool requires communication with the client,

competence in using the tool, protection of confidential information, and non-interference with the lawyer's independent judgment.

Communication

As a preliminary factor, lawyers have an obligation to discuss significant developments in their representation of clients. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 provides that a lawyer's duty to communicate includes reasonably consulting with the client about the means to accomplish the representation's objectives. (Rule of Prof. Conduct 1.4(a)(2).)

Such communication should include a discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular means or tool. For example, in the case of TAR, advantages could potentially include greater reliability, especially where there is also disclosure to an adversarial party in advance so that it will be more difficult to effectively challenge the results if it is aware of the method in advance and does not object or otherwise request modification. Disadvantages could potentially include new controversies over the use of TAR, including the results generated. Even if an agreement can be reached, some of the financial benefits of the technological efficiency may be lost in battles with other counsel regarding the terms for searching, reviewing, and producing documents.

Competence

We have previously addressed the duty of competence in the use of technology in SDCBA Legal Ethics Opinion 2012-1; other bar associations have recently done so as well. (See, e.g., LACBA Opn. No. 529; ABA Formal Opn. 477.) But some of these concepts bear repeating.

As a reminder, the duty of competence means to have the diligence, learning and skill, and mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such service. (Rules of Prof. Cond., rule 1.1) If lawyers do not have sufficient learning and skill, then they may either associate in another lawyer who does or acquire the requisite learning and skill. (*Ibid.*) To the extent that lawyers supervise others, a necessary corollary to the duty of competence includes the duty to supervise (see Rules of Prof. Cond., rule 5.1), including not only subordinates within the lawyer's firm but also non-lawyers both inside and outside the firm (Rules of Prof. Cond., rule 5.3). Accordingly, lawyers must be responsible not only for their own competence, but that of all who assist with the provision of legal services to their clients.

What the standard for competency is will continue to evolve, is often fact-specific, and is outside the scope of this opinion. But within the context of using a TAR, lawyers may wish to consider a number of factors. These may include considering whether there are other reasonable methods either to narrow the subset of or to identify potentially responsive documents, considering whether the seed set of documents is representative of the universe to be searched, and monitoring and sampling of results to determine whether the algorithms employed are either over- or under-identifying responsive documents.

Confidentiality

Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e), provides that lawyers must "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets" of their clients. Confidentiality concerns in the context of technology use are discussed in State Bar of California Formal Opinion 2012-184.

First, lawyers should understand who else may have access to the information. Third-party access may trigger the obligation to protect confidentiality, such as through the use of a non-disclosure agreement or similar tool. This includes not just those involved in the review of client documents, but also those that may have access by virtue of the platform used. Lawyers should familiarize themselves sufficiently with the technology to determine whether there is a risk of unauthorized access. What level of security is appropriate will be based on what is reasonable under the circumstances.[1]

Notwithstanding this, lawyers should consider whether addressing not only the use of TAR, but the terms being used, with opposing counsel is necessary under the circumstances to avoid a later challenge that would require disclosure of meaningful information for a material response. A natural question could arise about what documents were used as seed samples for non-responsive documents. That is because in addition to wanting to make sure that enough information was submitted for inclusion of documents within the TAR to identify what is responsive, there may also be a question whether what was excluded was too broad. The problem with responding to that element is straightforward. Disclosing non-responsive documents may violate the lawyer's duty of confidentiality since non-responsive information would not be discoverable to begin with and could otherwise contain trade secrets, sensitive financial data, or other proprietary or personal information that, if disclosed, would be harmful or embarrassing to the client.

A related risk is that, absent appropriate screening measures, attorney-client privileged or other protected information could be inadvertently shared with opposing counsel. And while clawback provisions may address inadvertent waiver, they cannot remove disclosed confidential information from the mind of opposing counsel.

Independent Judgment

Often, one of the primary benefits that a lawyer brings to a representation is the judgment that has been developed as a legal professional. This concept is a corollary to the duty of competence and is protected in other contexts. (See, e.g., Rules of Prof. Cond., rule 5.2.) Accordingly, lawyers must take care not to cede the entirety of the decision-making process for identification of responsive documents to any automated procedure. That does not mean, however, that they cannot rely on somebody or something, such as TAR, to assist them. But lawyers should act consistently with the concept that responding parties and their lawyers are in the best position to determine how to search for, review, and produce responsive documents. (See, e.g., *Hyles v. New York City* (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100390; *Dynamo Holdings L.P. v. Comm'r* (2014) 143 T.C. 183 [both concluding that courts are "not normally in the business of dictating to parties the process that they should use when responding to discovery"].)

This opinion is issued by the San Diego County Bar Association. It is advisory only, and is not binding upon the courts, the State Bar of California, any persons or tribunals charged with regulatory responsibilities, or any member of the State Bar.

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[1] This concept is supported by a number of ethics opinions addressing the need to take competent and reasonable steps in protecting confidential data. (See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona Opn. Nos. 05-04 and 09-04; New Jersey Comm. on Prof. Ethics Opn. 701; Nevada Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Resp. Formal Opn. 33; and Virginia Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics Opn. 1818.)